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ABSTRACT

Privacy Audits and the Certified
Public Accountant

September 1978

Ulric Joseph Gelinas, Jr., A.B., St. Michael's College
M.B.A., University of Massachusetts
Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by:

Joseph L.

Sardinas,

Jr.

Protecting the privacy of individuals about whom per¬
sonal information is maintained on computerized record¬
keeping systems has become a subject of great concern to a
majority of people in the United States.

There are no easy

solutions to the problem of protecting privacy given the in¬
ternational implications of such solutions,

the effect that

computer technology can have on the success of any solution,
and the adversary nature of the individual-record-keeper
relationship.

This research recommends that an audit of the

privacy safeguards implemented by a record-keeping organiza¬
tion be conducted by the Certified Public Accountant.

This

research also suggests a methodology for such an audit.
In July of 1977 The Privacy Protection Study Commis¬
sion issued its report.
Society.

Personal Privacy in an Information

This report suggested the record-keeping practices

which are necessary to protect the privacy of individuals in
the United States.

The Commission also suggested an imple¬

mentation plan which calls

for a combination of:

either

Vll

voluntary adoption of,
privacy practices;

or mandatory compliance with,

the

a permanent privacy commission to monitor

the activities of record-keeping organizations and to serve
as the nation's advocate on matters of privacy;

and,

the use

of the courts as a last resort to obtain civil or criminal
remedies

for violations of privacy rights.

This plan is

found to be incomplete because it does not recognize:

the

impact that technology might have on the adoption of and
compliance with privacy practices;
tional data accords;

and,

the drive

for interna¬

the needs of the public to receive

verified reports of the privacy practices of record-keeping
organizations.
tation plan,

The results of an analysis of this

conducted in this research,

implemen¬

is a recommendation

that a privacy audit conducted by a Certified Public Account¬
ant

(CPA)

be an additional component of the Commission's

plan.
Support for this recommended audit is developed in
three ways.

First,

the model

is

shown to be consistent

with privacy implementation goals.

These goals were taken

from the Commission report and from assumptions made con¬
cerning international trans-border data
technology,
cond,

computer

and the information needs of the public.

Se¬

the audit by the CPA is supported by authoritative ac¬

counting and auditing literature.
ter,

flow,

Third,

as a practical mat¬

the privacy audit is not unlike the present review of

internal control conducted by the CPA.

Although the purpose

viii

of the review of controls
vacy audits,

is different for financial and pri¬

the tools and techniques used by the auditor

are similar.
Having recommended and supported the audit of privacy
safeguards by the CPA,
the audit.

this research suggests a model for

Guidance in developing this model was obtained

from the authoritative accounting and auditing literature.
The first step in the model development is the selec¬
tion of a hierarchy of privacy objectives,
practices.

This hierarchy,

which is

standards,

similar in structure

to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles,
Generally Accepted Privacy Principles

and

(GAPP).

is termed
The standards

portion of GAPP is used to suggest privacy implementation
techniques as a guide to record-keeping organizations and is
also used as a guide to the auditors.

These standards are a

very useful abstraction of the many privacy practices.
The second step in the audit model development is the
specification of privacy audit standards.
cepted Auditing Standards
The

form the basis

The generally Ac¬
for these standards.

standards require that the organization devise a pri¬

vacy program and report annually on that program.
conducted is an audit of that report.

The audit

The auditor is to de¬

termine the accuracy of management's representation and the
effectiveness of the privacy program.
The

final step in the model development is a descrip¬

tion of the implications of existing auditing tools

and

IX

techniques when employed in a privacy audit.
for conducting the audit with these tools is
The privacy implementation plan is
able

A methodology
suggested.

found to be a vi¬

solution to the problems of privacy implementation

which were identified.

The audit by the CPA is supported by

authoritative literature,
performed by the CPA,
model itself.

by being a function which can be

and by the logical consistency of the

This model selves both the public and record¬

keeping organizations.

By allowing the organization to set

its own privacy policy,

recognition is given to the voluntary

components of the privacy practices.

The organization is

therefore able to devise a privacy policy which is
and also tailored to their situation.

legal

Being provided with

verified information concerning the privacy practices of
record-keeping organizations permits the public to use mar¬
ketplace pressures to force a compliance norm among record¬
keeping organizations.

This information is the most impor¬

tant component of any privacy implementation plan as it pro¬
vides a basis

for consumer choice and also provides a pre¬

emptive compliance monitoring device.
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CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION

This research proposes a model for protecting indivi¬
duals'

right to privacy which,

if adopted as policy,

would

have a significant impact on the accounting profession,
ticularly the Certified Public Accountant
discussions,
mics,

(CPA).

Privacy

which can encompass the fields of law,

sociology and information systems,

mally and informally locally,

par¬

econo¬

are being held for¬

nationally and internationally.

Many persons and organizations are examining the problems of
protecting privacy in today's world of computers and tele¬
communications.

Solutions to these problems are complicated

by the computer and telecommunications technology and are
further complicated by an almost universal dependence on in¬
formation and also by an international

interdependence which

exists in many aspects of life.
Privacy is very important to all concerned because
great financial and psychological harm can be done to an in¬
dividual whose right to privacy has been violated.

Nations

are greatly concerned with this issue as they try to protect
the right of their citizens to privacy.

At the same time

they are trying not to create data havens.

Data havens exist

in countries where privacy laws do not exist.

These havens

have the potential to dominate the international flow of data.
1

2

Solutions to the privacy problem must balance the fol¬
lowing:

first,

an individual's right to privacy;

second,

business and government rights to maintain information with
which to conduct their operations;
to maintain autonomy;

and fourth,

volved in international trade.

third,

a nation's desire

a nation's desire to be in¬

This research suggests solu¬

tions to the problem which directly involve the CPA.
chapter outlines the issue of individual privacy,
overview of the research project,
methodology,

This

presents an

including the scope and

and also discusses the significance of the pri¬

vacy problem and the solutions to the problem as a justifica¬
tion for this project.

The Privacy Problem

An individual's independent right to privacy has not
always existed.

It is not specifically mentioned in the Con¬

stitution or the Bill of Rights.

Certain privacy rights were

originally derived from such common law rights as nuisance,
trespass,

protection of business confidences,

the relevance and necessity measures
of evidence.
privacy was

As a legal concept,

trademarks and

for the admissability

an independent right to

first prominently discussed in 1879 by Judge

Thomas Cooley who said that privacy was a right
along."'*'

"to be let

In 1890 Warren and Brandeis published an article

"The Right of Privacywhich became a classic and the basis
for a discussion of privacy which goes on to this day.

3
Various court decisions since the Warren and Brandeis
article have defined privacy as a right which can be derived
from various parts of the Constitution and the Bill of
Rights,
as

specifically amendments

free speech,

1,

4,

expression and belief,

and free conscience,

5 and 9.
religious

Such rights
freedom

protection against search without proper

warrant and for unreasonable demands,

protection from force

to incriminate oneself and protection from cruel and unusual
punishment,

which have been part of the American civil-

liberties tradition throughout our history,
to develop this

have been used

individual right to privacy.

Although privacy has been defined as a constitutional
right by various court decisions,

these rights had not been

clearly enough defined given modern technology,
computer technology.
ing,

especially

This gave rise to privacy laws start¬

in the records-keeping area,

with The Fair Credit Re¬

porting Act of 1970.
Westin^ has described privacy as performing four func¬
tions

for individuals

personal autonomy,

in democratic societies.

emotional release,

limited and protected communications.
privacy as essential to physical,
moral well-being.^

These are

self-evaluation and
Others have described

psychological,

social and

A person is continually engaged in making

decisions on a trade-off between the desire for privacy and
the desire to communicate with and disclose
others.

information to

4

Privacy has
cited and

been defined

in various

in the

other places.

The

for privacy and other related terms,
those

adopted

for this

literature already
following definitions

taken

from Hoffman,

are

research:

1.

Security.
Data security is the protection of data
against accidental or intentional destruction, disclosure
or modification.
Computer security refers to the techno¬
logical safeguards and managerial procedures which can be
applied to computer hardware, programs and data to assure
that organizational assets and individual privacy are
protected

2.

Privacy.
Privacy is a concept which applies to an indi¬
vidual.
It is the right of an individual to decide what
information s(he) wishes to share with others and also
what information s(he) is willing to accept from others

3.

Confidentiality.
Confidentiality is a concept which ap¬
plies to data.
It is the status accorded to data which
has been agreed upon between the person or organization
furnishing the data and the organization receiving it and
which describes the degree of protection to be provided

4. Integrity.
Data integrity exists when data does not dif¬
fer from its source documents and has not been accident¬
ally or maliciously altered, disclosed, or destroyed.5
Security
fidentiality,

is

the means

and data

used to provide

integrity.

for privacy,

It should be noted that

many discussions of privacy are really talking about
items.
tween
he

There

is

also

some confusion as

secrecy and privacy.

con¬

Fried notes

all

four

to the difference be¬
the difference when

states:
. . . privacy seems to be related to secrecy, to limiting
the knowledge of others about oneself. ... It is not
true, for instance, that the less that is known about us
the more privacy we have.
Privacy is not simply an ab¬
sence of information about us in the minds of others; ra¬
ther it is the control we have over information about
ourselves.6

The idea of privacy as a process of choice by an indi¬
vidual or of control by the individual has been incorporated
into the various privacy laws.

Legislated privacy as it ap¬

plies to record-keeping may include the following rights:
to decide what personal information should be put into re¬
cords;

to decide with whom this

how this

should be used;

should be shared;

to decide

to be assured that the data is main¬

tained with confidentiality and integrity;

and to know about

and contest data used to make judgments affecting rights and
opportunities.

Westin and Baker

gards to record-keeping,

7

have noted that,

with re¬

that a person's right to privacy is

closely connected to a person's right to due process of law.
It is the force of these two rights which has been the source
of the drive

for the current privacy legislation.

Internal Controls

for Privacy Protection

Providing for privacy safeguards is essentially a pro¬
cess of implementing internal control.

Internal control

seeks to ensure that the organizational elements,

which are

bound together by various management and operational relation
ships,

are in accordance with management policies.

controls

include the following elements:

These

management policies

organization and assignment of tasks and responsibilities
within the organizational structure;

business plans and pro¬

jections used by management to guide the organization and
evaluate achievement;

operating policies and procedures;

6

manual transaction processing procedures;

record-keeping,

both computer-based information and record-keeping and those
independent of data processing;

and a feedback mechanism with

which to monitor compliance with the controls.
There are various manual and automated control techniques
available to record-keeping organizations which can be used
in a privacy protection program.
controls,

There are administrative

physical security methods,

and security and accur¬

acy controls built into the computer system which can be used
O

to enact a privacy protection program.

Martin0 describes

these controls as layers of protection with computer system
controls overlaid with physical security which is then all
overlaid with administrative controls.

All of the levels of

control are interdependent.
There are various computer control techniques available
to record-keeping concerns to assist them in complying with
the requirements of the various privacy laws.

For example,

to assist in maintaining accuracy there are methods to check
for errors as data are converted to machine-readable form,
input to the computer,

stored on a computer and finally as

data are accessed for use.

The use of telecommunications and

remote terminals as well as internal data accessing methods
allow the record-keeper to easily report record contents to
the individual upon request.
tion,

authorization,

There are various authentica¬

and logging methods to control access

7

and use of information and to provide a record of the uses
to which the information has been put.

Auditing and Internal Control Systems

Once an internal control system is installed,

its effec¬

tiveness is verified for management by an audit function.
may also be desirable to provide this

It

audit by an independent

function for those outside the organization who might be in¬
terested.

The desirability of auditing internal controls in¬

stalled for privacy has been proposed by various authors.
For example,

Lobel has

stated:

A privacy protection program . . . should also have a de¬
tailed system security plan designed to:
... provide
for the adequate testing and auditing of data accuracy
and system operation to make certain that once imple¬
mented, controls are not circumvented.9
Within an organization it is the responsibility of the inter¬
nal auditor to verify the effectiveness of internal control
systems.

This verification should include controls installed

for the purpose of protecting privacy.
Chapter

III discusses the desirability of conducting

an independent audit of privacy safeguards.

It is also sug¬

gested that a logical candidate for such a task is the CPA.
Suggesting that such an audit is desirable does not,

however,

necessarily mean that this audit task is acceptable to the
accounting profession nor that there is support for it in the
authoritative accounting and auditing literature.

8

A working panel on auditing of data base management
tems

(DBMS),

American

which was

chaired by Donald L.

Adams

by the

of the

Institute of Certified Public Accountants

reported a mixed reaction to an audit of privacy
CPA.

sys¬

(AICPA),

safeguards

For example:

The dual growth of DBMS and public concern for individual
privacy will create a flood of legislation.
Someone will
be given the job of determining whether or not specific
data base applications comply with privacy regulations.
Although they are not eager to accept this task, it seems
likely that an auditor will be called on the conduct of
such compliance reviews.10
Also,

in response

role be

in evaluating the

legislation on
the

panel which

volved.

to the question,

"What should the

auditor's

impact of privacy considerations

the design of

DBMS?",

there were

replies

suggested that the auditor would become

or

from
in¬

For example,

The auditor should be knowledgeable about what reason¬
able privacy considerations are possible.
He should un¬
derstand what privacy features management policy is di¬
recting to be implemented.
Most important, he MUST know
what features are actually being used and whether they
are effective. . . .
The external auditor will probably be the party respon¬
sible to management for insuring privacy legislation is
enforced within the systems of an organization.
The external auditor is responsible to parties external
to the organization.
The loss of assets which could re¬
sult from a legal suit over privacy may cause external
parties to look to the external auditor for attestation
as to the enforcement of privacy legislation within the
organization.
Interested parties such as government, so¬
cially conscious groups, stockholders, etc., and the or¬
ganizations themselves may look to the external auditor
as an independent party who can attest to the enforcement
of privacy legislation, because the integrity of data has
continually been the essence of auditing.

9

There were those panel members who did not foresee involvement
by the auditor.

For example,

No involvement.
That is a legal not audit problem.
It
is up to Systems and Programming to insure legal involve¬
ment.
Audit should only bring both parties together. . .
Independent auditors should not be used to assist in mo¬
nitoring compliance with the myriad of federal, state and
local law which governs our society.
Although it is
reasonable for independent auditors to particiate in some
compliance, that participation should be limited to situa¬
tions which have a direct bearing on financial position
or results of operations.
Because it is not possible for
auditors to be conversant in all areas of prevailing le¬
gislation concerning privacy, this area should not have
the involvement of independent auditors.H
This researcher recognizes that there are those in the ac¬
counting profession who do not deem it desirable for an au¬
ditor to undertake the task of a privacy audit.

Arguments

are presented to persuade those not inclined to undertake
such a task.
A review of the authoritative literature which has at¬
tempted to define theories of auditing and accounting reveals
that there is
guards.

some support for a CPA audit of privacy safe¬

Two aspects are addressed in this review of the li¬

terature.

First,

is there authoritative support for a privacy

audit as an engagement separate
cond,

from the

financial audit?

Se¬

is there support for a privacy audit as part of the fi¬

nancial audit?
Clearly,
engagement.
ance review.

there is

support for the audit as a separate

This would normally be referred to as a compli¬
The U.

S.

General Accounting Office

(GAO),

for

10

example,

established standards to be used by auditors

conducting audits of government activities.^

in

The scope of

these standards is wide enough to include a privacy audit as
a separate engagement.

The AICPA concurred with these stan¬

dards and suggested that auditors undertake such engagements.

13

Support for a review of privacy safeguards as a part of
a financial audit does exist but it is not as clear and cer¬
tainly not as strong.

The authoritative literature is briefly

reviewed here to outline the relationship between the audit
function and the review and evaluation of internal control.
Mautz and Sharaf limited the scope of the CPA audit
when they state:
Auditing is concerned with the faithfulness with which
reported financial data portray the realities of an en¬
terprise's operations and financial condition.
Although they do advocate a review of the internal control
system as one of their postulates of auditing,

they restrict

this review by limiting auditing to the financial condition
of the company.
The Committee to Prepare a Statement of Basic Account¬
ing Theory defined accounting as:
. . . the process of identifying, measuring, and commu¬
nicating economic information to permit informed judg¬
ments and decisions by users of the information.
In 1973 the Committee on Basic Auditing Concepts used the
scope of accounting defined by the Accounting Theory Committee
when it defined auditing as:

11

. . . a systematic process of objectively obtaining and
evaluating evidence regarding assertions about economic
actions and events to ascertain the degree of corres¬
pondence between those assertions and established cri¬
teria and communicating the results to interested
users.
The actual relationship of the CPA and the evaluation
of internal controls as it exists today is defined in the se¬
cond Standard of Field Work of the Generally Accepted Audit¬
ing Standards which states:
There is to be a proper study and evaluation of the ex¬
isting internal control as a basis for reliance thereon
and for the determination of the resultant extent of the
tests to which auditing procedures are to be restricted. 17
Statement on Auditing Standards No.

1

(SAS 1)

goes on to dis¬

tinguish between accounting and administrative control.
Administrative control includes, but is not limited to,
the plan of organization and the procedures and records
that are concerned with the decision process leading to
management's authorization of transactions. . . . Ac¬
counting control comprises the plan of organization and
the procedures and records that are concerned with the
safeguarding of assets and the reliability of financial
records. . . .
Later in SAS 1 it is stated:
. . . accounting control is within the scope of the study
and evaluation of internal control contemplated by gen¬
erally accepted auditing standards, while administrative
control is not.^°
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(AICPA)

recently issued SAS 20—Required Communication of Ma-

terial Weaknesses of Internal Accounting Control.

19

This

standard requires that auditors communicate to senior manage¬
ment and the board of directors or its audit committee ma¬
terial weaknesses

in internal accounting control.

It is not

12

required that this communication be made to the public and it
is only incidental to the auditor's review of accounting con¬
trol performed while making an examination of financial state¬
ments .
A major development on the subjeer of the relationship
between the CPA and the verification of internal controls
came in 1978 when the Commission on Auditors'
ties

(Cohen Commission)

Responsibili¬

recommended an extension of the au¬

ditors'

responsibilities in the evaluation of internal con¬

trols.

This extension would require the auditor to expand

the study and evaluation of the controls over the accounting
system to form a conclusion on the functioning of the system
during the year.

20

This recommendation takes the auditor

further away from evaluating controls as a basis for their
use in determining fairness of statements and closer to the
analysis of controls regardless of the purpose for which they
were established.

A more detailed review of this authorita¬

tive literature is undertaken in chapter III.

The conclusion

is reached there that there is authoritative support for the
privacy audit both as a separate engagement and as a part of
the financial audit.

Scope of the Research Projecu

When discussing privacy, people are at various times
talking about electronic surveillance such as wire-tapping.

13

psychological surveillance such as personality testing, mail
opening, and record-keeping.

This research deals with an in¬

dividual's right to privacy as it relates to individually
identifiable personal information maintained,

primarily in a

computerized form, by record-keeping organizations.
quirements of the law,

The re¬

the safeguards which implement those

requirements and the monitoring and enforcement of compliance
are the subjects of interest.

This research concentrates on

computerized systems because the majority of personal records
are stored in computerized form.
example,

The federal government,

for

reports that 74% of all personal records maintained

by federal record-keeping agencies are in a partially or totally computerized form.
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Legislation in the area of privacy is still evolving.
As of mid-1978 there are several bills before the Congress
which are currently pending action.

Therefore,

this research

suggests a set of privacy standards and objectives, which do
not vary with these laws,

rather than attempting to deal with

the detailed provisions of this legislation and laws already
enacted.

A few of the privacy safeguard implementation pro¬

cedures contained in this legislation will, however,
sented as examples.
mandatory,
industries.

be pre¬

Some of the implementation procedures are

some are optional,

and most procedures vary between

It is also expected that these procedures will

vary over time as the environment changes.

It would serve no
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purpose to present detailed procedures which lack consistency
and permanence.
This research will concentrate on federal privacy re¬
quirements only.

Just as it serves no purpose to present all

of the federal implementation procedures,

it serves no pur¬

pose to present the many state privacy laws.

Also,

Federal

privacy legislation precludes the states from enacting laws
which are inconsistent with or less stringent than federal
law.

A report to the President on a national information

policy concluded that national privacy legislation was more
desirable than state laws because it avoided conflicting re¬
quirements in different jurisdictions.

This inconsistency

could significantly increase costs and impede interstate data
flow.
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Although this research will discuss only federal

privacy procedures,

any implementation of privacy safeguards

should recognize that in certain jurisdictions there are
privacy requirements which may be more restrictive than the
federal requirements.

Research Methodology

There has been considerable discussion in the account¬
ing literature as to what constitutes appropriate methodology
for research in accounting.

There have been criticisms of

a priori research as well as some of the global normative
theories of accounting.

Some of the criticisms are directed

as the opinion-based nature of some of the theories and on
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untested or untestable nature of the conclusions.

Sterling,

however, has concluded that:
Since the research methods depend upon the questions and
since I am unwilling to place restrictions on questions,
it follows that I am unwilling to place restrictions on
methods. ... To avoid this danger, I am unwilling to
exclude any research method, and therefore, I must in¬
clude all research methods. 4
Since this project is a prescription of what ought to
be done as a solution to the privacy problem and how it
ought to be done,
counting.

Ijiri

it is essentially a normative theory of acdescribes the two steps involved in con¬

structing a normative theory as goal assumption and deduc¬
tion.

Ijiri states:

Since a normative model is goal oriented, the assumed
goals must be clearly stated. . . . One must state the
goals to be served by changing the existing accounting
practices toward the normative direction.
Then one must
develop a model, deducing from the goals some of the
properties that the model must have. ... A defense
for a normative model is made by demonstrating that cer¬
tain benefits are derived if the reality is changed to
fit the specifications of the model, where benefits are
defined in relation to the assumed goals.
A defense for
a normative model may be made by logically showing the
superiority of the state that can be created by using the
model, . . . Since goals are concerned with improving
reality, it must be feasible to apply a model in an em¬
pirical situation.
Thus, the feasibility of a normative
model becomes a vital part of its defense.26
This model will assume goals and logically derive
practices from the goals.

It will be demonstrated that the

conclusions are logically derived from the goals.

The feasi¬

bility of these conclusions will be established.
Within this overall normative framework this research
will resort to other approaches to theory development.

Choice
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of goals will be guided by sociological and ethical consider¬
ations.

The auditing practices which will be suggested will

be pragmatic in nature, derived by a process of induction
from the realities of the computerized record-keeping envi¬
ronment and tested by their consistency with this reality
and the standards which they are intended to satisfy.
driksen

Hen-

describes these approaches to accounting theory

and advocates the combining of the various approaches in an
eclectic approach to accounting theory development.

He

states:
. . . practically all fully developed theories of ac¬
counting rely upon more than one basic approach to
theory.
Those that attempt to rely upon a single goal
or approach are generally incomplete as a logical basis
for the formulation of accounting procedures or their
evaluation.2°
This research must use an eclectic approach because there are
several steps to the development of the privacy and auditing
model which require different research methods.

The re¬

search methodology to be employed at each stage of develop¬
ment of this model,

a justification for each method,

and the •*

methods of demonstrating the consistency and feasibility of
the conclusions are discussed in chapter II.

Organization of the Dissertation

The nature of this research project precludes conform¬
ing to what some would consider the norms of dissertation
organization.

There is no chapter dedicated to a review of
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the literature since that will be done in each chapter as
each aspect of the model is developed.

Also,

there is no

chapter dedicated to results of the research project.

At

each step in the development process the logical consistency
and feasibility of the arguments is discussed.
Chapter II is a detailed discussion of the steps

in

the model development and the research methodology for each
step.

Chapter III presents the normative model

tection of individual privacy.

for the pro¬

The practical justification

and the philosophical implications are presented.
IV deduces a set of privacy safeguards

Chapter

from a set of privacy

objectives which are consistent with the goals of the pri¬
vacy model.

The privacy safeguard requirements or procedures

are outlined and shown to be consistent with the standards.
Chapter V suggests

some of the ways that privacy safeguards

can be implemented in an organization.

It will not be pre¬

sented in such a way that it becomes a definitive model for
implementation but to provide a framework for the audit mo¬
del.

Chapter VI presents a model for conducting the audit

including the auditing standards to be used.

Concluding re¬

marks are presented in chapter VII.

Significance of the Research

The topic of the research is
vacy is

significant because pri¬

important to individuals and to society as a whole.

The results of the project,

the privacy and audit models.
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are significant because of the potential contribution that
they can make to society in solving the privacy problem.
The importance of privacy and the contributions that compli¬
ance audits would make to the monitoring of the use of tech¬
nology and to an international agreement on privacy are pre¬
sented below.

Importance of Privacy
At the beginning of this chapter the development of
privacy as a constitutional right was outlined.
said,

however,

individual.

Little was

about how important that right can be to an

As noted earlier,

in 1973 a committee commis¬

sioned by the Secretary of the U.

S.

Department of Health,

Education and Welfare reported:
There is widespread belief that personal privacy is es¬
sential to our well-being—physically, psychologically,
socially, and morally.
Concern about the effects of com¬
puterized personal data systems centers on their threat
to privacy.29
People have expressed concern over violations of their rights
to privacy.

Westin and Baker^

report on a series of opinion

studies conducted between 1970 and 1973.
they reach is

that there

"

A conclusion that

is a solid minority sentiment that
O 1

people

feel their privacy is being eroded in some respect."0

In the studies reported,

up to 84%

of the people surveyed ex¬

pressed some concern about and strong interest in their right
to privacy.

Over a third of those polled in another survey

thought that computers represented a real threat to people's
privacy.

A 1977-1978 Louis

Harris poll,

reported on in
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Computerworld,

32

shows that 54% of people now think that com¬

puter data banks pose a threat to personal privacy compared
to 38%

in 1973-1974.

This poll also showed that 71% of the

public thought that they surrendered their privacy by opening
their first charge account,

taking out a loan,

buying some¬

thing on the installment plan or applying for credit.
is

up from 48%

in 1973-1974.

In a 1977 study of five major U.
conducted by Purdue University's
search Center,

This

S.

corporations,
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Information Privacy Re¬

up to 92% of the employees questioned ex¬

pressed a desire to be consulted concerning the use of their
personnel records.
ever,

Less than half of those questioned,

felt that they had any control over the use,

or accuracy of their personnel records.
can be reached from these studies is

how¬

content,

A conclusion which

that people's privacy

is important to them and they are concerned about an erosion
of their rights to privacy.
Privacy was deemed important by the people surveyed
and should be important to most people because of what can
happen as a result of having a right of privacy violated.
In the context of record-keeping,

violation of privacy can

cause both financial and psychological harm.

Misuse of per¬

sonal information can have a much greater impact on a person
than actual direct financial losses brought about by pene¬
trating a data bank's security for purposes of committing
fraud.

Erroneous or improper use of information stored

20

about an individual can certainly cause direct financial loss
when a person is denied a job,
preferred rate.

credit,

insurance policy,

or a

But such abuses can also cause psychological

harm as when a person is

improperly accused of a crime,

de¬

nied custody of a child or other harms which can be caused as
a result of the financial losses.
directly measurable,

These losses,

although not

can cause greater damage than financial

losses.
As

stated earlier,

individuals are continually making

decisions about the amount of privacy desired and the degree
to which they want to communicate with others.

People try

to balance the information needs of organizations and the
need for privacy.

However,

people have been gradually losing

the ability to control this balance.

Governments and private

organizations have always maintained records on individuals
with which to administer programs and compete in the business
world.

For a time there was

would be misused,

little concern that the data

be inaccurate,

or not kept confidential be¬

cause there was usually a first-hand contact between the per¬
son and the record-keeper.

This contact would permit the

establishment of expectations of confidentiality,

accuracy,

and use which if not met would allow the person to terminate
the relationship or take action to see what expectations
were met.
Several things have happened which have changed this
situation and which prevent individuals

from knowing about
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or controlling the use,

accuracy or disclosure of records

maintained about them.

As society changed,

contact with re-

cordkeepers was no longer a normal situation.
ments became bigger,
the same time,

more complex,

Local govern¬

and less accessible.

At

the federal government took on a major role

in recordkeeping to administer various tax,
and social programs.

Also,

law enforcement,

as society became more mobile

and personal contact between business and customers became
rare,

there grew a need to have a method to check people's

credit.

This gave rise to credit bureaus and investigative

agencies.

All of these changes gave rise to massive files,

many containing personal or sensitive information,

which were

not under the control of the person about whom the information
was maintained.
It was at this point that government stepped in,

in

the form of study commissions and then legislation to pro¬
tect the privacy rights of citizens.
that this

It is

in this context

research suggests compliance monitoring of privacy

safeguards.

Technology
The potential for the abuse of the contents of personal
files

is

terized.

significantly increased when these

files are compu¬

With the extensive use of computerized data banks,

teleprocessing,

and terminals,

ter to very quickly access,
data from its

files,

and the ability of the compu¬

manipulate,

correlate,

and report

the protection of the rights of citizens
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to privacy became an important issue.

Files containing in¬

formation of a personal nature have always existed.

As

people have lost the ability to control these files and as
abuse of them has become very easy with computerization,

the

need to assist individuals in protecting their privacy has
become necessary.
There is reason to believe that future techological
advancements will cause the problem of privacy to become more
acute.

This conclusion is based on two independent yet com¬

plementary outgrowths of recent technological advances.
First,

today computer technology makes information gathering

and storage in anticipation of needs more attractive than
ever before.

These same advances make accessing of compu¬

terized files easier.

Second,

this techology also makes

compliance monitoring of computer systems more difficult.
At the same time,

however,

modern technology does at times

facilitate implementation of system controls.
Data-base management systems
be highly utilized in the future.
easier storage,

(DBMS),

for example,

will

These systems allow for

access and manipulation of computerized data.

The massive amounts of data that can be maintained by a DBMS
with the various access methods and storage structures make
auditing of DBMS files very difficult.
tems do have control
storage techniques.

However,

these sys¬

features not present in other file
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Computer networks,

distributed processing systems,

and

micro-processors are all advances which give access to data
files to more people

(some novices)

in such a way that secur¬

ity controls have become difficult to implement and monitor.
This dispersion of the use and control of computer files
becomes very critical when the files are of a sensitive na¬
ture .
Also,
it is

technology may have created a situation in which

financially desirable to permanently store data which

would not normally be saved or collected at all.
give rise to files,

This could

saved in anticipation of future needs,

which could be used just because they are available.

One

author feels organizations will collect extra data about employees

in anticipation of future government requirements.
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There are two aspects of computer technology which
make this a very real possibility.

First,

it is much easier

and cheaper to collect some data using direct sensing/
scanning devices than it is to go back and manually prepare
these data for computer input.

For example,

the cost of

preparing 1,000 characters of information for input is
if direct sensing is used and $.50
tape/disk/processor is used.
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$.01

if a key-to-paper/card/

...
If an organization waits

a need to arise before preparing data for computer input,
will be paying more than it would if
originally.

it had been captured

The organization also runs the risk that the

data will not be available when it goes back to get it.

for
it
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Much data is lost forever if not captured when the circum¬
stance which gave rise to the data occurs.
Second,
to decline,

the cost of mass storage devices will continue

making it cheaper to store data in anticipation

of future needs.

Withington,
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for example,

sees up to a

200% decrease in the cost of storage per bit of information
by 1985.

This means that organizations,

rather than running

the risk of needing data which may not be available in the
future,

will anticipate their needs and capture and store

data when originally available.
here.

One,

There are really two cases

if an organization is capturing certain data for

processing and then discarding it;

and two,

if they have the

opportunity to capture the data and are not doing so.

In

the first case the cost of converting 30,000,000 characters
to machine readable form,
characters

is

$15,000.

using the figure of $.50 per 1,000

That data can be thrown away after

processing and re-captured later for another $15,000 or
stored on one magnetic tape costing $20.
the organization,

In the second case

based on an evaluation of future needs,

choose to expend the

$15,020

may

as a protection against the risk

of never being able to get the data back.

Of course this

is

a simplified view since costs of storing and maintaining
tapes are not included and the ability of the organization
to estimate

future needs is assumed,

but it does

option which present technology does offer.

identify an
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An application of some new technology which offers the
ability to capture information previously not available and
which is lost as soon as a transaction has ended unless cap¬
tured is electronic

fund transfers

(EFT).

A recent article

expresses the concern that some have regarding the proli¬
feration of EFT systems and their threat to privacy:
What concerns consumers is that EFT, when used in lieu
of cash, creates records of transactions where no record
existed in the past.
That EFT makes retrieval of data
quicker and easier for both government agencies and for
indepth market research.^
A bill recently submitted in the U.

S.

Senate has removed

some of the restrictions on EFT systems and has paved the
"5 O

way for further expansion of their use.

The recently

published report of the National Commission on Electronic
Fund Transfers

found that privacy safeguards were not adequate

to deal with the threats to privacy that may arise with EFT.
The report did not,

however,

recommend any legislation for

protecting privacy.^
The question is,

given these technological changes,

can privacy be sufficiently protected with present and
planned legislation?

Two viewpoints were

found.

The pre¬

viously mentioned HEW study stated:
The natural evolution of existing law will not protect
personal privacy from the risks of computerized personal
data systems.^0
On the prospects of legislation being able to cope with the
problem Rothman and Mosmann state:
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The rate of change of technology is such that in another
forty years, computer power can have increased by a fac¬
tor of 1,000.
Technology, social attitudes, and econo¬
mic forces can change significantly in days, weeks,
months, and certainly in a year.
Our system changes po¬
litical office holders in periods of two, four, and six
years.
We create laws and commissions over periods of
twenty to forty years.
This disparity seems very great. 1
It seems clear that modern computer technology threatens
to erode a person's right to privacy.

It also seems that le¬

gal processes take too long to mature to keep up with the rate
of technological change.
privacy safeguards

A monitoring of compliance with

seems in order.

International Competition
In 1977 and 1978 there have been many reports
media expressing concern over the ability of some U.

in the
S.

firms

to compete internationally because of the disparity between
U.

S.

privacy safeguard requirements and those that exist in

other nations.
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The U.

S.

firms that would be affected

would be data base creators and suppliers,

specialized com¬

munication carriers and multinationals.
The

laws enacted in Sweden and Germany,

and proposed

by international bodies such as the Council of Europe,

the

European Economic Community and the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development vary quite a bit in their re¬
quirements making privacy agreements or treaties difficult.
Most however do have three points
a privacy board with licensing,
provisions.

in common.

They establish

regulation and enforcement

They usually have an omnibus type approach with
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privacy protection provisions being the same for all indus¬
tries.

Finally,

they all restrict the flow of information

to countries which do not meet the levels of privacy protec¬
tion required in the originating country.
The Privacy Protection Study Commission chose not to
suggest a government privacy board with powers over the pri¬
vate sector because they felt that in a democratic society
government intrusion into data flow must be kept to a mini¬
mum and that the first amendment sharply limits
ment intrusion anyway.

The Commission also felt that,

order to achieve fairness
individual,

in

for both the recordkeeper and the

a varying combination of rights

and responsibilities

such govern¬

for individuals

for organizations according to the par¬

ticular circumstances of each type of record-keeping rela¬
tionship should be designed.

Thus,

they suggest no omnibus

legislation.
There would seem,

then,

to be an impasse with other na¬

tions requiring procedures which in the United States are
unconstitutional or at least undesirable.
the American Journal of
tion,

An article in

International Law suggests a solu¬

an international agreement.^

This agreement would

have as one of its principles a minimum protection of rights
which would be binding on any company receiving data
another country.

from

This agreement would also require rules

verification of observance of the principles.

for

The indepen¬

dent audit of the privacy safeguards which were suggested by
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the Privacy Protection Study Commission or other minimum
standards agreed upon would meet the intent of the interna¬
tional agreement suggested by this article.

Summary

This chapter has presented the privacy problem and its
historical and legal development.

It was shown that imple¬

menting privacy safeguards is a process of implementing in¬
ternal controls, controls which are audited to verify their
effectiveness.

Verification of internal controls is carried

out by internal and independent auditors,

although the CPA

does not at this time verify privacy controls.

The scope of

this research project is limited to privacy as it relates to
the computerized record-keeping and only as to privacy re¬
quirements at the federal level.

The research methodology to

be employed was briefly introduced.
of the next chapter.

This will be the subject

The importance of this research was

discussed in the previous section.

Monitoring of privacy

safeguards by an independent agency will be a significant
assistance to individuals and to society as it wrestles with
the problems of the advancing capabilities of automated in¬
formation technology and the devising of an international
agreement on the protection of privacy.
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CHAPTER

I

I

METHODOLOGY

In the previous chapter it was mentioned that the model
to be

developed in this

tion of what ought to be
viduals

in the

exists

today.

to be,

it

mative

theory.

is

research project will be
done to protect

a prescrip¬

the privacy of

indi¬

computerized record-keeping environment that
When a model or theory prescribes what ought

a normative model.

Hendriksen describes

a nor¬

Normative theories attempt to prescribe what accounting
ought to do and how it ought to do it; that is, they at¬
tempt to explain what should be rather than what is.
Normative accounting theory may be used to evaluate cur¬
rent practice or it may be used to develop new proce¬
dures. . .
This model will

develop new procedures which ought

lowed to effectively
privacy.

These new procedures

practice of
countants,
then,

safeguard the

accounting,
both

internal

as

the previous

velopment of

and

and

must have

to meet

individuals
to the

fol¬
to

current

are prescribed

independent

auditors.

for
It

ac¬
is,

accounting.

chapter it was mentioned that

a normative theory

ing goals

changes

new roles

a normative theory of
In

are

right of

to be

is

a process

of

the

clearly

de¬
stat¬

logically deducing practices which the model
those

goals.
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It was

also

stated that

34

a defense of a normative model requires demonstration of the
logical consistency and the feasibility of the practices.

2

This chapter will present the methodology of the model and
outline the defenses that will be used at each stage of the
development process.

First,

however,

the appropriateness of

this research method in accounting and reasons for having an
eclectic approach within this normative development will be
discussed.

Normative Models in Accounting

It was

stated in the previous chapter that some author¬

ities have criticized the normative research which has oc-

3
curred in accounting.
research

Nelson,

for example,

"a priori research" which,

he says,

has called this
prescribes ac¬

counting practice by stating hypotheses without testing these
hypotheses.

He complains that the hypotheses have been too

broad in scope and the models developed too grand to be use¬
ful or testable.
problems,

He suggests that it is time to take smaller

to develop and test hypotheses and while doing

this possibly make use of some tools outside of accounting or
develop new ones.
Caplan has stated that deductive global theories
. . . have failed, in part at least, because they have
neglected a fundamental aspect of scientific reasoning—
they provide no evidence to support their logic except
the opinions of their authors.^
These criticisms,

which are based on a review of writings of
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Chambers,

Edwards and Bell,

and Ijiri,

seem to be represen¬

tative .
There have been several authoritative answers to these
criticisms.

As was noted in the previous chapter,

Sterling5

is not willing to limit the methodology used in accounting.
The methodology chosen depends on the problem to be solved or
the question to be answered.

A normative model is appro¬

priate to the privacy problem to be solved.
Wells has written about the role of such models in the
development of accounting theory.

He states:

. . . the works fulfill a critically important role;
they are both a natural reaction to the recognition of
anomalies and a vital step in the selection of a new
disciplinary matrix.^
Wells

is using terminology taken from Kuhn.

A disciplinary

matrix is composed of symbolic generalizations,
particular models,
problem solutions.

values,
7

in

and examples which are concrete

What this means

is recognized in a science,

beliefs

is that when an anomaly

theory which proposes a new dis¬

ciplinary matrix is appropriate as a means of overthrowing
outdated ideas and practices.

A revolution occurs.

Wells

argues that accounting satisfies all of Kuhn's requirements
to be considered a science and that the development of ac¬
counting theory should be judged in light of the revolution
which Kuhn outlines.
This research presents a situation in which the exist¬
ing roles of accounting and the practices of accountants do
not adequately meet the problems posed by the environment.
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Kuhn

presents this

specific situation as justification for

fundamental changes in existing institutional or conceptual
framework.

A priori or normative research in accounting pro¬

poses new elements

for the disciplinary matrix by proposing

new ways of looking at parts of the world to solve problems
that have been recognized.
mative research,

states,

Caplan,

"...

who had criticized nor¬

their function would be to
q

identify problems and possible solutions."
Some of the specific criticisms of this methodology
can be answered.

First,

hypotheses of models operating in

previously unplowed ground do not necessarily need to be
tested.

Kuhn points out that new ideas

discussion,
thought.

testing,

form the basis

for

and identification of new schools of

One of these

schools eventually dominates as a re¬

sult of the discussion.
Second,

this research does not intend to be a global

solution to all accounting problems.
previous chapter,
area.

Finally,

this research limits

As mentioned in the
itself to a small

the goals of a normative model have to be

based on opinion.

Ijiri points out that:

. . . the selection of a goal itself seems to be a mat¬
ter of personal value judgment.
As such, the goal se¬
lected is not scientifically testable. 0
It seems,

then,

search techniques
some for use

that there is authority for using re¬

in accounting which are not favored by

in accounting.

When a problem exists which
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cannot be solved by more preferred research methods,

those

that will be of assistance should be used.

The Eclectic Approach to the Model

The overall approach to this model will be normative.
The goals of the privacy protection model will be stated and
the practices necessary to implement this model will be de¬
duced from the goals.

There are reasons,

however,

for using

other research methods within the overall framework.
evolutionary nature of accounting practice,
of a body of accounting and auditing theory,

the existence
the close con¬

nection between accounting theory and practice,
tence of computer system technology,
privacy laws,

The

the exis¬

and the existence of

requires that this research do more than de¬

duce from the goals of the model.
Ijiri points out the close relationship between ac¬
counting theory and practice and the problems that that re¬
lationship presents.

He states:

Since theory and policies are so intermingled in ac¬
counting, it is difficult to have one's theoretical
argument understood purely on theoretical grounds.
The
argument is likely to be accepted or rejected not based
on its theoretical strength or weaknesses, but rather
on whether or not one likes its conclusions.
He goes on to state that:
Goal assumptions in normative models or goals advocated
in policy discussions are often stated purely on the
basis of one's conviction and preference, rather than
on the basis of inductive study of the existing system.
This may perhaps be the most crucial reason why so many
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normative models or policy proposals are not implemented
in the real world.12
While the development of accounting theory may be a
revolutionary process as described by Wells,

accounting prac¬

tice is decidedly evolutionary as it looks to the existing
theoretical and practical framework for guidance.

The close

relationship of theory and practice requires that any ac¬
counting theory look closely at the existing framework.
Caws states:
. . . But I might suggest that people sometimes do
things not because they feel they ought but because those
things follow from other things that are done. . . . Also,
people sometimes feel that they ought to do what every¬
body else is doing, and that might in turn be the basis
for an inductive normative explanation.-^
It may seem peculiar that after explaining that this model,
being revolutionary in nature,
ing framework of accounting,

need not abide by the exist¬

that arguments are presented

for being careful to observe this very framework during de¬
velopment.

There are aspects of the model and the method¬

ology which cannot conform to the existing norms.

However,

the close relationship of the theory and the practice of ac¬
counting require that this development process be cognizant
of the framework in which the model must exist.

This model

does not suggest change to the whole field of accounting,
only a small part.

There are parts of the model where induc¬

tion from the existing accounting framework will be required.
Just as there is an existing accounting framework
within which to operate,

there

is

an existing privacy and
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record keeping environment which must be considered.
model must,

This

as with the accounting framework, deduce from

the goals and induce from the existing environment to obtain
a meaningful result.
Hendriksen^ points out that there are several ap¬
proaches to developing accounting theory in addition to in¬
ductive and deductive normative models.

Some of these ap¬

proaches will be used in this research in the setting of
goals and in devising practices.
at justice, truth and fairness.

The ethical approach looks
The sociological approach

looks at the effect of accounting reports on all society not
just users of accounting information.

The pragmatic approach

involves the development of ideas which are in agreement with
the real world and find usefulness in realistic situations.
These will all be used in the development of this model.
The final point to be made in this section is the hier¬
archical,

interdependent nature of the various aspects of

this model.

This is diagrammed in figure 1.

First,

there

is the overall privacy model which specifies the relationship
between record-keepers and their accountants and legal coun¬
sel,
dual.

the courts,
Second,

privacy policy commissions,

and the indivi¬

there is the formulation of privacy standards

which will be a framework for the implementation,
and auditing of privacy safeguards.

Third,

reporting,

there is a review

of possible implementation procedures to establish a frame of
reference for the audit of privacy safeguards.

Finally,

Figure 1.

Hierarchical Nature of Privacy Model Development and
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there is the auditing model.

The next section will discuss

the methodology of each of these steps.

Stages in the Model Development

It is the purpose of this section to outline the me¬
thodology for each stage of the development of the model and
to propose tests or defenses of the results of these stages.
The model development considerations are outlined in figure
2.

First,

however, a few general points about goal-setting

and the testing of the resulting practices.
As was noted earlier,
of personal value,

the setting of goals is a matter

reflects the opinion of the researcher

and is not empirically testable.
this research,
explained.

As goals are selected in

the reasoning behind their selection will be

Where there are sources in the literature which

have been of assistance in setting the goals,

reference

will be made.
It was also noted earlier that defenses of a normative
model involve showing logically the superiority of the me¬
thods chosen over alternative methods of achieving the goals.
If a process of induction from observations of existing
theory, practices, or the environment is used then it must
be shown that the practices logically follow from the obser¬
vations .
Finally,

it was also noted earlier that feasibility

is a test of the methods prescribed in a normative model.
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In discussing normative accounting valuation models,
ample,

for ex¬

Ijiri notes that "it it important for us to question

whether the model is capable of producing figures with a re¬
quired level of quality.

He also notes:

Here feasibility refers to both the practical problems
in coming up with figures under the proposed alterna¬
tive and the problems of developing a system under the
proposed alternative in such a way that the figures pro¬
duced satisfy a set of quality requirements.^
A test of the feasibility of the methods of this model will
be made by showing that the methods chosen can be accom¬
plished in the environment that exists and can produce
quality results.
It might seem that in this model much is left to the
opinions of this researcher and that the tests to be applied
are not rigorous.

In defense it could be argued that this

is because of the nature of the problem to be solved.

The

area being covered is new and just now being explored.
methods to be prescribed are revolutionary.

The

Exploratory re¬

search of this kind need not conform to the criteria of
more well-defined, well-worked areas.
empirical versus logical tests,

On the subject of

Hendriksen states:

. . . in the view of some, theoretical hypotheses can be
tested only through empirical research.
Regardless of
the validity of this statement, there is little ques¬
tion that empirical research can be a valuable aid in
the formation and testing of accounting theories.
In
the opinion of the author, however, complete theories
through the process of lo-
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Privacy Model
Goals for the overall model will be based on ethical,
sociological,

and pragmatic considerations.

used as defined by Hendriksen.
which has practical use

18

These terms are

A model will be devised

(pragmatic),

serves the needs of as

many of those concerned about privacy as possible
gical)
sible

(sociolo¬

but which is fair to as many of these parties as pos¬
(ethical).

in the literature,

The grounds for these goals will be found
the environment and where necessary from

opinion.
Practices will be deduced from these goals.

They will

be logically tested to see if they satisfy these goals bet¬
ter than other alternative methods.

These methods will also

be tested to see if they are reasonable and whether they can
be accomplished.
While these practices are being derived it will also
be necessary to make observations from the literature and
the environment to assist in deriving the practices and to
test for the consistency of the derived practices with the
observations.

Observations for this purpose will be taken

from the literature on accounting and auditing theory and
practice.
That is,

Also the "privacy environment" must be looked at.
the laws on privacy,

the reports of various commis¬

sions on the subject of privacy,
individuals,

the needs and sentiments of

groups, businesses and governments both na¬

tional and international and the function of courts and
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commissions in privacy protection.

And finally,

the compu¬

terized record-keeping environment must be observed to deter¬
mine its relationship with the derived practices.

These in¬

terrelationships are shown in figure 2.

Privacy Standards
A set of privacy protection standards will be sug¬
gested.
First,

There are two reasons for this presentation.
the number of and variation in privacy requirements

requires that standards be abstracted to simplify discus¬
sions of privacy implementation and privacy audits.

Second,

since it will be suggested that auditors conduct a privacy
audit,

it will be a positive aspect of this model to have

privacy standards which are similar in structure to account¬
ing standards.
Principles"

A hierarchy of "Generally Accepted Privacy

(GAPP)

which are similar in structure to Gener¬

ally Accepted Accounting Principles

(GAAP)

will be suggested.

This will be a dual process as was the establishment of
practices in the privacy model.

A set of privacy standards

will be deduced from privacy objectives and derived from and
shown to be consistent with legislated privacy requirements.
In defending these privacy standards it will be neces¬
sary to show that the structure and intent of the GAPP is
similar to that of the GAAP.

The internal consistency of the

GAPP themselves will be shown as they are derived.

It will

also be necessary to show that the standards are the simplest
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possible abstraction of the privacy requirements which serves
the purposes intended.

Feasibility of this

tested by its usefulness

framework will be

in showing implementation plans and

in devising the audit model.

Finally,

to show that the GAPP framework is

it will be necessary

logically consistent with

the privacy model.

Implementation
The purpose of this part of the model is to provide a
framework for the audit model.

It will be necessary to de¬

velop an understanding of how the privacy requirements are
implemented before an audit model can be devised.
tion of the model development will,
of the privacy standards.

however,

This sec¬

provide a test

If the implementation procedures

are consistent with privacy safeguard requirements and can
be deduced from the privacy standards,

then support is given

to the GAPP framework.

Audit Model
There will be two major aspects to the audit model.
The first is the audit function that the auditor will per¬
form and the second is the audit techniques to be employed.
The development of the audit model will be pragmatic.

The

auditor will not be asked to perform a function for which
auditors cannot be expected to be qualified nor for which
the necessary tools do not exist.

The primary goals,

then.
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will be practicality,

feasibility,

and consistency with the

other aspects of the privacy model.
The functional aspects of the audit model will involve
defining the roles of the independent and internal auditors,
the attestation statement that the auditor will make,

the

audit standards to be employed and the liability of the au¬
ditor.

As with other aspects of this model,

development will

involve derivation from previously developed parts of the mo¬
del and from existing theory and practice.

Defending the

audit function will involve verifying consistency with the
model and with observations

from the literature.

The audit techniques will be developed from the litera¬
ture on auditing and EDP auditing.

They will be checked for

their consistency with the audit function.

There is a pos¬

sibility here for more rigorous tests of feasibility.
lity requirements

Qua¬

for the audit results will be specified.

The potential outcome of the audit techniques may be testable
against the quality levels established.

Summary

This chapter outlined the methodology to be used in de¬
veloping the privacy protection model.

The methods are

varied and can be considered eclectic.

The overall model is

essentially normative deductive with goals assumed and prac¬
tices deduced.

The nature of the model

itself and the envi¬

ronment from which it is derived and in which it will
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operate requires the use of other methods
the normative approach.
from observations

in conjunction with

Goals and practices are induced

from the literature and the environment.

Goal assumptions are selected by this researcher's opinion
guided by observation and ethical,

sociological and pragma¬

tic consideration.
A defense of this model is primarily through logical
verification which is explained by Ijiri and supported by
Hendriksen.

This verification process is consistent with the

research methodology employed.

The logical consistency of

the conclusions with observations and other aspects of the
model make up most of the verification.

The feasibility of

the model is also tested by showing that the practices sug¬
gested can be accomplished and that they satisfy any quality
requirements which might be specified.
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CHAPTER

III

PRIVACY MODEL

This chapter presents the overall normative model for
the protection of individual privacy.
are stated.
2.

These are the goals

The goals of the model

left unspecified in figure

The practices are deduced from these goals.

Concurrent

with this deductive process observations are taken from the
literature and the environment to assist in deriving and jus¬
tifying the practices.
These defenses are:

Defenses

first,

for the model are explained.

the logical consistency of the

derived practices with the goals;

second,

the practices with the observations taken;

the consistency of
and third,

the

feasibility of the practices.

Goals of the Model

The Privacy Act of 1974 created the Privacy Protection
Study Commission'*’ which published its
1977

2

findings

in July of

after an extensive two year study of the issue of pri¬

vacy as it relates to record-keeping in this country.
findings of the Commission are a model
individual privacy.

for the protection of

The Commission formulated the

for a national privacy policy.

framework

Guided by a set of implemen¬

tation choices and principles and with knowledge of the
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The
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presence of competing societal values,
sents 166
policy.

specific recommendations to implement its privacy
These recommendations prescribe a combined use of

voluntary compliance,
ests,

the Commission pre¬

statutory creation of rights,

inter¬

or responsibilities enforceable through either indi¬

vidual or government action,

and an ongoing government mech¬

anism to investigate,

and report on privacy protec¬

study,

tion issues.
The Commission's report is the starting point for this
research for two reasons.
this time,

First,

although not adopted at

this report could eventually be the basis

national privacy policy.

fo a

In an appearance before a U.

House of Representatives subcommittee in May of 1978,

S.
a gov¬

ernment spokesman confirmed that President Carter's approach
to privacy policy would follow the lead of the Privacy Pro3
tection Study Commission.

Therefore,

as a practical matter

any privacy protection model proposed should use as a basis
this very important and potentially influential report.
cond,

Se¬

the recommendations of the Commission are carefully and

logically

deduced from a set of principles or policy goals

which have a firm foundation in the problem of privacy.

This

research must recognize the report of the Commission and use
it as a basis

for

searcher does not,

further theoretical development.
however,

reached by the Commission.

This re¬

agree with the conclusions
There is no objection taken to

the specific privacy practices.

These practices are taken
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as preconditions for this research.

Objection is taken to

the implementation plan which consists of voluntary and sta¬
tutory compliance with those privacy practices,

a non-

regulatory privacy commission and the use of the courts as
a last resort to remedy any violations of privacy.
not sufficient theoretically,
with this implementation plan.

however,

It is

to simply disagree

Objections to the conclu¬

sions must be based on objections to the implementation prin¬
ciples or goals of the Commission.

The implementation is

thought to be incomplete because the implementation goals
are seen as incomplete.
The three concurrent objectives of the Commission's
privacy protection policy are:
to create a proper balance between what an individual is
expected to divulge to a record-keeping organization and
what he seeks in return (to minimize intrusiveness);
to open up record-keeping operations in ways that will
minimize the extent to which recorded information about
an individual is itself a source of unfairness in any
decision about him made on the basis of it (to maximize
fairness); and to create and define obligations with
respect to the uses and disclosures that will be made
of recorded information about an individual (to create
^
legitimate, enforceable expectations of confidentality).
These objectives guided the Commission in the formulation of
its recommendations for the procedures which must be observed
by record-keeping organizations to protect the privacy of in¬
dividuals.

These objectives are carefully derived

privacy problem as

it exists today.

from the

If implemented appro¬

priately these objectives would correct the important imbal¬
ances

in the record-keeper-individual relationship.

In
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chapter IV it is shown that these objectives are not only re¬
lated well to the privacy problem but serve as a good basis
for the deduction of privacy standards and practices.
part of the model being developed in this chapter,
deals with implementation mechanisms
sions,

laws,

The

however,

such as courts,

commis¬

and audits not with the practices of individual

organizations.
The Commission,
licy recommendations,

in exploring ways to implement its po¬
was guided by three principles which

were:
. . . (1) that incentives for systemic reform should be
created; (2) that existing regulatory and enforcement
mechanisms should be used insofar as possible; and
(3) that unnecessary cost be avoided.
These are the goals of the Commission's
licy.

implementation po¬

Since this researcher takes exception to the Commis¬

sion's implementation mechanism which consists of voluntary
compliance,

statutory enactment,

a privacy commission,

the courts,

exception must be taken to these goals.

and

These

goals are adequate as partial -'guidance for the formulation
of a privacy implementation mechanism but are incomplete.
The Commission has ignored or in any case not made explicit
three other goals which must be included in any complete

im¬

plementation plan.
First,

as was

shown in chapter I,

cant movement in other countries,
ticular,

there is a signifi¬

European countries

in par¬

to formulate an international privacy policy.

The
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existence and persistence of these movements requires that
a goal of any model for the protection of individual privacy
be an attempt to satisfy the desires of that international
movement.

The Commission has ignored the position of this

country in the

international

flow of data and has therefore

deduced an incomplete implementation plan.
the three goals of the Commission,

the model proposed here

adopts a fourth implementation goal,
4.

In addition to

which is:

That consideration be given to the movement for an inter¬
national privacy policy
Second,

advances

it was also noted in chapter I that the rapid

in computer and computer-related technology has

created an environment in which it is often to the advantage
of record-keeping organizations to violate the right of in¬
dividuals to privacy.

Any privacy protection model must

take technology into account if it is to be successful.
fifth goal of this proposed model,
5.

therefore,

The

is:

That the impact of technology on compliance be considered
Third,

the Commission suggests that record-keeping or¬

ganizations know that another organization is complying with
privacy safeguard requirements before personal data is ac¬
cepted from or delivered to that organization.

The Commis¬

sion suggests that a privacy commission be created to moni¬
tor privacy practices and participate in privacy policy de¬
bates.
will

They suggest that the pressures of the market place

force organizations

into compliance with privacy
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safeguards.

Finally they suggest that companies that do not

comply can be brought to do so by the courts.
sion has not,

however,

The Commis¬

provided any monitoring and reporting

mechanism to serve as a source of information to those in¬
terested parties.
Record-keeping organizations need to know what other
organizations are doing with regard to privacy and how ef¬
fective those procedures are before they can make decisions
regarding the transfer of personal data.

A privacy commis¬

sion must be provided with reliable information regarding
the privacy practices of record-keeping organizations if
they are to participate intelligently in privacy policy de¬
bates.

Individuals are expected to choose organizations with

which to do business without being provided information re¬
garding the privacy practices of these organizations.

All

of this creates a situation in which the only information
about an organization is provided in hindsight when an indi¬
vidual takes

judicial action after a right to privacy has

been violated.
Since there are so many in the general public who re¬
quire information concerning the privacy procedures of
record-keeping organizations,

the following is adopted as

the sixth and final goal of the model proposed here:
6.

That information be provided to the general public con¬
cerning the privacy procedures of record-keeping organi¬
zations
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In summary,

the following goals are adopted for this

model for the protection of individual privacy:
1.

That incentives for systemic reform should be created

2.

That existing regulatory and enforcement mechanisms
should be used insofar as possible

3.

That unnecessary cost be avoided

4.

That consideration be given to the movement for an inter¬
national privacy policy

5.

That the impact of technology on compliance be con¬
sidered

6.

That information be provided to the general public con¬
cerning privacy procedures of record-keeping organiza¬
tions

Practical Justification for the Model

As has been stated in chapter I,

this model suggests

an independent audit of privacy safeguard procedures by the
CPA.

This section shows how this suggestion complements the

implementation mechanism suggested by the Privacy Protection
Study Commission.

It is also shown that this combined mech¬

anism is the best method of implementing privacy safeguards
given the six implementation goals adopted above.

Arguments for an Audit
It was 3hown in chapter I the importance that indivi¬
duals attach to their right to privacy.

It was also sug¬

gested that advances in computer-related record-keeping tech¬
nology may require a monitoring of compliance with privacy
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safeguard requirements.
of privacy procedures.

These are two reasons

for an audit

Below are other reasons

for an audit

of privacy safeguards.

Systems Audits Make Good Sense
Any organization which maintains an information system
has an obligation to the organization itself and,
case of personal records,
maintained,

in the

to those on whom information is

to devise and implement systems controls and

periodically review those controls to verify their utiliza¬
tion and effectiveness.
a U.

S.

For example,

in testifying before

House of Representatives subcommittee Professor

Joseph Weizenbaum noted that

"any information system should

be designed to be auditable in addition to being periodically
audited."

6

On personal

information systems

Bigelow and Nycum

note:
It should be emphasized that not only must privacy pro¬
cedures be designed, but they must be followed . . .
insist on audits on a regular basis to insure that the
system has not been harmed.7
A recent audit of The Social Security Administration's
(SSA)

central computer facility points up this need for au¬

dits of computerized record-keeping systems.
the General Accounting Office
vented the SSA's

(GAO)

Auditors

from

successfully circum¬

sophisticated security system and

"removed

38 reels of magnetic tape containing the names and addresses
of 1.14 million Americans."

The GAO report stated

effective controls and security procedures must be

"that more
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established to protect both Social

Security records

and

o

property and the privacy of American people."
been conducted,

the deficiencies

Had no

audit

in the controls may never

have been discovered and may have allowed the privacy of
dividuals

in¬

to be violated.

Not only

is

there

tion monitor privacy
of privacy to

a moral

imperative that an organiza¬

safeguards

individuals

in

light of

the

importance

but verifying that they are

good business

compliance

also makes

Protection

Study Commission devised a combination of volun¬

tary

and mandatory privacy

hope

that

to

inspect

Providing an

the personal

maintained will

"give

incentives

the

timely and complete as

Commission relays why

the

company a powerful motive

keep

as

in the

right

records which an organization has

pertinent

records

Privacy

for private

individual with

cord only accurate,
its

The

safeguard recommendation

it would create monetary

sector compliance.

sense.

in

this

to

re¬

information about them and

is

true when

possible."

The

they state:

The Commission's recommendations should make it easy
for an individual to assert his interest, thus making it
attractive to organizations to comply voluntarily rather
than incur the cost of enforcement through judicial or
administrative action.10
The

conclusion

rally and

reached

financially

ance with privacy
with an

additional

goal of

this

is

that

for a business

safeguards.

model.

it makes

incentive

An
for

good

sense both mo¬

to monitor

audit provides

its

compli¬

businesses

reform required by the

first
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Success of Audits
There is little evidence of what effect the auditing of
privacy safeguards has on an organization’s effectiveness
protection the privacy of personal records.

However,

viewing the effectiveness of the Privacy Act of 1974,

in

in re¬
the

Privacy Protection Study Commission did find that government
agencies which audited their privacy procedures were the most
successful in implementing the Act.

They state:

The Commission has found that those agencies that have
established formal, structured approaches and mechanisms
to implement the Privacy Act are the most successful in
their implementation of the Act.
They have provided the
best training for their personnel, have issued detailed,
consistent internal guidelines, and have devised proce¬
dures for auditing their own compliance with the Act '
£ emphasis addedj.-l-l
There are no other reports of organizations auditing their
privacy programs.

There is,

however,

this one case where

such a practice was successful.

Audit as Complementary to Other Devices
Privacy implementation mechanisms may include various
regulatory,

enforcement,

and compliance monitoring mechanisms.

National and international privacy boards or commissions have
been suggested.

The right to take recourse in the courts

for

privacy violations has been granted to individuals by privacy
legislation.

As mentioned above,

there have been suggestions

that compliance with privacy safeguards
by periodic audits.

should be monitored

It is the purpose of this section to
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present these suggestions and to show that the auditing of
privacy safeguards

is complementary to this combination of

commissions and courts.

Commissions
Privacy boards or commissions have been proposed in
various forms with varying duties and powers.

12

Some of the

suggested functions of such boards are to receive complaints
and bring them to the attention of bodies
establishing public policy,

to investigate,

port on privacy protection issues,
surveillance,

responsible for
study,

to set the standards

supervise practices under the rules,

gate compliance,

and re¬

investi¬

and hear complaints about misconduct.

Others have suggested privacy agencies with more powers.
For example,

for

13

it has been suggested that a privacy commission

be established and given licensing powers and investigatory
powers to police the operations of computer-based data banks
which would include the right to receive complaints,

to sus¬

pend or revoke licenses and institute civil or criminal le¬
gal proceedings.

Another has

would provide standards

suggested that a privacy agency

for the establishment and maintenance

of personal data banks and authorized to enforce compliance
with these standards and to authorize access to data banks.
Another suggests an information agency to which all recordkeepers would be obligated to send information about what
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they are doing,

why they are doing it,

and how the

system and

the data are going to be used.
The Privacy Protection Study Commission believed that a
commission was necessary to interpret law and policy and pro¬
vide a global,

systemic view of the privacy issue.

They saw

this commission as complementary to the provision for re¬
course in the courts. ^

It was not their intention to have

this commission be responsible for enforcement but to monitor
compliance,

be aware of changing privacy needs and problems

and suggest policy and legislation to meet the changing envi¬
ronment .

Courts
Legislation enacted in the United States has given cer¬
tain rights to individuals."^

Should these rights be vio¬

lated by record-keeping organizations,

individuals are left

with the option of taking these organizations to court in
either criminal or civil proceedings and receive monetary re¬
imbursement,

penalties or orders to comply.

Privacy Audits
An audit of privacy programs instituted by record¬
keeping organizations could complement these two mechanisms,
the commission and the courts.

For the commission an audit

report could give evidence of how effectively privacy is be¬
ing protected,

what is being done and how it is being done.

This information could be used by the privacy commission to
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suggest policy or legislation or to suggest legal action in
the courts if organizations consistently are not in compli¬
ance with existing regulations.
As a remedy for providing recourse to those whose
rights have been violated,

the courts are necessary but in

many ways need an auditing function to complement their
power.

Recourse in the courts is curative rather than pre¬

ventive.
privacy,

There are those who believe that,

in the area of

it is very important that as much as possible be

done to prevent violation of rights to privacy leaving the
courts as a last resort to recover monetary reimbursement
or satisfaction.
is done as

16

In many violations of privacy the damage

soon as the right is violated,

the injury is very

difficult to translate into dollar rewards and there are very
few people who would undertake a lawsuit solely for moral sa¬
tisfaction.

For example,

it does little good to know tnat

you can bring a credit agency to court for inaccurate records
while you are in a strange town unable to get a hotel room
because your credit cards are not accepted.
Another reason why the court mechanism needs to be sup¬
plemented is because few people are aware of their rights to
recourse in the courts or to their other rights to see and
correct their records.
and Budgets

A report of the Office of Management

showed that very few exercised their rights under

The Privacy Act of 1974.
aware of these rights.

17

Tne conclusion was that few were
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In conclusion,

a privacy audit complements the mechan¬

isms of a privacy commission responsible for systemic policy
and monitoring and the courts which should be used as a last
resort for recovering damages or forcing compliance.
the above,

however,

All of

could easily be accomplished with inter¬

nal audit functions.

Arguments

This

for an Independent Audit

section will make arguments

for the conduct of a

privacy audit by an agent independent of the organization be¬
ing audited.
ity,

Independence is necessary to provide credibil¬

to satisfy those outside the organization who are very

interested in the design and effectiveness of privacy safe-guards instituted by an organization.

Confidentiality
As was defined above,

confidentiality describes the de¬

gree of protection to be offered data which is agreed upon
between the person or organization furnishing the data and
the person or organization receiving it.

In the case of two

organizations or persons which make a regular practice of
exchanging personal data a knowledge of and confidence in
the privacy procedures of the cooperating record-keeper could
be established over time.
however.

This is not always the situation,

People and organizations often need an independent

evaluation of the privacy procedures used by a record-keeper
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with whom they wish to do business.

At both the national

and international levels there is a need for an independent
source of information concerning the privacy safeguards of
record-keepers.

National
Both the Privacy Protection Study Commission and the
Secretary of Health,

Education and Welfare's Advisory Com¬

mittee on Automated Personal Data Systems recommended that
record-keepers know the level of confidentiality in effect
in the organizations from whom they received information or
to whom they were sending information.

18

The Privacy Protec¬

tion Commission recommended changes to The Fair Credit Re¬
porting Act

(FCRA)

which would require that credit grantors,

depository institutions,

insurance institutions and insurance

support organizations exercise reasonable care in the selec¬
tion of support organizations

so as to assure that such or¬

ganizations comply with certain privacy safeguard require¬
ments.

The Secretary of Health,

Education and Welfare' s-'Ad¬

visory Committee on broad privacy policy recommendations
sought a requirement that record-keepers know and assure that
privacy requirements would be observed by receiving organiza¬
tions.

There is,

then,

evidence that privacy requirements

in

the future will have record-keepers know about and assure the
effectiveness of privacy safeguards enacted by organizations
with whom they share data.

It is suggested one way to do
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this is to have published reports of privacy audits conducted
by independent auditors.

International
It was noted in chapter I that there

is considerable

international debate concerning the formulation of an inter¬
national privacy policy.

The possibilities that an indepen¬

dent audit of privacy safeguards could allow the United
States to participate in such an international agreement is
a very compelling reason for conducting such an audit.

Public service
The report of an independent audit could also be a
service to the general public.

The public could use such

reports to pick organizations with which it chooses to do
business.

These audits could also be a stimulus to busi¬

nesses to comply with privacy safeguards.
The Privacy Protection Study Commission made compli¬
ance with many of its recommendations voluntary.

They hoped

that in the private sector the organizations would be moved
to protect their customers'

privacy interests.

If their

customers knew and understood the organization's record¬
keeping practices,

the customers would use the competition

of the market place as an ally in securing compliance with
privacy safeguards.

19

The audit report would be the credible

evidence that the customer would need to gain the knowledge
with which to force this compliance.

66

Westin has suggested that

"ethical and professional

commandments will not always be sufficient to control the
conduct of criminal elements,
cials,

profit-seekers,

over-zealous government offi-

or insensitive researchers."

seems to be the case for some companies.
found that TRW-Credit Data,
the FCRA.

Inc.

20

This

Westin and Baker

was not in compliance with

The Federal Trade Commission found many violations

of the FCRA on the part of Equifax Services,

Inc.

21

It is

suggested here that an independent compliance audit serves
the purpose of not only providing credible information to
those outside an organization but also forces those organi¬
zations not inclined to effect privacy safeguards to comply.

Arguments

for Audit by the Certified
Public Accountant

The argument is made here that the only independent au¬
dit function which satisfies the second and third goals of
this model is the CPA.

It is an established mechanism which

has the expertise for such an audit and already does much of
the work suggested for a privacy audit.

The CPA is at this

time required to review internal controls and given the en¬
actment of SAS 20 and given the recommendations of the Cohen
Commission the auditor may be doing even more in this area in
the future.

To have another agency trained to perform such

a function would be costly.

To have another agency review

the very same controls as were verified by the CPA would be
an unnecessary and costly duplication of effort.

These are
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the same controls

because in an information system controls

are installed which are effective over both accounting and
personal data.

In fact some data are both personal and ac¬

counting in nature.
At the Symposium on Data Banks and Society held in Oslo
in 1972 Gunnar Arnholt made a few remarks which give support
to the idea that the CPA is the one who should conduct these
audits.

He said

There should be some body which is not dependent on the
administration, but has a position similar to the exter¬
nal auditor, who can watch the use of data banks, see
what kind of information is put into the bank, and
react if the objectives of the banks are changed without
responsible decisions having been made by the proper au¬
thorities .
Arnholt is recommending here an agency with policy and moni¬
toring responsibilities similar to the commissions discussed
above.

In specifying how this commission should operate,

Arnholt goes on to say:
If a professional, permanently working body is set up, I
think this should engage the competence not only of EDP
systems and technical specialists, but also of technical
specialists in what you might call information quality
control, namely public and government auditors.22
Arnholt is agreeing with part of the three part mechanism be¬
ing suggested here.

He thinks that an independent commission

responsible for privacy policy should review reports of inde¬
pendent auditors as a basis

for its

inquiries into what is

being done by organizations to protect privacy.
There is one other aspect of the CPA function which
makes it the logical choice to conduct the privacy audit.
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The CPA has

an ongoing relationship with the client organiza¬

tion which allows
cular privacy

the CPA to become

safeguards

required

dustry and with the policies
this

shown

in

the design of the

to be

a

the parti¬

in that organization's

of that organization.

ongoing relationship allows

volved

familiar with

Also,

the auditor to become

system of control.

significant advantage as

in¬

in¬

This will be

the audit model

is

developed.
Finally,

another ongoing audit

function which satisfies

most of the requirements

specified above

ditor.

suggested that the

can

A recent article

gain a certain amount of

the director of a
of

the

acts,

firm's
this

are

is

firm's

industry,

the

audit

dent audit

function needed

not

gain
are

independence by
still

to be

In a
Andersen

&

really

recent
Co.,

auditor

internal

a

auditor

familiar with the

audit

logical

All

choice

for the

for a privacy audit.

the

internal

of

function's

auditor does

is

firm's
these

report¬
indepen¬

This

setup

not really

reporting to the audit committee.

part of one

conflicts

internal

committee

suitable because

au¬

Although discussing illegal

out that the

ing to the

is

internal

involved on an ongoing basis.

traits which make

internal

independence by reporting to

23

article points

and

the

audit committee on certain aspects

operations.

familiar with the
policies

firm's

is

company with too many pressures

They
and

independent.

speech Harvey

discussed

the

Kapnick,

failure of

Chairman of Arthur
internal

corporate
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professionals,

both lawyers and accountants,

dependence in their professional duties.

to maintain in¬

He stated:

To be a professional while on a corporate payroll, how¬
ever, requires the same degree of independence in thought
and action as that required of a professional retained
from a professional firm.
Unfortunately, not every indi¬
vidual is willing to accept such a responsibility.^
Kapnick concludes that since internal professionals

failed to

maintain professional independence in their corporate duties
that they have lost the public's confidence in them.

In¬

ternal privacy audit reports might lack the credibility they
need to be effective.

Conclusions

This

section has developed arguments

dit by the Certified Public Accountant.

for a privacy au¬

Audits are required

because of the importance of the privacy problem in the con¬
text of society and its technology.

The audit needs inde¬

pendence to give order to the relationships which exist be¬
tween information processing organizations at the national
and international levels.

The CPA satisfies all of these

requirements better than any other audit function.
been suggested that the combination of the courts,

It has
a privacy

commission and the CPA privacy audit is the best way to pro¬
tect an individual's right of privacy.

This plan is dia¬

grammed in figure 1.
In developing the arguments

for the audit,

careful at¬

tention has been given to maintaining consistency with the
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implementation goals.
the CPA,

The combination of a privacy audit by

remedy in the courts and the formation of the pri¬

vacy commission is a mechanism which meets the requirements
of the goals better than any other mechanism.
the courts create incentives
anisms.
ties,

The audit and

for reform using existing mech¬

The audit provides information to interested par¬

both domestic and foreign,

and creates an incentive

for reform which recognizes the influence that technology
can have on compliance by organizations.

Although the cost

of the audit raises the price of privacy protection monitor¬
ing above the price of the mechanisms suggested by the Pri¬
vacy Protection Study Commission,

the cost is lessened when

the required balance between the other goals is recognized.
Finally,
mation,

the privacy commission,
serves as an important

the mechanisms

provided with proper infor¬

feedback on the success of

in an evolving environment.

If parts of this argument are found to be lacking,
does not nullify the remainder of the research.

it

The very

least that will occur is that managements will want their
privacy safeguards monitored by their own internal audit
staffs.

There are major parts of this research which could

be used to guide the conduct of such an audit.
In the next section this recommended function for the
CPA is compared to the role of the CPA as defined by the ex¬
isting accounting and auditing literature.
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Philosophical Implications of the Model

A review of the literature which serves as the founda¬
tion for the present theory and practice of accounting and
auditing reveals some disagreement concerning the role of
these two disciplines.
theoretical grounds

Until recently there was

for the model proposed above.

little
Below

some of the literature is briefly presented showing where
there is and is not theoretical support for the privacy au¬
dit.

The Philosophy of Auditing
In 1961 The Philosophy of Auditing,
Sharaf,

was published.

by Mautz and

This has been one authority on mat¬

ters relating to the theory and practice of auditing.
define the role of auditing as

They

follows:

Auditing is concerned with verification, the examina¬
tion of financial data for the purpose of judging the
faithfulness with which they portray events and condi¬
tions . 25
This definition limits the scope of auditing to verification
of presentations which are financial in nature.

They dis¬

tinguish between auditing and accounting by stating:
Accounting includes the collection, classification, sum¬
marization, and communication of business events and
conditions as they affect and represent a given enter¬
prise or other entity. . . . Auditing does none of these
things.
Auditing must consider business events and con¬
ditions too, but it does not have the task of measuring
and communicating them.
Its task is to review the
measurements and communications of accounting for pro¬
priety. 26
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Accounting and auditing,

then,

are two distinct disciplines.

Accountants prepare reports of financial condition and opera¬
tions and auditors verify these reports.
go on later,

however,

Mautz and Sharaf

to say:

All auditors are first accountants, or at least trained
as accountants, because one cannot effectively verify
accounting data unless he has some understanding of how
they are gathered, summarized, classified, and pre¬
sented. 27
The role of auditing,

then,

would seem to be closely tied to

or even dependent on the practice of accounting.

This pre¬

sentation of the function of accounting and auditing does not
support a presentation by the enterprise of privacy safe¬
guards compliance nor a verification of that compliance by
the auditor.
It was mentioned above that privacy safeguards are in¬
ternal controls.

Mautz and Sharaf emphasize the importance

of internal controls to the auditor.

Their fourth postulate

of auditing is:
The existence of a satisfactory system of internal con¬
trol eliminates the probability of irregularities.2^
They go on to say:
There are so many events and relationships which can
work to offset the most effective internal control mea¬
sures and which at the same time would be neither appar¬
ent to nor necessarily discoverable by the independent
auditor that acceptance of responsibility for the review
and evaluation of internal control is hazardous at best.
Nevertheless, it remains an essential preliminary to the
development of an intelligent audit program and an area
in which the auditor can be of great service to his
client.29
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Although Mautz and Sharaf recommend a review and evaluation
of internal control systems,
it a

they limit this review by making

part of the audit of the financial presentations of

the enterprise.

The presentation of Mautz and Sharaf would

not seem to support the privacy model proposed here.

A Statement of Basic Accounting Theory
In 1966 The American Accounting Association published
the Report of the Committee to Prepare a Statement of Basic
Accounting Theory,
(ASOBAT).

A Statement of Basic Accounting Theory

This has been for some the basis of accounting

practice and also has

served as a basis

tical development in accounting.
counting as

for further theore¬

The Committee defined ac¬

follows:

. . . the process of identifying, measuring, and commu¬
nicating economic information to permit informed Judg¬
ments and decisions by users of the information.^0
This definition of accounting differs

from that used by

Mautz and Sharaf by emphasizing the use of accounting infor¬
mation in decision-making but continued to tie accounting
reports to financial or economic reality.
recognize,

however,

The Committee did

that the future scope of accounting in¬

formation need not be so constrained.

They state:

Most applications of accounting have dealt with economic
resources . . . accounting need not be confined to such
subject matter.
The Committee also stated that:
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The objectives of accounting are to provide information
for the following purposes:
•

3.
4.

•

•

Maintaining and reporting on the custodianship of
resources
Facilitating social functions and controls22

Taking these two statements together it could be assumed
that the presentation of information concerning an organiza¬
tion's compliance with privacy requirements
a theoretical basis

is

justified on

since privacy compliance presentations

would facilitate social controls and would be a report by
the organization on their custodianship of personal records.
The Committee later goes on to state criteria by which
accounting information could be evaluated.

They state:

Four basic standards are recommended as providing cri¬
teria to be used in evaluating potential accounting in¬
formation:
relevance, verifiability, freedom from bias,
and quantifiability.
Adherence to some or all of these
standards may be partial. ^
Should an organization be asked to expand the information
which it reports to the public,

the information would need

to meet these criteria.
It was suggested above in this chapter that an integral
part of the privacy model was an independent audit of the
privacy safeguards by the CPA.

It is

suggested here that

the organization present information concerning the activi¬
ties taken to comply with privacy safeguard requirements.
The CPA would then attest to the accuracy of that presenta¬
tion and the effectiveness of the control
sis

system.

An analy¬

is presented here of how well the information meets the

criteria established by the Committee.
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An organization’s presentation of information concern¬
ing the privacy controls installed would be relevant to the
assumed needs of the potential users of such information.
Individuals,

the privacy commission,

and domestic and fo¬

reign concerns are assumed to be interested in the privacy
safeguards of record-keeping organizations.

That certain

controls have been installed is certainly verifiable.

It

will be shown in the audit model that the effectiveness of
the system is also verifiable by the CPA.
ditional accounting information,

Unlike more tra¬

the needs of the potential

users are similar with regard to the presentation of pri¬
vacy controls.

The users need to know what is being done

and how effective that process is.

Bias in such a presenta¬

tion is held in check through the independent attestation.
This,

of course,

is necessary since the interests of the

organization and the users are not necessarily the same.
The presentation of the privacy controls
quantifiable in all respects.

is not necessarily-

Where it is not quantifiable,

its measurability would not be implied.
In summary it would seem that the accounting theory
developed in ASOBAT lends

itself to an expansion of the ac¬

counting information presented by an organization into a pre¬
sentation of the privacy control system.

Such a presentation

meets an objective of accounting information by serving cer¬
tain social goals and the information can be made to meet
the criteria

for accounting information established by the
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Committee.

Since the CPA attestation of this presentation

is not yet supported.

The literature which describes the

role of the auditor is reviewed below.

A Statement of Basic Auditing Concepts
In 1973 the American Accounting Association

(AAA)

pub¬

lished the Report of the Committee on Basic Auditing Con¬
cepts,

A Statement of Basic Auditing Concepts which,

the other AAA monographs reviewed above,

like

serves as a good

framework for discussing the theoretical implications of
extensions to the accounting and auditing functions.

The

Committee used The Philosophy of Auditing and ASOBAT as a
basis

for their conclusions.

Taking the definition of ac¬

counting proposed in ASOBAT they updated Mautz and Sharaf's
definition of auditing.

They state:

Auditing is a systematic process of objectively obtain¬
ing and evaluating evidence regarding assertions about
economic actions and events to ascertain the degree of
correspondence between those assertions and established
criteria and communicating the results to interested
users.34
This definition would seem to close the door on non-economic
extensions of the attest function which was opened by ASOBAT.
The Committee would seem to be ignoring possible extension
of accounting into non-economic reporting areas and defining
a role

for auditing which is restricted from expanding with

the accounting function.

The audit function as defined is

limited to a review of economic representations
information.

in accounting
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This

Committee

goes

on

to qualify their stand against

the attestation by the CPA of non-economic data.

They

state:

In the final analysis, any definition of the subject mat¬
ter to which the auditing process might be applied is ar¬
bitrary and artificial.
It is mostly tradition which has
led us to the 'economics' focus of auditing.
In prac¬
tice, the auditor's competence and the existence of
operational criteriadictate the boundaries of the sub¬
ject matter to be investigated by the audit process.35
The

Committee

goes

matter of an audit

on to

further specify criteria

function.

It

is

for

subject

stated that the Committee

. . . believes that the subject matter of any extension
of the audit function must possess the following attri¬
butes :
1.
The subject matter must be susceptible to the de¬
duction of evidential assertions.
Such assertions
must be both quantifiable and verifiable.
2.
An information system must be present to record the
actions, events, or results thereof; preferably ade¬
quate internal controls will also be operating.
3.
Consensus must exist on the established criteria
against which the information prepared from the sub¬
ject matter can be evaluated.
While each of the attributes mentioned above is neces¬
sary, two further conditions needed are:
auditor's com¬
petence and summarization of the findings in a report.3^
The

proposed privacy audit meets

these criteria
ters V and VI

in the

following ways.

is

It

is

not meet

shown

that an auditor can gather evidence

that an organization's
guards

and does

representation of

either reliable

the organization's

or not.

representation

its

in chapand assert

privacy

safe¬

As was discussed above,
is verifiable

and partially

quantifiable.
In chapter V the
is

discussed.

itself an

It

internal

is

implementation of privacy

shown

control.

that much of what
It

is

also

shown

is

safeguards
done

that

is

in

a privacy
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standard of accountability requires
maintain a

record of

individually

criteria
vacy

as

criteria

and policies
the

developed

in the chapters

the model

in a

auditor's

competence

remains

systems

level of

As

last

two attri¬

the privacy model

below,

do

con¬

and do conduct

attempts

is

are made
this

to cast

questionable.
the Committee

report

requires

that

"report

upon by the profession"

language
tell

summary,

meets most of

The

in the mean¬

if

and presents

it becomes

it
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language
before

This

the

the

in chapter VI.

agreed upon by

subject matter

of

any

project

the profes¬

sion.
In

com¬

further

problem.

audits,

into new subject matter can occur.

Only time will

consensus

time possess much know¬

regarding privacy

developed and agreed

develops

as

are based on pri¬

the

framework which minimizes

Finally,

extension

(GAPP)

Although auditors

they do not at this

ledge of the privacy area.

be

not have

of internal control

audits,

GAPP

chapter

GAAP.

required by the Committee.

duct reviews

time,

These

audits,

Principles

and thereby gain a

The privacy audit does

pliance

financial

Generally Accepted Privacy

which exceeds

butes

for

for privacy audits.

laws

records.

there are Generally Accepted Accounting

(GAAP)

IV develops

actions with regard to privacy of

identifiable personal

Just as
Principles

its

that an organization

a privacy audit

important criteria proposed by

the
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Committee on Basic Auditing Concepts
audit

function.

teria,
dures
mation
the

can be made by

themselves

is

a

not,

however,

an accepted

possess
for

operational

auditor,

control

about which infor¬

review.

competence

in

The auditor

knowledge of privacy nor

reporting on the

cri¬

privacy proce¬

auditor possesses

internal

format

the

system of controls

maintained and the

general area of

does

an extension of the

A privacy audit does have

assertions
are

for

results

is

there

of a privacy

audit.

Statements

on Auditing Standards

A review of present auditing practice,
by

the

Statements

American
is

useful

for determining discrepancies
and

In chapter
study and

the present practices
I

it was

a basis

accounting control
in chapter
to

(SAS)

issued by the

I

the

that

is
SAS

to be
20

in

found in the

review of the

the

financial

audit of

extensive

evaluated.

now requires

the

enough to

are required

control

in an

reliance thereon and that only

senior management of

material weaknesses

of CPAs.

system of internal

for

(AICPA)

between the proposed

stated that auditors

evaluate the

organization as

cate

Standards

specified

Institute of Certified Public Accountants

privacy model

to

on Auditing

as

the

internal

It was

that auditors

communi¬

audited organization
control

system performed

statements.

also noted

The

system which are
incident to

review,

include privacy controls

then,

and the

is

not

report
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is not made to the public.
vacy model.

This model is

Both are required for the pri¬
suggesting a fundamental change

in the present audit practice.

Extensions of Accounting and Auditing
In the last few years there have been many authorita¬
tive recommendations for extending the scope of both ac¬
counting and auditing.

It will be shown here that these

authorities give significant support to the privacy model.

Accounting extensions
One of the objectives of financial statements

speci¬

fied by the AICPA's Study Group on the Objectives of Finan¬
cial Statements deals with the
economic,

issue of reporting on non¬

socially-oriented activities.

They state:

An objective of financial statements is to report on
those activities of the enterprise affecting society
which can be determined and described or measured and
which are important to the role of the enterprise in
its social environment.^
This objective supports a report by an organization on the
policies and procedures adopted to protect the privacy of in¬
dividuals.

It was noted above how important privacy is to

individuals and society as a whole and what an impact that
the activities of record-keepers can have on society.

The

steps taken by organizations can be determined and described
and in many cases can be measured.
This conclusion of the Study Group is
other authorities.

May has

stated:

supported by
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Accounting conventions should be well conceived in rela¬
tion to at least three things:
first, the use of ac¬
counts; second, the social and economic concepts of the
time and place; and, third, the modes of thought of the
people.39
This

gives us

the thought that accounting should change as

social pressure dictates and as needs of users are identi¬
fied.

The

importance of privacy and the assumed needs of

the public for information was noted above.
Linowes said:
The social responsibility of the accounting profession
falls into three levels:
1.
The social responsibility of our profession to per¬
form well its traditional assignments for those it
serves—its clients.
2.
The responsibility of every discipline to probe new
frontiers and expand the parameters of its work, to
help contribute to a better society.
3.
The social responsibility of any educated group of
citizens to its nation and society.40
This repeats the argument of May.
and willing to perform services
known.

This research is

Accounting must be ready

for society as they become

identifying a function to the pro¬

fession which is of great importance to society-

It is

hoped that accountants will react favorably.
In conjunction with the Report of the Study Group on
Objectives of Financial Statements a second volume of se¬
lected papers,
published.

used as the basis of the Group's study,

was

Two of these papers discuss the subject of ac¬

countability which is very useful to this research.
Cyert and Ijiri stated:
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Accountability is an example of a fundamental objec¬
tive . . . the recent emphasis on the quality of the en¬
vironment . . . has added the public to the list of
parties to whom a firm is accountable. ... In any
case, accountability requires the recording and reporting
of the entities' activities and their consequences.41
In the same collection of papers Rosenfeld states:
A person who is accountable to another person for his
behavior may be required to report his behavior or its
results to the other person; ... as reports on account¬
ability, financial statements are directed to specific
persons—those to whom the persons reported on are ac¬
countable. . . . The behavior for which those who con¬
trol or use resources are accountable also depends on
law, contract or custom and also may change over time.42
An organization is accountable to an individual

for

the proper safeguarding of personal records maintained on
that individual.

This accountability is established by law,

and by government recommendation.

This

is not,

perhaps,

the

type accountability relationship anticipated by these au¬
thors,

but it is real and it is

important in the world today.

Ijiri in another place notes the role of accounting in
facilitating accountability relationships.

He states:

Accounting is a system designed to facilitate the smooth
functioning of accountability relationships among in¬
terested parties. . . . The role of the accountant is to
assist the accountor in accounting for his activities
and their consequences and, at the same time, provide in¬
formation to the accountee.43
In summary,

it has been noted that organizations are

accountable to individuals on whom personal individually
identifiable records are maintained.

The organizations are

responsible for maintaining the records

in accordance with

the GAPP developed in the next chapter and for making reports
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on that accountability to the
cant authoritative
place

for

such a report

ganization and
the

support

that of the

organization in
This

is

for

the

idea

the

annual

statements

appropriate

fits

There

is

signifi¬

that an appropriate
of the or¬

function to assist

such a presentation

conclusion

developed above.

individual.

is

the

accountant.

nicely into the privacy model

Rosenfeld

states:

Financial statements designed as accountability reports
are not meant to be simple historical recitations,
mere curiosities.
Their purpose is to permit those to
whom an accounting is made to make informed decisions
concerning the persons who are accountable. . . . Un¬
satisfactory behavior by those accountable can be met,
for example, by terminating their control or use of re¬
sources . . . or by requiring restitution.44
It was

noted

above

Commission advocated

that the Privacy Protection

incentives

safeguards.

It was

be driven to

comply with the

place.

It was

their

for compliance with privacy

belief that record-keepers
functioning of

the market

reporting of

the procedures

of

keeping organizations which would allow preemptive
As

noted by Rosenfeld,

porting by an organization provides
Arguments

have

is

An

independent

also necessary.

the

of

record¬
action by

accountability re¬

such a mechanism.

therefore been made

record-keeping organizations
procedures.

could

also noted that the Commission provided no

mechanism for public

individuals.

Study

for a

report by

their privacy policies

and

assessment of that presentation

Rosenfeld

states:
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Financial statements may be prepared by those who are
accountable or by others.
Those who are accountable
usually are most familiar with the information to be re¬
ported, but are not disinterested.
Conservative report¬
ing standards and independent audits can help overcome
this conflict.
An independent audit by the CPA is required but not yet sup¬
ported.

Authorities have recently lent support to such an

audit.

Auditing extensions
In 1972

the General Accounting Office

(GAO)

issued a

booklet which contained standards to be used for audits of
certain government activities.

This booklet presented a

definition of auditing which expanded the scope of the audit
function.

They state:

These standards provide for a scope of audit that in¬
cludes not only financial and compliance auditing but
also auditing for economy, efficiency, and achievement
of desired results. . . . However, an audit that would
include provision for the interests of all potential
users of government audits would ordinarily include pro¬
vision for auditing all of the above elements of the
accountability of the responsible officials.
Definitions of the three elements of such an audit fol¬
low:
1.
Financial and Compliance—determines ... (c) whether the entity has complied with applicable laws
and regulations.46
In response to these standards the AICPA published a
booklet for CPAs.
tions are as

Some of their conclusions and recommenda¬

follows:

However, in GAO's definition, an audit may also be con¬
cerned with . . . compliance with both financial and
nonfinancial laws and regulations. . . . Independent
public accountants should be encouraged to participate
in audits of the types contemplated by the GAO. . . .
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The members of this committee agree with the philosophy
and objectives advocated by the GAO in its standards" and
believe that the GAO's broadened definition of auditing
is a logical and worthwhile continuation of the evolu¬
tion and growth of the auditing discipline.^7
It can immediately be noted that the GAO standards and
the comments of the AICPA are in reference to government au¬
dits.

It should also be noted,

however,

that the AICPA

agrees with the expanded scope of auditing and encourages
CPA engagement in such audits.

The AICPA also recognizes

that the auditor will be involved in non-financial areas
while performing these audits.
these

Also,

the GAO established

standards because they believed that it was essential

that those to whom the government is accountable,

the gen¬

eral public,

should have reported to them the actions of

government.

There is no reason why this should not also

hold true in the private sector.

If CPAs can perform com¬

pliance audits in nonfinancial areas,

they should be able to

do it for any accountable organization.
As was noted in chapter I,

another recommendation for

expansion of the scope of the audit
Cohen Commission.

function was made by the

This recommendation

. . . would require the auditor to expand his study of
the controls over the accounting system to form a con¬
clusion on the functioning of the internal accounting
control system.^8
This review,
from the

being a review of the entire system,

limited review required by SAS 1,

differs

which is a test

sufficient to determine the degree of reliance to be placed
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on the controls.

The review suggested by the Cohen Commis¬

sion is,

a review of accounting controls only.

however,

The Commission goes on,
that matter.

however,

to discuss

its position on

They state:

. . . the auditor should limit his report on whether he
agrees with management's description of the company's
internal control system to the accounting controls. . . .
The Commission does not wish to preclude further develop¬
ment of standards for the evaluation of administrative
controls and for reporting on them, but rather to sug¬
gest that there is a later step in the evolution of the
audit formation.49
The Commission does recommend one extension of the
audit function into a non-financial area.

They do so because

of public expectations regarding the auditors'
responsibilities.

duties and

They recommend an extension of the audit

function into the monitoring and reporting of organiza¬
tions'

compliance with laws and regulations.

The Commission

recommends a framework for achieving legal accountability
c n

which involves participation of the independent auditor.
They believe that the auditor is not completely qualified to
judge an organization's compliance with all laws but,
a proper framework,
to society which,

can be effective

they say,

given

in offering a service

appears to want greater assurance

on the compliance of corporations with laws and regulations.
Although privacy safeguards are not always
tions,

laws or regula¬

some are only recommendations of commissions and some

are still in legislative

form,

the framework proposed by the

Commission corresponds very closely to that proposed in the
privacy model above.
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The Commission recommends a framework which combines
actions of the organization and its

legal counsel,

nal auditor and the independent auditor.

the inter¬

The organization

should formulate a statement of policy on illegal acts which
would be made public and included in the annual report.
They should also adopt policies and procedures to provide
for effective monitoring of compliance and state which pro¬
cedures can be audited.

The organization should have their

internal auditors participate in the design and implementa¬
tion of the programs

for achieving and enforcing corporate

policy statements in this area.
The independent auditor should then provide users
with assurance on whether a company is taking effective ac¬
tion on the policy.

The Commission states:

The auditor should review the company's code of conduct
and the procedures adopted to monitor compliance with it.
The auditor should determine whether there are material
weaknesses in the related monitoring procedures, and in¬
dicate his conclusion on these matters in his report.
Should the auditor require assistance during the inves¬
tigation the legal counsel of the organization would be con¬
sulted.

The organization's legal counsel also becomes

in¬

volved in devising the overall policy and the presentation
in the annual report.
The framework suggested by the Commission is essen¬
tially the same as that suggested for the privacy model.
record-keeping organization,

assisted by legal counsel,

mulates a privacy policy which conforms to various

The
for¬

legal.
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regulatory and voluntary privacy safeguards required for that
company.

The organization,

nal audit staff,

with the assistance of the inter¬

implements procedures to enact that policy.

The organization with assistance of legal counsel and the
internal auditors

includes a description of the policy and

procedures in the annual report.

The CPA reviews this policy

and the procedures to assure the readers of the report that
the policy and procedures are in place and are effective and
includes a report on these

findings

in the auditor’s report.

The audit model is diagrammed in figure 3.

Conclusions
The discussion of the philosophical implications of
the privacy model has revealed that the proposed privacy mo¬
del is not inconsistent with the recent authoritative ac¬
counting and auditing literature.

There is also consider¬

able authoritative support for the model.

The presentation

by management of its policies and procedures is supported by
ASOBAT which required that such reports meet social goa'ls
and certain criteria which the information was shown to have
met.

Such a report was also shown to be supported by other

authorities as a requirement of society in the present envi¬
ronment and as a means of facilitating the accountability of
record-keeping organizations.

The Cohen Commission suggested

that companies report on their policies and procedures for
complying with laws and regulations.

Figure 3

Privacy Audit Model
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The suggested extension of the audit function was sup¬
ported by the Committee on Basic Auditing Concepts which said
that extensions of the audit function require auditors'
petence and operational criteria.
fies those requirements.

com¬

The privacy audit satis¬

This extension of the auditing

function was also supported by the GAO and the AICPA for
government audits and by the Cohen Commission for all audits.

Summary

This chapter has developed the privacy model.
gan with a description of the goals of the model.

It be¬
Three of

these goals are taken from the Privacy Protection Study Com¬
mission and three were adopted for this model.

The practices

required to implement those goals were deduced from and shown
to be consistent with those goals.
It is noted here that the practices are assumed to
meet the model's goals.

For example,

it is assumed that the

audited privacy report will satisfy the needs of interna¬
tional concerns.

However,

privacy is responsible for only a

portion of the impasse on the

issue of- transborder data flow.

The international data flow problem is also complicated by
the issues of nationalism,
tries and interests.

the protection of national indus¬

The privacy model developed here does

not address these other aspects of the international data
flow oroblem.
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It is also assumed that the public will be served by
the audited privacy report.

However,

there is a danger that

the public will not interpret this report correctly.

The

public may perceive the auditor's attestation as a certifi¬
cation that privacy is protected by the organization.

This

would not necessarily be true since the auditor is to merely
state that the organization is doing what the organization
had said it was doing with regard to privacy.

This possi¬

bility of public misunderstanding was voiced by some members
of the Auditing Standards Executive Committee when they dis¬
sented on the issuance of SAS 20.

They objected to any

public communication of the material weaknesses in internal
control.

The dissenting members believed that such communi-

cation could easily be misunderstood by the public.
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This chapter also contained a review of the accounting
and auditing literature.

It was noted that this model is in

many ways supported by the authoritative literature.
noted here, however,

It is

that showing that the model is consis¬

tent with the assumed implementation goals and showing that
it is not inconsistent with the authoritative literature may
not make up sufficient support for the model.

The account¬

ing profession would not necessarily be convinced by such
arguments.

If the profession is not convinced by such ar¬

guments and does not develop an interest in conducting pri¬
vacy audits,

this may not be a significant model.
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The accounting profession,

being pragmatic in nature,

would probably be more convinced by practical arguments con¬
cerning this model.

If the auditor can be shown to be qua¬

lified for this task and if there is substantial overlap
with existing audit tasks,

the auditor might be convinced.

This researcher believes that there is substantial overlap
and that the auditor is qualified for this task.

This will

become more apparent in the remaining chapters of this re¬
search.
In conclusion,

this researcher believes that this mo¬

del is consistent with the assumed environment,
by authoritative accounting literature,

is supported

and finally will be

perceived by the auditing profession to be a desirable task
to undertake.

These three aspects together are convincing

arguments for this model.
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CHAPTER

I V

PRIVACY STANDARDS

The purpose of this chapter is to outline privacy
safeguards as a hierarchy of objectives,
cedures.

The presentation lends

itself to the implementation

of privacy safeguards and provides a
ing of these

safeguards.

standards and pro¬

framework for the audit¬

This relationship was

shown in

figure 1.

Framework

This presentation of privacy safeguards
ter the hierarchy of accounting objectives,
procedures

framework is

privacy safeguards
This

standards and

sometimes collectively referred to as Generally

Accepted Accounting Principles
this

is modeled af¬

(GAAP).

This

is done because

familiar to the accountant and because
lend themselves to such a presentation.

framework is also useful to the organization in imple¬

menting privacy safeguards.

It could be argued that a pri¬

vacy audit is a compliance audit,

because it certainly is a

test of the compliance with privacy laws,
confused with,
nancial audit.

nor made similar to,

and should not be

nor conducted with a fi¬

It is argued here that a privacy audit should

be conducted as part of a financial audit.
stated:
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Proctor has
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The compliance audit should be an integral part of fi¬
nancial and operational or performance audits and should
not generally be conducted as a separate examination.
Basically, this is due to the nature of compliance au¬
dits since most aspects of these examinations overlap
with financial and performance auditing.1
This concept reduces cost by eliminating duplication of ef¬
fort.
The information system within an organization contains
both accounting and personal data.

Some accounting data is,

in fact,

also personal data.

example,

contain some information which is personal in na¬

ture.

Accounts receivable files,

for

If privacy and financial audits are conducted sepa¬

rately there would be duplication of some tests of the infor¬
mation system.

The review of the internal control system

and the tests of file accuracy are examples.

A privacy au¬

dit is a test of an information system to determine compli¬
ance with privacy safeguards and if it is

to be conducted

as a part of a financial audit it should be modeled after
financial audits which determine whether financial statements
are prepared in accordance with accounting requirements
called Generally Accepted Accounting Principles.
cessary,

then,

It is ne¬

that privacy safeguards be outlined as a

hierarchy of objectives,

standards and procedures as are the

GAAP.
The auditor,
tion's

while conducting a review of an organiza¬

financial statements,

Accepted Auditing Standards

is guided by a set of Generally
(GAAS).

Therefore,

if the CPA
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is to conduct a privacy audit it is not only necessary that
a framework such as GAAP be developed but also that privacy
audit standards be developed.

In chapter VI modification

of the GAAS are suggested to assist the auditor in design¬
ing and conducting a privacy audit.

Accounting Objectives/ Standards and Procedures

GAAP have been defined as a hierarchy of various le¬
vels,

levels with various descriptions and definitions.

These levels have been called postulates,
ciples,

rules,

procedures,

objectives,

basic concepts and purposes.

authors have agreed that there is a hierarchy,
ally has three levels,

prin¬
All

that it usu¬

that the higher the level the more

permanent the concept and that the lower levels are logically
derived from those above.
In 1958 the American Institute of Certified Public Ac¬
countants'

special committee on research programs proposed

four levels,
research.

postulates,

principles,

rules or guides and

They stated the following:

Postulates are few in number and are the basic assump¬
tions on which principles rest.
They necessarily derive
from the economic and political environment and from the
modes of thought and customs of all segments of the busi¬
ness community. ... A fairly broad set of coordinated
accounting principles should be formulated on the basis
of the postulates. . . . Rules or other guides for the
application of accounting principles in specific situa¬
tions, then, should be developed in relation to the
postulates and principles. . . .2
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Moonitz

in his search for postulates of accounting adopts

.
3
this hierarchy.

Leonard Spacek in his comments contained in

the Moonitz monograph contends that purposes and objectives
4
should be specified,
Moonitz

then postulates and principles.

in another monograph tells us

something about

the relative permanence of the upper levels of the hierarchy
when he states:
The complexities of modem business make it necessary to
formulate more specific rules, beyond the principles
themselves. . . . But changes in the detailed rules do
not necessarily affect the broad principles and basic
postulates, all of which are comprehended in the term
generally accepted accounting principles.
In 1965 Grady published an inventory of GAAP.

In out¬

lining his presentation he agreed with the hierarchy speci¬
fied earlier by the committee on research programs but chose
to use the term basic concept rather than postulates.^

He

goes on further to explain what principles are not rules
which cannot vary.

Grady summarizes the principles of fi¬

nancial accounting by stating that accounting principles
must follow from the purposes of accounting,

and that:

Such principles are necessarily stated in terms of ob¬
jectives and major criteria, and the complexities fac¬
ing modern business make more definitive rules, such as
the APB Opinions, necessary to implement the principles
in relation to the pertinent circumstances of the time.
In a changing world it naturally follows that detailed
rules not only may but should be changed to meet changes
in conditions or in the mode of thought of the busi¬
ness community, and that such changes do not necessarily
affect the broader principles and concepts, all of which
are comprehended in the term, generally accepted account¬
ing principles.
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In 1973 the American Insittute of Certified Public Ac¬
countants issued its report of the study group on the objec¬
tives of financial statements.
hierarchical

That report outlines the

framework in which the study group was operat¬

ing when it was

stated:

To serve users' needs, the accounting process should con¬
sist of an interrelated and compatible system of objec¬
tives, standards or principles, and practices or proce¬
dures.
Objectives should identify the goals and pur¬
poses of accounting.
Standards should follow logically
from objectives, and should provide guidelines for the
formulation of accounting practices compatible with the
desired goals.
All three levels of the system should
be linked rationally to the needs of users.9
In summary,

it has been shown that Generally Accepted

Accounting Principles are a hierarchy of objectives,
dards and procedures.

stan¬

Objectives are relatively permanent

in nature and are broad definitions of the problem at hand.
Standards derive from objectives and are rather broad
guidelines of how the objectives are to be carried out.
This

is the framework to be used in presenting privacy safe¬

guards as a set of Generally Accepted Privacy Principles
(GAPP).

Privacy Objectives,

Standards and Procedures

Objectives
There are several opinions of what the objectives of a
privacy policy should be.

One of the early statements on

the issue,

as reported in the preceding chapter,

who called

"the right of privacy"

was Cooley

"the right to one's
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person" which is

"a right of complete immunity:

alone."2 3 * * * * * * 10

This

to be let

is certainly a broad objective but it is not

sufficient to suggest standards

for its implementation,

par¬

ticularly in today's record-keeping environment.
Westin feels that the overriding issue on privacy is
the obtaining of a balance between the right of privacy and
the need for disclosure or surveillance.11
far as

This is

fine as

it goes but still presents problems of operationaliz¬

ing as did Cooley's objective.

Miller also feels that the

central privacy problem is a need for balance but he sees
privacy and efficiency as
Westin and Baker

13

the conflicting interests.

12

suggest a privacy policy which has

these three points:
1.

Place limits on the amount and types of data collected
and the uses of that data, for decision making

2.

Provide greater rights of access by individuals
cords maintained about them

3.

Fashion new rules

to re¬

for data sharing and confidentiality

These points would suffice as the objectives of a privacy
policy except that point number two outlines a procedure

for

accomplishing a more broad objective.
The report of the Secretary of Health,

Education and

Welfare's Advisory Committee on Automatic Data Systems

14

suggested a code of fair information practice which had
these
1.

five points:

Define fair information practice as adherence to speci¬
fied safeguard requirements
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2.

Prohibit violation of any safeguard requirements as an
unfair information practice

3.

Provide that an unfair information practice be subject
to both civil and criminal penalties

4.

Provide for injunctions to prevent violation of any
safeguard requirement

5.

Give individuals the right to bring suit for unfair in¬
formation practices to recover actual, liquidated, and
punitive damages, in individual or class actions.
Provide for recovery of reasonable attorneys' fees and
other costs of litigation incurred by individuals who
bring successful suits

This code is a method for providing a legal structure for
unmentioned privacy issues and is not suitable as a privacy
objective.

This report also sets

forth five fair informa¬

tion principles which are considered to be standards and
will be discussed below.
The report of the Privacy Protection Study Commission
concluded that an effective privacy protection policy must
have three concurrent objectives:

15

1.

to create a proper balance between what an individual is
expected to divulge to a record-keeping organization and
what he seeks in return (to minimize intrusiveness)

2.

to open up record-keeping operations in ways that will
minimize the extent to which recorded information about
an individual is itself a source of unfairness in any
decision about him made on the basis of it (to maximize
fairness)

3.

to create and define obligations with respect to the
uses and disclosures that will be made of recorded in¬
formation about an individual (to create legitimate, en¬
forceable expectations of confidentiality)

These objectives are suitable as the broad privacy objec¬
tives necessary as a foundation of the Generally Accepted
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Privacy Principles hierarchy.

They lead to privacy stan¬

dards without being specific in themselves.

They are

founded in the history of the privacy issue discussed in the
preceding chapter.

That is,

individual to be let alone,

they address the rights of an
to participate in decisions made

regarding personal records which are maintained by others,
decisions regarding collection,

use and accuracy.

This will

serve as the foundation from which privacy standards are de¬
rived.

Standards
No source could be found which proposed privacy safe¬
guards and called them standards,
is original to this research.

since that terminology

However,

there are several

sources which suggest privacy safeguard classes which will
satisfy as

standards.

A number of these will be presented

here to gain a concensus of what these standards are.
useful to restate that standards must derive
tives,

It is

from the objec¬

be relatively broad and permanent in nature and sug¬

gest specific

implementation procedures.

Westin and Baker present a section in their report on
the implications

for public policy which they derive

their three point privacy policy mentioned above.

16

from
This

policy includes the following points:
1.

A person should have access to a personal record main¬
tained by others.
This should include rights to know
that the records exists, to inspect the record, and to
challenge its accuracy, completeness, and propriety
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2.

Rules should be established for confidentiality and
data-sharing

3.

Limit unnecessary data collection

4.

Record-keeping organizations should provide security
measures for their information system

5.

Establish a privacy agency to manage certain bodies of
sensitive data

With the exception of the establishment of a privacy agency,
these points meet the criteria established for standards
and,

as will be shown below,

are similar in many ways to

other suggested standards.
The Health,

Education and Welfare study mentioned above

contains certain fundamental principles of fair information
practice which has

five points:

17

1.

There must be no personal-data record-keeping systems
whose very existence is secret

2.

There must be a way for an individual to find out what
information about him is in a record and how it is
used

3.

There must be ways for an individual to prevent informa¬
tion about him obtained for one purpose from being used
or made available for other purposes without his consent

4.

There must be a way for an individual to correct or amend
a record of identifiable information about him

5.

Any organization creating, maintaining, using, or dis¬
seminating records of identifiable personal data must
assure the reliability of the data for their intended
use and must take reasonable precautions to prevent mis¬
use of the data.

Again,

these points

standards.

satisfy the criteria established for

Although arranged differently,

this

list is es¬

sentially the same as that proposed by Westin and Baker
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above.
this

The

list,

Privacy Protection Study Commission accepted
added

a

few points,

sented their own principles

of

rearranged others

and pre¬

fair information practice

as

follows:
1.

Openness—There shall be no personal-data record¬
keeping system whose very existence is secret

2.

Individual Access—Individuals shall have the right to
see and copy individually identifiable information
stored about them

3.

Individual Participation—The right to correct or amend
information maintained about an individual

4.

Collection Limitation—Limits
of collection of information

5.

Use

6.

Disclosure Limitation—Limits

7.

Information Management—Organization shall bear an af¬
firmative responsibility for establishing reasonable and
proper information management policies and practices
which assure that its collection, maintenance, use, and
dissemination of information about an individual is
necessary and lawful and the information itself is cur¬
rent and accurate

8.

Accountability—An organization is accountable for its
personal-data record-keeping policies, practices, and
systems

These
as

Limitation—Limits

principles

the privacy

consistent with
collection

2,

and

maximize

standards
the

on internal

types

three

on external disclosure

being sought.

standards

primary objectives.

Standard

1,

2

from objective
and

3;

individual participation,
fairness.

are taken here

These

derives

Standards

and manner

use

fair information practice

limitation,

intrusiveness.
access,

of

on the

Standards

5,

6,

1,

openness,
derive
7,

and

are
4,

minimizing
individual

from objective
8;

use
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limitation,

disclosure limitation,

and accountability,
mate,

derive

information management,

from objective

3,

create legiti¬

enforceable expectations of confidentiality.

These

standards are relatively broad and as will be shown below,
they suggest specific implementation procedures.

Procedures
Specific implementation procedures are contained in
various laws passed by the Congress and in the recommenda¬
tions of the Privacy Protection Study Commission.
of procedures

specified in The FCRA,

Examples

The Privacy Act of

1974 and the Privacy Commission Report will be presented
here.

Table 1 contains a list of the sources of privacy

procedures.

Hoffman

suggests

abreast of privacy legislation.

several ways of staying
Also the Privacy Journal

publishes an annual compilation of privacy laws.
pose of this presentation will be to show a

The pur¬

few examples of

implementation procedures and also to show how they are con¬
sistent with the privacy standards.
In 1970 Congress passed The FCRA.

This was the

first

major recognition of the rights of citizens to privacy of
records kept by others.

Congress recognized

"a need to en¬

sure that consumer reporting agencies exercise their grave
responsibilities with fairness,

impartiality,

for the consumer's right to privacy."

and a respect

The law's purpose was

to require that these agencies perform their duties with
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TABLE 1
Sources of Federal Privacy Procedures

Freedom of Information Act
1966)
Truth-in-Lending Act

(U.S.

(U.S.

Code,

Code,

vol.

vol.

15,

5,

sec.

SEC.

552,

1601,

1968)

Regulation Z of the Federal Reserve Board (Code of Federal
Regulations, vol. 12, sec. 226, 1968)
Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act of 1970
(U.S. Code, vol. 3T, sec. 1051-1122, 1970)
Fair Credit Reporting Act
1970)

(U.S.

Code,

vol.

Law on Federal Justice Information Systems
42, sec. 3771, 1973)
Privacy Act of 1974

(U.S.

Code,

vol.

5,

15,

sec.

(U.S.

sec.

602,

Code,

552a,

1974)

Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974
Code, vol. 20, sec. 1232q, 1974)

(U.S.

Fair Credit Billing Act
1974)

1601,

Tax Reform Act of 1976
1976)

(U.S.

Code,

(U.S.

Code,

Equal Credit Opportunity Act
1976)

(U.S.

vol.

vol.

Code,

15,

26,

sec.

secs,

vol.

15,

vol.

408,

6103,

sec.

1691,

Report of the Privacy Protection Study Commission (Personal
Protection in an Information Society, by David F.
Linowes, Chairman^ Washington, D.C.:
Government
Printing Office, 1977)
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regard to
able

information

"in a manner which is

to the consumer,

accuracy,
mation.

relevancy,

..."

21

with regard to the

fair and equit¬

confidentiality,

and proper utilization of

The major

requirements

such

of the

infor-

law with

regard to

consumer reporting agencies,

with parenthetical

reference

to privacy

follows:

reports

can only be

standards,

are

as

issued in response

to court order,

instructed by the consumer,

or to persons

in legitimate business

as

or

insurance

not

such

(disclosure

contain obsolete

credit

when

expected to use

granting,

limitations);

information

consumer

it

employment

consumer reports

can¬

(information management);

consumer reports

should be prepared with procedures

to assure

maximum possible

accuracy

consu¬

mers

shall

upon request be notified of nature,

and sources
ports

tion

of

information and recipients

(individual access,

ability,

(information management);

collection

disclosure

limitation,

should be reinvestigated,

resolved,

a

consumer statement
recipients

openness);

is

amended to

information

(individual participation);

if a

report

limitation,

is

disclosure

this

informa¬

cannot be
record and

the disputed

consumers must be

for an employment decision or

limitation,
for various

act requires

the

are notified of

the cause of an adverse

addition to providing
ties,

used

account¬

disputed

and if the dispute

future

is

consumer re¬

limitation,

any past or

notified if a report

of

substance,

credit decision

openness).
civil

Finally,

(use
in

and criminal penal¬

that the provisions

be

enforced by
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various federal agencies
are given "procedural,
powers,

.

.

."^2

(accountability).

investigative,

These agencies

and enforcement

jn 1977 the Report of the Privacy Protec¬

tion Study Commission recommended that consumers be informed
of the actual contents of records maintained about them rather than just the substance of such records.
The Privacy Act of 1974,
legislation to date,

the most important privacy

adopts the eight privacy standards as

policy for federal agencies.
are:

23

The main provisions of the law

agencies are required to provide notice of the exis¬

tence or proposed existence of data banks and also the gene¬
ral contents and likely subjects of such files

(openness);

provide access to files and correction or amending proce¬
dures

(individual access,

individual participation);

re¬

quest permission for and provide history of non-routine dis¬
closures

(use limitation,

disclosure limitation);

must establish appropriate administrative,

agencies

technical, and

physical safeguards to insure the security and confidential¬
ity of sensitive records

(information management);

and civil penalties are provided

criminal

(accountability).

The most extensive and comprehensive work in the area
of privacy was that of the Privacy Protection Study Commis¬
sion which was created by the Privacy Act of 1974.

The Com¬

mission published its findings in July of 1977 in a book
titled Personal Privacy in an Information Society.
above,

As stated

the Commission formulated three objectives of an
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effective privacy protection policy.
minimization of intrusiveness,

These objectives are

maximization of fairness and

legitimizing expectations of confidentiality.

In proposing

methods for implementing this policy the Commission was
guided by three principles:
reform should be created;

that incentives for systemic

that existing regulatory and en¬

forcement mechanisms should be used insofar as possible;
that unnecessary cost be avoided.

In keeping with these

principles the Commission's recommendations include a combin
ation of voluntary compliance with the policy;
creation of rights,

interests,

statutory

or responsibilities enforce¬

able through either individual or governmental action;

and

establishment of ongoing governmental mechanisms to investi¬
gate,

study,

and report on privacy protection issues.

The Commission makes 166 specific legislative recommen
dations as well as some suggestions for voluntary compliance
with the privacy policy outlined in the report.

With very

few exceptions the only mechanism suggested for enforcing
compliance with the policy is remedy through the courts.
The Commission feels that if the rights of individuals are
established so as to create a balance between them and the
power of the record-keepers, then any violations can be
remedied in the courts.

The Commission feels that this will

create an incentive for organizations to comply with the
policy.

Ill

The Commission also recommended the creation of an in¬
dependent entity within the federal government charged with
the responsibility to:

monitor and evaluate the implementa¬

tion of any statutes and regulations enacted pursuant to
this study and participate in proceedings or processes whose
action affects privacy;

continue to research,

study and in¬

vestigate areas of privacy concern and to be a mechanism
whereby information collection and use could be questioned;
to issue interpretive rules that must be followed by Federal
agencies in implementing The Privacy Act of 1974; provide ad
vice regarding the privacy implications of proposed federal
or state statutes or regulations.

It is important to note

that the only enforcement authority given the board is in
connection with the implementation by federal agencies of
the Privacy Act itself.
A very important part of the Commission's report is a
review of the effectiveness of the Privacy Act of 1974 and
its recommendations concerning the adoption of the Privacy
Act in the private sector.

The Commission does not feel

that the Privacy Act should be adopted because:

economic in

centives are more effective in the private sector than in
government;

there is a high degree of uniformity in govern¬

ment not present in private institutions;

government inter¬

vention could not be kept at a minimum in administering the
Privacy Act in many diverse private concerns;

some require¬

ments of the Privacy Act would be improper or even illegal
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if applied in the private sector;

and the Privacy Act is not

working very well in the Federal government.
The Commission's recommendations vary according to the
particular circumstances of each type of record-keeping re¬
lationship.

Implementation by different industries would be

similar in that the recommendations follow from the primary
objectives and standards but vary with the particulars of the
individual's typical relationship with that industry and with
an eye to balancing the competing interests of the individual
and record-keeper.
Some examples of the recommendations of the Commission
are presented here.

For the insurance and insurance-support

industries it was recommended that The FCRA be amended to:
prevent false or misleading representations in the collection
of information on individuals

(collection limitation);

re¬

quire reasonable care in selection of support organizations
so as to assure that the Commission's recommendations are
followed by that source
management);

(disclosure limitation,

information

and require that individuals be notified of ex¬

istence of records and contents of that record

(openness,

individual participation).^
In the employment records area,

the commission recom¬

mended amendment to The FCRA to limit information collected
about employees

(collection limitation), and to specify uses

and disclosure of information collected
disclosure limitation).

25

(use limitation,

113

In the medical-care relationship,

the Commission re¬

commends that The Social Security Act be amended to require
that medical-care providers comply with certain recommenda¬
tions as a condition of participation in the Medicare and
Medicaid programs.

The recommendations specified involved

access to records

(individual access), correction of records

(individual participation), and availability of records to
authorized recipients

(use limitation,

disclosure limita-

. .
,26
tion).
The Commission's report contains many more recommenda¬
tions in the areas mentioned above as well as in the areas
of consumer credit, banking, mailing lists and investigative
reporting agencies.
tions.

In mid-1978 these were still recommenda¬

However several bills were pending before Congress

to implement various parts of the Commission's report.

Summary

This chapter has suggested a set of Generally Accepted
Privacy Principles
standards,
gure 4.

(GAPP)

and procedures.

which is a hierarchy of objectives,
The GAPP are summarized in fi¬

The objectives and standards are taken from the

Report of the Privacy Protection Study Commission.

Using

these objectives and standards in the way suggested in this
chapter is,

however, original in this research.

The proce¬

dures in this hierarchy are the specific privacy practices.
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These are found in various laws and in the Privacy Commis¬
sion Report.
The GAPP framework is developed for both the auditor
and for the record-keeping organization.

The GAPP framework

will assist the auditor in the privacy audit in much the
same way that the GAAP framework is of assistance in the fi¬
nancial audit.

It is emphasized here that the GAPP frame¬

work is different from the GAAP framework in that the GAPP
is a classification scheme for the privacy practices some
of which are optional.

The accounting practices in the GAAP

framework are for the most part not optional.
The GAPP framework's classification feature is useful
for this research because the presentation of suggested
techniques for implementing privacy, discussed in the next
chapter,

can make reference to the standards rather than the

actual practices.

This approach broadens the scope of the

presentation and relieves it of the difficulties of discuss¬
ing the many specific procedures.
in chapter VI,

The audit model,

discussed

also makes reference to the standards rather

than the procedures.
This framework also simplifies privacy implementation.
Implementation by an organization would require reference to
the specific requirements or optional practices for that in¬
dustry and for that organization.

However, being able to

classify the many privacy procedures into just eight stan¬
dards will facilitate this implementation.

The organization
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can view the specific procedures in light of the objectives
and the standards and more easily make decisions on the ex¬
tent of implementation by knowing the intent of the speci¬
fic procedures.

The framework also assists in choosing spe¬

cific implementation techniques,

given the presentation in

chapter V.
This framework will also assist the auditor as it
will facilitate the auditor's learning process.

The frame¬

work, which classifies the many privacy procedures,

sim¬

plifies the many privacy requirements and makes it easier
for the auditor to identify what practices are being imple¬
mented,

the intent of the practices and the techniques which

can be used to implement those practices.

The audit model

in chapter VI is also presented with this framework in mind
which allows the auditor to choose audit techniques based
on the standard being tested.
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CHAPTER

V

IMPLEMENTING PRIVACY STANDARDS

This chapter presents procedures which are or can be
used to implement privacy safeguards in a record-keeping
organization.

These procedures,

a combination of policies,

and manual and automated controls, are presented not to give
an implementation plan but rather to establish a framework
for the privacy audit model.
detail,

Where this presentation lacks

references to privacy methods will be made.

This presentation does not discuss the specific pri¬
vacy safeguards suggested by laws and studies but instead
uses the privacy standards adopted in the preceding chapter.
Since these standards do not vary between industries and are
relatively constant over time,

the implementation procedures

and the audit model based on those procedures will have suf¬
ficient scope and permanence to be useful.
This presentation proceeds as follows:

first,

the

eight privacy standards and the types of procedures neces¬
sary for their implementation are discussed;

second,

each of

the standards and some of the manual and automatic controls
which could be used to implement them are discussed;

finally,

some thoughts on the subjectivity of privacy procedures will
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be presented.
tation were

Ideas

for the

general

sary to
detail

presen¬

found in Hoffman and Linowes.'*’

Implication of the

Table

outline of this

2

presents

implement the
in the

Standards

an outline of the procedures
standards.

Each is

neces¬

discussed in more

following sections.

Openness
The
of

Privacy Act of

system notices

tended to

give

in The

routine

such as

the Federal

ness
of

internal

such time as

reach the

Register exists

type

of

individual

existence of

requires
the

in

individual

contributes

vidual;

that system.

in¬

uses.

data;

the

that each

No mechanism
sector.

could publish

sys¬

likely to

in the bank.

The open¬

individual

notified

if there

is

authorizes

when the record

be

a record on the

The notice could be

individual,

in the bank

in the private

included

the organization has

or when

questions

This was

inclusion

organizations

system,

from third parties;

ically as

2

in such a way that they would be

individual

data

for

and external

one does,

standard also

the

Federal Register.

likely candidates

and the

tem notices

required an annual publication

information on the existence of a data-bank,

a description of

Until

1974

given

collection of
is

set

up;

as

an

that

period¬

correspondence with the

indi¬

responding to public notice,

an organization concerning existence

of a

record.
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TABLE

2

Implementing the

1.

Openness:

2.

Individual Access:

3.

Individual

4.

Collection Limitation:

5.

Use

6.

Disclosure Limitation:

7.

Information Management:

8.

Accountability:

Standards

. Public notice of existence
Notice to individuals
Copy of record provided with notice
Copy of record provided upon request

Participation:

Limitation:

Mechanisms for individuals to
challenge record contents
Amendments included in or
linked to the record

Policy of limited data collection
Notify individuals and third
parties at time of data collec¬
tion

Mechanisms to
formation

limit

internal

use of

in¬

Mechanisms to limit external use
of information
Procedure for verifying uses by
receiving entities
Designate an individual as
privacy monitor
Provide mechanisms to propagate
corrections
Establish security system

Maintain log of record uses
Audit of privacy safeguards

and sources
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Individual Access
This
the

standard requires

individual

a copy of

dividual.

This

amendments

or variations

a

that

record maintained about the

copy should be

complete,

in duplicate

form readily understood by the
be

included with the notice

existence

of the

an organization provide

containing

records,

individual.

to the

individual

record or provided upon the

in¬

any

and be

This

to

in a

copy might

concerning the
request of the

individual.

Individual
After

an

Participation

individual has

provided by the organization,
contents
rate,
have

the

timely,

complete

the

and

for

or relevant.

for the

individual

the organization to

record after

a

to

be

be

should make

record or
to the
record.

link

it

the

to the record

record would capture

not

the

accu¬

register these

lodged.
the

rebuttal

so that

contents

Should the

the organiza¬

part of

any

the amendment

com¬

record would

disagreement,

individual's

is

re-evaluate the

individual,

tion

it

to

The organization must

complaint has been

Should there

record

objections

that

organization agree with the
corrected.

copy of the

there may be

record on the grounds

a mechanism

plaints
of

of

reviewed a

as

future
well

the
access
as

the
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Collection Limitation
An organization should periodically review its data
collection practices to insure that a minimum of informa¬
tion is collected for a given use and,

as

that it is collected from the individual.

far as possible,
The results of

each review would become organization policy until a subse¬
quent review.

Practices would then be implemented to carry

out this policy.

The organization should also notify indi¬

viduals and third parties,
lected,

at the time that data is col¬

of the uses of the information,

niques and sources

the scope,

tech¬

used to get additional information about

the individual and the effects of not providing the informa¬
tion requested.
sis

This notice would give the individual a ba¬

for deciding whether or not to provide the information

requested or whether to participate at all in the record¬
keeping relationship.

Use Limitation
An organization must install mechanisms to insure that
uses of personal information are consistent with the uses
specified in the notices given to individuals under the
openness and collection limitation standards.

These mech¬

anisms would limit uses of information by restricting data
to certain applications and persons or functions within the
organization.
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Disclosure Limitation
As with the use

limitation standard an organization

must install mechanisms to insure that external disclosures
are consistent with notices

given to individuals.

In addi¬

tion an organization must take action to verify the uses to
which the information is put by organizations receiving per¬
sonal data.

An organization can insure that internal uses

are consistent with an individual's expectations and that
other organizations which receive data are known to the in¬
dividual.

It is the organization's responsibility to verify

that the uses to which the data are put by receiving organi¬
zations remains consistent with the individual's expecta¬
tions .

Information Management
This

standard establishes that there are proper ap¬

proaches to the management of

information and that the

record-keeping organization should take affirmative

steps to

assure that their information management practices conform
to a reasonable set of norms.

Some of the practices

sug¬

gested by this standard have been incorporated into the
other standards.
lection,
practice.

Establishing policies on limited data col¬

for example,

is a good information management

The information management standard,

however,

suggests that there are other more general steps that an or¬
ganization should take in regards to the management of its
information system.
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First,

an individual within the organization should be

appointed as privacy monitor with responsibility to issue
instructions,

guidelines and standards,

and make such de¬

terminations as necessary to implement privacy safeguards.
This person would be responsible for training the organiza¬
tion's personnel in privacy procedures,

for reviewing

record-keeping practices or computer system design for
reasonableness.

This person would also be responsible

for

participation in privacy policy-making and for enforcing com¬
pliance with safeguards within the organization.
would serve as a central

This person

focus within the organization to

keep abreast of current privacy procedures and to provide as¬
sistance to organization personnel on privacy matters.
Second,

the organization should provide procedures

for

notifying any sources or prior recipients of personal infor¬
mation whenever a correction to that information is made.
Third,

the organization should establish reasonable

administrative,
the

integrity,

technical and physical safeguards to assure
confidentiality,

and security of its

indivi¬

dually identifiable records.

Accountability
To verify that the organization is complying with its
privacy policy,

an audit of the privacy system is required.

The audit would involve a review and testing of the proce¬
dures noted under the other seven standards.

In order to
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assist in verifying that the use and disclosure of informa¬
tion is consistent with policies and with the notices given
and also as an aid in propagating record corrections,

a

logging of sources and uses of personal records would also
be required.

Techniques

for Implementing Privacy Procedures

This section reviews the techniques
the privacy procedures.

for implementing

As mentioned earlier,

this presen¬

tation is not intended to be an implementation plan nor an
exhaustive review of the literature available.

It is

in¬

tended to present suggested ways to implement the procedures
and provide a

framework for auditing the privacy system.

with the previous section,
presenting techniques

As

this presentation proceeds by

for each privacy standard.

Table

presents an outline of the techniques presented in the

3
fol¬

lowing sections.

Openness
As mentioned above,

there is presently no mechanism

that record-keeping organizations

in the private sector can

use to notify the general public as to the existence of that
organization's personal record-keeping systems.

Until such

time as there is an index of private sector data banks,
ganizations can make public announcements.

or¬

For example,

tices concerning personnel records can be made

in company

no¬
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TABLE 3
Privacy Techniques

1.

Openness:

Pre-printed forms
Automatic notice
File inquiry

2.

Individual Access:

3.

Individual Participation:

4.

Collection Limitation:

5.

Use Limitation:

6.

Disclosure Limitation:

7.

Information Management:

8.

Accountability:

Conversion of record to understand¬
able form
Linkage to amendments and duplicates
Mechanisms for file update
Data fields for amendments or
linkage to amendments

Controls on data types
Controls on data sources

Authentication and authorization proce¬
dures
Other software controls on applications
of data
Authentication and authorization
procedures
Other software controls on appli¬
cation of data
Automatic verification of confi¬
dentiality of receiver of re¬
cord
Privacy monitor as database ad¬
ministrator
Software procedures for automa¬
tically propagating record
corrections
Security system

Data fields to record sources and uses
of information
Transaction logs of data use
Privacy audit
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bulletins,

in pay envelopes

or on company bulletin boards.

Notices concerning personal records maintained on indivi¬
duals outside the organization could be made as advertise¬
ments in the media.

All such notices would include a de¬

scription of likely candidates

for inclusion in the data

bank and the type and uses of information maintained.

The

organization could continue to use these techniques even af¬
ter the data bank index is established.
By having notices pre-printed on forms used by an or¬
ganization,
data bank,

people could be notified of the existence of a
its use,

and other information deemed desirable.

Forms used to collect data could contain such a notice as
well as a description of third parties who might be used as
sources to complement the data being collected.

Periodic

correspondence such as monthly statements might have such a
pre-printed notice which also describes procedures

for view¬

ing and copying the individual record and also procedures
for correcting or amending the record,
deemed by the individual to be

if the record is

in error.

The actual record could also be printed on periodic
correspondence with the individual.
ganization could,

for example,

Each person in an or¬

be provided annually with a

copy of their personnel record.

Credit card companies

could send annually a copy to each customer of the record
maintained about that individual.

Use of this procedure
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would,

of course,

depend on size and sensitivity of the re¬

cord.
If an organization is to respond to requests by indi¬
viduals concerning the existence of a record,
response to the public notice,

possibly in

an organization must provide

a method of querying their files to make such a determina¬
tion.

There would need to be a function within the organiza

tion which would make such file inquiries either on-line
with terminals at their desks or overnight on a batch basis.
The answers to such queries could be a simple yes or no or
might include a copy of the record if the organization felt
that most requests concerning existence of a record were
coupled with or immediately followed by a request for an
actual copy of the record.
The openness standard would be implemented by an or¬
ganization knowing the specific procedures
quired or suggested,
vacy.

for disclosure re

keeping in mind the objectives of pri¬

The purpose of the openness procedures is to notify

likely candidates of the existence of a record,

its uses,

additional sources of information not provided by the indi¬
vidual and procedures

for seeing,

copying and correcting or

amending the record in order to relay to the individual ex¬
pectations concerning confidentiality and to maximize the
fairness of the record-keeping relationship.

This also al¬

lows the user to participate in the decision concerning
amount of data collected and its uses.
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Individual Access
Quite often the computer printout of records,

for use

by people familiar with the system and its records,

are ra¬

ther cryptic and difficult for an untrained observer to re¬
cognize or use.

Organizations should make provisions

readable printouts of personal records

for

for an individual

whether these print-outs are for a specific request or are
produced automatically with systems notices or periodic
correspondence.

This might require conversion tables to

match internal codes with a phrase or word which describes
their meaning.

This may also require special headings and

other explanations of the meaning of the data being printed.
The organization may want to have a variable on the query
input to allow shortened,

coded print-outs

and expanded,

formatted print-outs

use.

translated,

for internal use
for external

In any case special software and tables would be re¬

quired.
Print-outs of records,
nal use,

whether for internal or exter¬

must include the entire record.

That is,

all amend¬

ments to the records must be included any time a record is
accessed.

This must be done to maximize the

individual.
cords.
exists.

fairness to the

Decisions should not be made on incomplete re¬

If the amendment is part of the record,

no problem

If the amendment is stored internally but not part

of the record,

the inquiry routine should include a search

for and print-out of that amendment.

If the amendment is
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stored externally,

the print-out should signify the existence

of an external amendment,

which would then be manually at¬

tached to the record print-out.
If the organization has duplicate copies of records,
any print-out of the record should include a note concerning
the existence and location of the duplicates.

In this way

inconsistencies can be corrected prior to any use or disclo¬
sure of the record.
The individual access standard should be implemented
knowing the specific procedures required or suggested.
example,

some data,

such as medical records,

For

are exempt from

certain disclosures and would not be included in most print¬
outs to the individual.

The primary objective of this

standard is to maximize the fairness with which record keep¬
ing operations are practiced and to provide the individual
with sufficient information with which to participate in
the record-keeping relationship.

Implementation should

keep these objectives in mind.

Individual Participation
One purpose of giving an individual access

is

to pro¬

vide the individual with the means by which to participate
in the record-keeping relationship by asking for corrections
to erroneous data contained in the record.

After reinves¬

tigating the data on which the individual takes exception,
the organization must either correct the errors or,

if they
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disagree,

attach an amendment to

agreement.
a means
is

The organization,

of updating the

file.

a common occurrence.

the

record noting this

therefore,

would need to have

Making corrections

It would be

dis¬

an unusual

system which did not allow such corrections

to

files

computer

to be made

easily.
Providing

for amendments

to records

is

not quite

common and deserves more consideration.

There

are

cases

is

fixed

to consider.

First,

and cannot provide
cord

ternal manual

is

no

to be

file

understood

The

system,

signify the existence

to mean

second case

is

a

of

to be

then an ex¬
and the

such an amendment.

single

digit code which

length record not providing

room for

an amendment

there

room to

store the amendment in another place on

A

in

is

system.

field

the place where
a

link between

the

record would

record

whenever necessary.

The

cord which provides

space

the record.
tation .

included

the amendment
the

This

re¬

that an amendment exists.
fixed

to be

a

length

amendment

of amendments must be maintained

alteration would only need be

would be

of

three

included in the

room for the

else on the computer

record altered to
This

record

for amendments

itself or if there

included anywhere

if the

as

and

is
its

in a

serve

stored.

record but where

as

a pointer

is

a variable

for the amendment as

situation presents

to

This would create

amendment to be

third case

the

used
length re¬

a part of

no problem in

implemen¬
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The purpose of
tion of,
dual

standard

or amendment to,

about whom the

plemented with the
light of
dual.

this

records

record

is

is

maintained.

specific procedures

inaccurate

son about whom the

record

for correc¬

upon request of

the objective of maximizing

The use of

to provide

records

It

the

indivi¬

should be

im¬

in mind and in

fairness
is

not

to

the

indivi¬

fair to the per¬

is maintained.

Collection Limitation
As mentioned above,
policies
and

concerning the

the means

policies
dures
ness

types

by which the

are,

as

always,

of information

information is

derived

by

limiting the

lected as

collected.

from the

amounts

and

types

fairness which requires
much as

last resort

what other

possible

from the

from reliable

sources

are established,

specific

are or

of data

that data

These

proce¬

third parties,

could be

used.

sources

The design of

on the

forms

and then as

all

of whom know

Once

the policies

the organization should provide controls

from being entered

a method to

and the ob¬

should be col¬

individual

which prevent unauthorized data or data

as

to be collected

keeping in mind the objective of minimizing intrusive¬

jective of

a

the organization must establish

forms

into the

record.

used to collect data could be used

restrict data

could be

from unauthorized

used to

types.

Pre-printed notices

inform the

individual or

third
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parties of other data and sources which might be used to
complement the data being collected thereon.
Controls on the types and sources of data which the
computer would accept as input might also be advisable.
striction of data type,

if the record was of fixed format,

would not be difficult.

The design of the record would

preclude unauthorized data types.
sources of information,

As to the restriction on

the system could be so designed that

a source indicator is required with the input.
would reject any data,
authorization table,
sources.

Re¬

The computer

which by scanning a source/data

was

found to come from unauthorized

This procedure depends somewhat on the honesty of

the persons preparing the data for input who would be re¬
sponsible for assigning the source code.

Particular atten¬

tion would be paid to this area in any audit.

A comparison

of source documents with the data could uncover such dis¬
honesty.

This problem is discussed further in chapter VI.

The problem of controlling data types becomes more
complex when records are not fixed-format type.

Many modern

internal computer storage structures do not by nature have a
fixed format or size.

3

When such storage structures are

accessed by means of a data base management system
there

(DBMS),

is a method of restricting the types of data which can

4
be stored.
base

system,

Date,

in describing an architecture for a data¬

shows how the Data Model

Data Model Definition

(DMD)

(DM)

as defined by the

can restrict the types of data
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available to the user for access or update.

This effectively

restricts the types of data stored.

Use Limitation
The purpose of this objective is to limit the persons
or functions within an organization who can use certain data
and to restrict the applications
used.

for which data can be

There are two problems here.

Restricting access is
5

one and restricting application is the other.

Hoffman

de¬

scribes the solution to these problems as authentication and
authorization.
Authentication verifies that a person or object is
who they claim to be.

Software authentication methods such

as the use of passwords require that the user know some
privileged information and transmit this to the computer.
There are physical authentication methods which require that
users have in their possession some object such as a key or
magnetic card or possess some physical characteristic
as their voice or fingerprints.-*

such

These methods are used to

restrict access to the computer system itself by limiting
those who get near the computer or one of its remote termi¬
nals and by limiting those whom the computer will allow ac¬
cess to all or selected parts of the system.
Once a person or object has been authenticated as

le¬

gitimate and given access to the computer facility or termi¬
nal and access to the system,

an authorization check is made
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on each request to determine if the requester can be given

g
the data item requested.

Hoffman

describes authorization

techniques which can be designed to key on the user,

the

terminal,

the

the operation requested,

the datum itself,

7

value of the datum or other miscellaneous criteria.

Date

describes the general principles whereby a database

system

can restrict the use of the stored data through the data
submodel definition

(DSMD)

of the data submodel

(DSM).

Since the DSM is the only part of the DM to which a user has
access,
zation.

the DSMD can become a means of restricting authoriGraham

8

describes the principles by which an ope¬

rating system can restrict access to authorized processes.
As with all of the standards,

there are many varia¬

tions in the procedures required or suggested for a record¬
keeping organization.

The permitted uses of data within an

organization vary with the type of data and type of organiza¬
tion.

An organization would implement these specific proce¬

dures keeping in mind the objective of creating and enforc¬
ing an expectation of confidentiality for the individual to
maximize the

fairness of the uses of the data.

This

is done

by limiting the uses of the personal data.

Disclosure Limitation
Just as there are limits on the uses of data within an
organization,

there are specified limits on the disclosure

of data outside the record-keeping organization. There are
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limits on the types of organizations which are authorized to
receive data and also on the uses to which those organiza¬
tions can put the data.
The techniques
lar to those

for implementing this standard are simi¬

for the preceding standard,

use limitation.

A

system of authentication and authorization can be used to
restrict the transfer of data to authorized organizations.
Providing data only to authorized organizations presents no
particular problems.

The list of authorized organizations

would simply be included in the authentication/authorization
criteria list described below.
What does present a problem is determining which or¬
ganizations are complying with certain privacy safeguards.
It is essential to determine which organizations will provide
the level of confidentiality expected and will restrict their
use of the data provided accordingly.

Receiving organiza¬

tions cannot be included on an organization's authorization
list until

it can be shown that they comply.

It is

sug¬

gested here that organizations review the reports of the in¬
dependent privacy audits,

suggested in chapter III,

and

periodically update their authorization lists based on the
results of that review.

Only if an organization has been

found to be in compliance with certain privacy safeguards
can they be included on an authorization list
of personal data.

for disclosure

Records would automatically be sent to

authorized requesting organizations until such time as

it
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is determined that they are not in compliance and are re¬
moved from the list.

This procedure requires no manual in¬

tervention as requests are made and only periodic update of
authorization lists.
Implementation of this procedure would require a re¬
view of the required and suggested procedures to make a de¬
termination of the types of organizations which are permitted
disclosure of personal records and a review of compliance
with privacy safeguards by those authorized organizations.
In assembling the external disclosure authorization list an
organization should be guided by the objectives of this
standard.
is

The purpose of the disclosure limitation standard

to restrict the external uses to which personal records

are put to enforce the individual's expectations of confi¬
dentiality.

This process is an attempt to maximize

for the

individual the fairness of the uses of individually identi¬
fiable data.

Information Management
In the report of the Privacy Protection Study Commis¬
sion it was -recommended that a person in each federal agency
be designated as privacy monitor to oversee implementation
9

of the Privacy Act.

It is

suggested here that such a moni¬

tor be appointed in all organizations,
which implement privacy safeguards.

public or private,

The responsibilities of

this monitor involve reviewing privacy procedures established
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for the organization,
vacy policy,

assisting in setting organization pri¬

and overseeing the implementation of informa¬

tion management controls to implement that policy.

The re¬

sponsibilities of this monitor are essentially the same as
those given to a function proposed for data processing ac¬
tivities,

the Database Administrator

(DBA).

The role of the DBA has been described in various
sources.1^

The DBA is seen as the manager of the data re¬

source within an organization.
or more people.
things,

The DBA function may be one

The DBA is responsible for,

among other

deciding the information content of the database,

writing the DSMD for each user or user group,

and defining

authorization and authentication procedures.

The privacy

monitor is essentially a DBA responsible for implementing
controls on the collection,

storage and use of data and

the overall quality of the data.

for

It is suggested here that

the DBA perform the duties as the manager of the data re¬
source

for the users and

with additional guidance
This

for the organization's management
from the above suggested GAPP.

function should not relieve others in an organization

of responsibility for protecting the privacy of individually
identifiable information.

Rather,

it should be a

function

responsible for reviewing privacy procedures and changes
them to become a
ganization,

focus of privacy implementation in an or¬

a function which assists

implementation of policy,
forcement.

in

in policy formulation,

problem solving,

and policy en¬
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Another aspect of information management is propaga¬
tion of corrections.

In general,

it is a good information

management practice to notify the users of information of
any errors which have existed in that information.

If an

organization finds that it has had errors in its data base,
those who have had occasion to use that data as well as
those who were the sources of that data should be notified
to prevent decisions from being made on the basis of erro¬
neous data.

This is also important in the privacy area be¬

cause decisions made concerning an individual,
erroneous data,

are unfair to an individual.

if based on
This would

violate the privacy objective of maximizing fairness to the
individual.

There are many privacy procedures concerning

the propagation of corrections.

An organization implement¬

ing this portion of the information management standard is
left with some subjective judgments concerning the extent
to which propagation is required.

If an organization for

any reason makes a correction to a personal record,

they

should notify those who have obtained a copy of that record
and those who were the source of the erroneous data of that
correction if it is likely that there would be no other way
for them to know of the error and if it likely that a deci¬
sion could be made about an individual on the basis of the
erroneous data.
To implement this part of the information management
standard an organization would have to modify its computer
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system to provide for automatic propagation of error correc¬
tions.

The system would be designed to recognize correc¬

tions of personal records,
and uses

to scan the log of data sources

(to be discussed below)

these functions.

and to send notices to

This notice would contain sufficient infor¬

mation for the function receiving the notice to identify the
record and the correction being made.

It might be difficult

to have the system recognize an error correction and to dis¬
tinguish it from a routine update.
person responsible

This would mean that the

for input of the error correction might

notify the system that propagation was required.

The system

could then automatically make the required notices.
The third aspect of information management is
security.

system

If an organization is to bear an affirmative re¬

sponsibility for establishing information management poli¬
cies and practices to assure that information that it main¬
tains about individuals is current and accurate,
must have a system of security controls.

then it

Security is gene¬

rally considered to be a set of technological,

physical,

and

administrative controls which are installed by an organiza¬
tion to protect both data and the equipment which processes
the data.

The purpose of the security measures

tect the data

is to pro¬

from accidental or intentional destruction,

authorized disclosure or unauthorized modification.

un¬

There

is a considerable overlap of privacy and security controls.
For example,

the techniques of authentication and
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authorization are both security and privacy measures.
two concepts are interdependent.

The

A secure system is not

necessarily a private system.
Perfectly accurate data may not be authorized by pri¬
vacy procedures

for collection or use.

Adequately controlled

access may be access to functions not authorized for such
use by privacy procedures.

Also,

vacy a system must be secure.

to properly protect pri¬

All of the privacy safeguards

discussed above will not be effective unless the computer
system is

in a secure environment.

Procedures to keep per¬

sonal records accurate will not be effective

if the computer

system is open to intentional or accidental modifications of
data.
Security systems range from nothing or possibly a lock
on the computer room door to very elaborate control proce¬
dures which may include cryptographic coding of data as a
precaution against unauthorized use of data.

There are li¬

terally hundreds of sources on the subject of computer se¬
curity.

Martin and Hoffman have been referenced above.

Wooldridge is considered a good source on security and
Browne contains a recent bibliography of security litera¬
ture . H
The essential elements of a security system can be sum¬
marized as

follows:

it should protect the physical environ¬

ment against sabotage,
and unauthorized entry;

fire and other natural disasters,
it should provide administrative
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controls
use

to prevent

fraud,

theft or

by providing personnel policies

duties,

and by

routines;

unauthorized access
such as

separation of

installing authentication and authorization

systems

for backup

reestablish operations

correcting errors

and recovery are necessary

after disasters;

tem should provide methods

and the

their

information.

implementation must include

facility and the

derived,

the

sensitivity of

environment of the

the

files.

with the

standard

generally accepted that a perfectly

attainable,
privacy,

security systems

should,

be designed to maximize

should be

in mind.

secure

system is

to the

on whom data are maintained by reaching a

chosen

Since

for the purposes

fairness

computer

Whatever security

the measures

information management

be¬

consideration of

system an organization chooses,

is

sys¬

for preventing or detecting and

and for purging dated

cost versus benefits

to

security

Security measures will vary among organizations
cause

or

it
un¬

of

individual

reasonable

level

of confidentiality.

Accountability
Implementation of this
logging data
ficient
personal

sources

standard

and uses.

The

information to determine
data

required by
correction

to aid

the
to a

the

requires

logs

data

in the propagation of

field

is

made,

the

system of

should contain

sources

information management

a

and uses

of

errors which

standard.

suf¬

is

When a

log would be

used to
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send notification of the correction to the sources of the
data and the past users of that data.

The logs created for

this purpose could consist of data fields

in the record it¬

self or might be contained in the system transac tion log de¬
scribed below.

This log of uses of data might also be main¬

tained to notify the individual,

upon request,

of the past

uses of the personal records maintained on that individual.
There are requirements in certain record-keeping relation¬
ships

for notifying an individual of such past uses.
Another form of logging,

transaction logs,

are main¬

tained as a method for increasing the security in the com¬
puter center as well as a means of providing for the auditability of the system.

This log can be a record of all at¬

tempted or actual access to data or programs.

A log might

contain all requests made by a user,

the data items

or program involved,

the time,

the terminal or other access method used,

the job or program submitting and whether or not the request
was granted.

The log could also be designed to capture the

external sources and uses of personal data.

Typical trans¬

action logs may be produced for accounting,

for security or

might be produced for privacy.

These logs could be pro¬

duced separately or as one combined log.

Regardless of how

a privacy log is produced and regardless of what information
is contained,

there should be sufficient information to make

determinations concerning:^
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1.

the authorization profiles associated with any protected
resources

2.

accountability
profiles

3.

all accesses that were made to any protected resources

4.

all access denials made

for and any changes made to authorization

The privacy log would be used to:
1.

notify individuals of uses of personal records (unless
such information is contained in the record itself)

2.

allow propagation of record corrections (unless sources
and uses is contained in the record itself)

3.

allows auditors to determine sources and uses of per¬
sonal data
The final aspect of the accountability standard is the

privacy audit.

As a minimum,

an organization should provide

for an internal audit of the effectivenss of its privacy
safeguards.

It is

in the best interest of any record-keeping

organization to have

such an audit performed just as audits

of security systems are performed.
in chapter III

Arguments were presented

for an independent audit of the privacy safe¬

guards .

Conclusions

The implementation of privacy procedures
subjective undertaking.

is partly a

There are aspects of the standards

which give some latitude to the organization in the imple¬
mentation of privacy safeguards.

For example,

an organiza¬

tion could choose not to implement privacy safeguards on
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some personal records because they are determined not be be
individually identifiable.
mission reports

The Privacy Protection Study Com¬

some Privacy Act exemptions claimed by fe¬

deral agencies because their personal,

sensitive records

could not be retrieved by use of any personal identification.

13

Hoffman,

however,

shows that records containing

personal information can be retrieved without reference to
any identifier associated with that person.
An organization makes

14

subjective decisions on the ex¬

tent to which errors are propagated.

It is expected that

sources and users of information who can reasonably be ex¬
pected to use the faulty information should be notified.
Also,

an organization is expected to implement a security

system to protect any personal records.
system is perfect,

the organization is

Since no security
left to decide what

amount of security is necessary.
In implementing privacy procedures an organization
might be guided by the objectives of privacy.

The organiza0

tion should attempt to minimize

intrusiveness,

gitimate expectations of confidentiality and,
should attempt to maximize

provide

le¬

in particular,

fairness to the individuals on

whom information is maintained.

In many cases this will

require the use of judgment on the part of the organization.
An organization might also consider the sensitivity of the
data in determining the level of security required or in
making other decisions regarding the privacy implementation
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plan.

A paper presented by Jon Bing at The First Interna¬

tional Open Symposium on Data Banks and Society outlines a
method of rating the sensitivity of a data bank.^

He

classifies personal information and assigns a sensitivity
grading for each class.

An organization might thereby be

assisted in making some of the subjective decisions necessary
in implementing privacy procedures.

Summary

This chapter has outlined the general implications of
the eight privacy standards.

A description of the proce¬

dures an organization might use to implement the standards
was presented and was summarized in table

2.

A brief survey

of the techniques which might be used to implement the
standards was presented and was
final

summarized in table 3.

The

section attempted to outline some of the considerations

which a firm might make in implementing the standards.
purpose of this chapter was
for implementation,

to present a general

The

framework

not to present a definitive implementa¬

tion plan.
This presentation also serves as a framework for the
audit model.

This presentation has

suggested the techniques

which could be used to implement privacy.

Chapter VI pre¬

sents the actual controls applicable to each technique and
then suggests the audit tools which could be used to test
the controls.
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CHAPTER

VI

AUDIT MODEL

This chapter presents the model for the audit by the
CPA of the privacy safeguards of an organization.

Since

this audit model is a step in the hierarchical development
of the overall privacy model,
presented.
goals.

goals of this audit model are

These practices are logically deduced from the

It is shown that these practices are consistent with

the overall privacy model.

The three major sections in this

chapter present the development of the goals,

the outline

for the audit function and the audit techniques.

Audit Model Goals

As was indicated in chapter III,
Auditing Concepts specified boundaries
subject matter.

These concepts

The Committee on Basic
for potential audit

follow carefully from the

writing of Mautz and Sharaf and were used as the basis for
some of the findings of the Cohen Commission.

It seems

reasonable that the audit goals developed here remain consis¬
tent with the approach of the Committee on Basic Auditing
Concepts.
The Committee specified the boundaries of audit
matter as

follows:
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subject
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In practice the auditor's competence and the existence of
operational criteria dictate the boundaires of the sub¬
ject matter to be investigated by the audit practice.^
The design of the CPA's
audit practices
requirements.

function for a privacy audit and the

suggested here should attempt to meet these
This keeps the audit practices consistent

with auditing theory and also provides a practical framework
for the formulation of the practices.

Therefore,

the first

two goals of the audit model are:
1.

That the auditor's assumed competence be maximized and
that limitations on the auditor's ability be minimized

2.

That wherever possible oeprational criteria be estab¬
lished

The first goal requires that the auditor's tasks while con¬
ducting a privacy audit be designed to be similar to those
tasks already being performed in a financial audit.

This

goal also requires that assistance be given to the auditor
in those areas of the audit where the auditor's knowledge
not adequate.

For example,

since the auditor cannot be as¬

sumed knowledgeable in the area of privacy law,
tance may be necessary.

is

legal assis¬

The second goal requires the formu¬

lation of privacy audit standards which guide the auditor in
determining the degree of correspondence between that which
is audited and the established criteria.
The Committee on Basic Auditing Concepts also specified
attributes of audit subject matter as
1.

follows:

The subject matter must be susceptible to the deduc¬
tion of evidential assertions.
Such assertions must
be both quantifiable and verifiable
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2.

An information system must be present to record the
actions, events, or results thereof; preferably ade¬
quate internal controls will also be operating
3.
Consensus must exist on the established criteria
against which the information prepared from the sub¬
ject matter be evaluated
While each of the attributes mentioned above is neces¬
sary, two further conditions needed are;
auditor's com¬
petence and summarization of the findings in a report.
Therefore,

the following additional goals are adopted;

3.

That quantifiable,
facilitated

verifiable evidential assertions be

4.

That provisions be made for the recording of information
and installation of controls for use by the auditor

5.

That a suggested report for summarization of audit find¬
ings be formulated

The third goal requires that any assertion that the auditor
is required to make be verifiable and/or quantifiable through
the gathering of evidence.

The fourth goal requires that re¬

sponsibility be established for the controlled recording of
information from which the auditor can gather evidence for
making assertions.
model allows

The fifth goal requires that the audit

standardization among audit engagements.

It is also necessary to modify the second goal to
specify that the established criteria be generally accepted.
The second
2.

goal,

therefore,

is;

That wherever possible generally accepted operational
criteria be established
An implied goal of the audit model is that it be con¬

sistent with the overall privacy model.
example,
IV.

It is necessary,

for

to use the privacy standards developed in chapter

It is also necessary that the auditor's

report

satisfy
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the needs
mission,

of the assumed users,
national

and

the

international

courts,

the privacy

concerns,

and the

com¬

gen¬

eral public.
In
tical

summary,

these

goals

and theoretical basis

tices.

This

assists

for

vacy model.
well

as

for the

and theory.

developed within the

The

goals

the audit
audit

formulation of

a prac¬

audit prac¬

in generating practices which are

sistent with audit practice
audit model are

are established to give

The goals

con¬

and the

framework of the pri¬

and practices of the privacy model

goals

developed above

serve

as

as

the basis

function and techniques.

Audit Function

In this
developed.
internal
legal

as

The

roles

auditor,

counsel

CPA will

section the

for the privacy audit

and responsibilities

of the

part of

the
as

are discussed.

standards
a

report

Roles
In chapter
formulated a

organizations

CPA,

is

the

the organization and the organization's
The

standards

with which the

conduct the privacy audit are developed.

the auditor

had

framework

III

a
of

findings

statement

for use by

is presented.

and Responsibilities
it was

framework

achieve

suggested

Finally,

legal

stated that

the Cohen Commission

for auditor participation to help
accountability.

This

general
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framework is used to develop the roles and responsibilities
of those concerned with the privacy audit.

Organization responsibilities
Since

it is the record-keeping organization which is

accountable for its record-keeping practices,

the first re¬

sponsibilities should fall on the organization.

It is the

organization that should adopt a privacy policy,

establish

responsibilities for enactment of the policy and take action
to report on this policy to those to whom the organization
is accountable.
The establishment of a privacy policy was
tioned in chapter V.

first men¬

This policy would be established in

cooperation with legal counsel.

This

counsel is required to

assist the organization in interpreting privacy laws and
privacy commission recommendations.

The counsel must deter¬

mine which of these requirements are applicable given the
organization's industry type and the characteristics of the
individually identifiable personal records which the organi¬
zation maintains.

The policy should be specific as to the

practices which are required and the responsibilities of the
functions which will implement the policy.
lities of the legal counsel,
base administrator
fined.

(DBA)

All of these

ment and legal

The responsibi¬

the internal auditors,

the data

and the CPA should be clearly de¬

functions should participate with manage¬

counsel in formulation of the policy.

In this
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way all functions will have input to and be aware of the in¬
dependent responsibilities.

Suggestions

for minimum infor¬

mation to be included in the policy statement are given in
table 4.
Once the policy is formulated,
implement the policy.

As was mentioned in chapter V,

DBA should be the focal point
policy.

action must be taken to
the

for implementing privacy

As manager of the data resource within the organiza¬

tion the DBA would enact procedures to limit data collection
and use,

to protect data integrity,

provide

for security,

and to facilitate the accessing and correcting of records
for the individuals about whom the records are maintained.
The internal auditor would be responsible for assisting
the DBA in implementing privacy policy and for periodically
auditing the privacy safeguards

for effectiveness.

The in¬

ternal auditor should recommend audit controls during the
privacy policy implementation phase.

The internal auditor

would require that privacy safeguards are auditable and that
records are maintained on the functioning of the privacy con¬
trols.

The internal auditor should also periodically audit

the privacy controls to insure that they are auditable,

that

privacy protection is effective and to provide the ground¬
work for the CPA privacy audit.
Finally,
policy,

the organization should summarize its privacy

its procedures and the effectiveness of the system,

in the annual report.

The responsibilities of all parties
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TABLE

4

Minimum Information for Organization
Privacy Policy Statements

The organization's policy statement
lowing minimum information:

should contain the

fol¬

1.

The personal record systems maintained by the organiza¬
tion—for example, personnel records, credit records,
etc.

2.

The laws or other requirements which are applicable to
those systems—for example, the personnel records should
meet the voluntary requirements of chapter 6 of The Re¬
port of the Privacy Protection Study Commission

3.

An interpretation, for each record system, of what should
be done to protect privacy—this would be a list of the
actions which must be taken to implement each of the
eight privacy standards for each record system

4.

A description of the responsibilities of the DBA and
the internal auditor for implementing the privacy po¬
licy—for example, the DBA is responsible for implement¬
ing the privacy policy.
The internal auditor is respon¬
sible for suggesting controls and monitoring techniques
to the DBA to provide for auditability

5.

A description of the responsibilities of legal counsel,
the DBA and the internal auditor for preparing a report
on the privacy protection system—for example, counsel
is responsible for stating which record systems are
covered by which laws.
Legal counsel is responsible for
identifying all required privacy practices.
Counsel is
also responsible for identifying any optional procedures.
(The organization may choose to implement all, some, or
none of these optional features.)
The DBA is respon¬
sible for reporting what procedures are implemented to
protect the privacy of those systems.
The internal au¬
ditor reports on what controls exist and what monitoring
of the system has been accomplished
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Table 4
(continued)

6.

A description of the responsibilities of the internal au¬
ditor and the CPA for monitoring the effectiveness of
the system—for example, the internal auditor is respon¬
sible for periodic monitoring of the effectiveness of the
system.
The CPA is not responsible for implementing the
policy or the controls nor for judging which laws and
which record systems are applicable.
The CPA is respon¬
sible for reviewing the statements made by management to
verify that a policy does exist, to verify that it has
been implemented, and to test the procedures used to im¬
plement that policy.
The CPA will report on this review
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should be described to inform readers where the responsibili¬
ties of the organizationleave off and those of the CPA begin.
Suggestions for the minimum information to be included in the
organization's privacy report are given in table 5.
In summary,

the organization is responsible for devis¬

ing a privacy policy,

for implementing that policy,

for mo¬

nitoring the effectivensss of the implementation and report¬
ing on the actions taken.
counsel,

Within the organization the legal

the DBA and the internal auditor are responsible

for various tasks

in formulating,

implementing,

reviewing and

reporting on the privacy policy.

CPA Responsibilities
The CPA is not responsible for designing the organiza¬
tion's privacy protection procedures.
perform this

The CPA may,

function on a separate engagement.

however,

The CPA is

responsible for reviewing the statement made by the organiza¬
tion and reporting on that review.

The auditor would review

the organization's privacy policy and implementation proce¬
dures and determine that the policy is actually implemented.
The auditor would test these procedures to determine their
effectiveness.

Finally,

the auditor would report on this re¬

view and on the results of the tests performed.
or's responsibilities will be

The audit¬

further defined in sections be¬

low on privacy audit standards.
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TABLE
Minimum

Information

5

in Organization

The organization's privacy report
ing minimum information:

Privacy Report

should contain the

follow¬

1. A description of the privacy policy and procedures
adopted by the organization—for example, the mandatory
procedures for the personnel records which are . . .
have been adopted as well as these optional procedures

2.

Delineation of responsibilities in formulating the pri¬
vacy policy—for example, the organization in cooperation
with legal counsel, etc.

3.

Delineation of responsibilities for implementation of the
privacy procedures—for example, the organization and its
staff with suggestions from the CPA, etc.

4.

Delineation of responsibilities for review of the privacy
procedures—for example, the privacy controls are subject
to periodic review of the internal audit staff and are
reviewed and reported on by the CPA

5.

Description of CPA responsibility sufficient to fix lia¬
bilities—for example, the privacy policy, the choice of
procedures and effectiveness of the controls are the re¬
sponsibility of the organization.
The CPA is responsible
for a review of the effectiveness of the system as repre¬
sented in the privacy policy statement and in this re¬
port.
The CPA is also responsible for reporting the
findings of the review
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Legal Counsel Responsibilities
Although the role and responsibilities of the organiza¬
tion's legal counsel has already been discussed,

it is ela¬

borated on further here because of the key position that this
function occupies in the privacy monitoring process.

It is

the legal counsel which will minimize the limitations of the
auditor in matters of law and reduce the potential liability
of the auditor for statements made regarding the review of
the privacy procedures.
The legal counsel in assisting in the formulation of
privacy policy relieves the auditor of responsibility for
determining what safeguards are appropriate for each record
system.

By participating in the writing of the organiza¬

tion's statement on the privacy safeguards,

the legal coun¬

sel relieves the auditor of the responsibility for reporting
what actions have been taken.

The auditor would be respon¬

sible only for exercising due care in detecting weaknesses
in the implementation procedures.
The concept of relying on the organization and its le¬
gal counsel has been advocated before.

The AICPA in provid¬

ing guidelines for CPA participation in government audits
stated:
Legal and regulatory reviews in other than the financial
audit areas may require extensive data gathering and can
be time consuming and expensive.
A substantial part of
the work required to identify applicable laws and regu¬
lations should be done by the organization requesting the
evaluation, thus limiting the practitioner's involvement
to the exercise of professional judgment in gathering and
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testing the related data.
required or advisable.4

.

.

.

Legal assistance may be

Similar wording is used by the AICPA in another report.^

Audit Standards

This section suggests the substance of audit standards
for use by the auditor in conducting privacy audits.

The

privacy audit implications of the present standards and any
required additional standards are presented.

This presenta¬

tion begins with a review of the generally accepted auditing
standards

(GAAS)

these standards.

and the implications of a privacy audit on
The classification of general standards,

standards of field work and standards of reporting used by
the AICPA is utilized here.
As a guide to determining where the present standards
need to be extended or where additional standards are neces¬
sary Mautz and Sharaf have suggested characterisitcs of au¬
diting standards.

They state:

Standards should provide guides:
(1) for the evaluation of professional performance by
practicing public accountants
(2) to indicate accepted requirements of practice to
those outside the profession who have occasion to
judge or evaluate the work of practicing account¬
ants
(3) to suggest the extent and nature of education ex¬
pected of those preparing for entry into the profes¬
sion. ^
The auditing standards for privacy audits should provide
guidance on the duties,

responsibilities,

expertise required of the CPA.

liabilities and
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General Standards
The first general standard

7

is:

The examination is to be performed by a person or per¬
sons having adequate training and proficiency as an au¬
ditor.
The model of the privacy audit minimizes the knowledge re¬
quired of the auditor in non-accounting matters.
ditor will not require knowledge of law,

The au¬

for example, be¬

cause of the reliance on the assurance of the organization's
legal counsel.

The organization's counsel will,

therefore,

be responsible for knowledge of the law and for determining
the applicability of various privacy laws to the organiza¬
tion.

The auditor would, however,

be responsible for know¬

ledge of the implications of privacy implementation.
The auditor will still be required to have knowledge
of computer systems suggested by the following statement con¬
tained in SAS 3:
Situations involving the more complex EDP applications
ordinarily will require that the auditor apply special¬
ized expertise in EDP in the performance of the necessary
audit procedures.
The auditor will not require any additional training in this
area beyond that already required.
The second general standard is:
In all matters relating to the assignment, an indepen¬
dence in mental attitude is to be maintained by the au¬
ditor or auditors.
Situations will arise in which an accounting firm will be
asked to assist an organization in implementing its privacy
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policy and then be required to audit the effectiveness of
the privacy procedures.

Mautz and Sharaf note that this si¬

tuation creates an inevitable loss of independence.

They

state
. . . public recognition and acceptance of the auditor's
status is significant to the successful accomplishment
of his purpose.
It recognizes also that within the
broad range of public accounting services, important
differences exist between auditing and other services.
These differences are such that performance of these
services by the same individual is incompatible with the
idea of independence.^
It would therefore seem necessary to require, as a minimum,
that performance of audit engagements and design engagements
be accomplished by different people.

The optimum arrange¬

ment in terms of public confidence would be to have these
engagements performed by different firms.
The third general standard is:
Due professional care is to be exercised in the perform¬
ance of the examination and preparation of the report.
This standard attempts to assign the degree of responsibility
which the auditor is assumed to take in performance of pro¬
fessional duties.

It is not meant to require that an auditor

discover all irregularities but that the auditor will be
alert to the possibility of irregularities and discover
those which the exercise of due professional care and good
judgment would lead one to discover.
In the performance of privacy audits this standard is
not as important as it is in the performance of a standard
audit.

In a financial audit this standard requires that the
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auditor be alert to the possibility of all manner of irregu¬
larities and fraud.

For a privacy audit this standard re¬

quires the discovery of irregularities in the implementation
and effectiveness of specific privacy controls.
Mautz and Sharaf summarize their concept of due audit
care which,

although directed at all irregularities,

is use¬

ful here as an explanation of the responsibility that an au¬
ditor takes on in performance of a privacy audit.

Mautz and

Sharaf state:
Independent auditors should accept responsibility for
the discovery and disclosure of those irregularities
which the exercise of due audit care by a prudent prac¬
titioner would normally uncover.
A prudent practitioner
is assumed to have a knowledge of the philosophy and
practice of auditing, to have the degree of training,
experience, and skill common to the average independent
auditor, to have the ability to recognize indications
of irregularities, and to keep abreast of developments
in the perpetration and detection of irregularities.
Due audit care requires the auditor to acquaint himself
with the company under examination, its method of
operation and any significant practices peculiar to it
or the industry of which it is a part, to review the me¬
thod of internal control operating in the company
under examination by inquiry and such other methods as
are desirable, to obtain any knowledge readily available
which is pertinent to the accounting and financial prob¬
lems of the company under examination, to be responsive
to unusual events and unfamiliar circumstances, to per¬
sist until he has eliminated from his own mind any
reasonable doubts he may have about the existence of ma¬
terial irregularities, and to exercise caution in in¬
structing his assistants and reviewing their work.-*-®
The auditor would,

therefore,

accept responsibility for the

discovery and disclosure of those areas in which an organiza¬
tion's privacy policy was not implemented and those areas
where implementation was not effective which the exercise of
due audit care by a prudent practitioner would normally
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uncover.

A prudent practitioner would be as defined by

Mautz and Sharaf except,

as was noted earlier,

that they

would be required to be knowledgeable of the implications of
the generally accepted privacy principles.
A fourth general standard is suggested here.

A state¬

ment of the scope of the privacy audit is required to define
the responsibilities and functions of the auditor while con¬
ducting a privacy audit.

The generally accepted auditing

standards do not include a standard on the scope of the au¬
dit work since it is assumed that all audits are audits of
financial statements.

Because it was necessary to establish

the work required in government audits,

the GAO included a

scope of the audit work as its first general standard.^
A general standard on the scope of a privacy audit
would contain the following information:
1.

.

2

The objective of a privacy audit—express an opinion as
to the accuracy of the organization's representation
with regard to privacy protection
The responsibilities of the auditor and of the organiza¬
tion—it is the responsibility of the organization to
determine what must be done to protect privacy, to as¬
sure the auditor that the organization's privacy policy
includes all mandatory privacy practices, to enact con¬
trols to carry out its privacy policy, and to make a
statement concerning its actions.
It is the responsi¬
bility of the auditor to review the privacy statement,
determine if said controls have been implemented to en¬
act the privacy policy, and test the effectiveness of
the controls
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Standards of Field Work
The first standard of field work is:
The work is to be adequately planned and assistants,
any, are to be properly supervised.

if

A privacy audit presents no new implications for this stan¬
dard .
The second standard of field work is:
There is to be a proper study and evaluation of the ex¬
isting internal control as a basis for reliance thereon
and for the determination of the resultant extent of
the tests to which auditing procedures are to be re¬
stricted.
A major portion of the work in a privacy audit revolves
around this standard.

Except as noted below,

the informa¬

tion in SAS 1 on the auditor's study and evaluation of inter¬
nal control as supplemented by SAS 3 and as superceded by
SAS 9

12

scope,

holds true for a privacy audit.

Revision of the

purpose and some of the basic concepts in SAS 1 is re¬

quired.
The purpose of the review of internal control required
in a privacy audit is twofold.

First,

the review will deter¬

mine for the auditor how much reliance can be placed on the
organization's internal control to insure compliance with the
privacy policy of the organization.
overall functioning of the controls.

This is a review of the
Second,

serve as a basis for determining the nature,

the review will
extent,

and tim¬

ing of audit tests to be applied in the examination of the
effectiveness of the privacy policy.
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This differs from the review of internal control per¬
formed in conjunction with an examination of financial state¬
ments.

In that case the review of internal control is per¬

formed solely as a prelude to the application of auditing
procedures to determine the fairness and accuracy of the fi¬
nancial statements.

In a privacy audit the review is a pre¬

lude to the use of auditing procedures but is also a review
of the functioning of the controls themselves.
Given the two purposes of the review the auditor could
make two statements concerning the privacy procedures of an
organization.

The auditor could state that the controls out¬

lined by the organization in its privacy policy are in ef¬
fect and if effective could carry out the privacy policy.
The auditor after application of auditing procedures,
nature,

the

timing and extent of which were determined by the

initial review,

could make a statement concerning the effec¬

tiveness of the controls.
The scope of the auditor's review depends on the pre¬
sentation made by management.

Management is responsible for

reporting on the organization's privacy policy and the con¬
trols implemented to enact that policy.

The auditor is re¬

sponsible for reviewing those controls.
Since SAS 1 restricts the review of internal control to
accounting control as defined in SAS 1,

13

it is useful to

suggest here a definition for privacy control to provide a
reference to the auditor on the controls which are reviewed
in a privacy audit.
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Privacy control comprises the plan of organization and
all the methods,

measures and records that are concerned

with the safeguarding of the privacy of the individuals
about whom the organization maintains individually identifi¬
able personal information.
procedures,

The term includes the policies,

and practices established or encouraged by

management as well as the plan of organization and other
measures intended to carry them out.
The characteristics of a satisfactory system of pri¬
vacy control have been specified in chapter V.

It was noted

in that chapter that the nature of the controls

implemented

are relatively standard across organizations while the speci¬
fic implementation practices vary depending on the applica¬
bility of the various laws,

regulations and requirements.

The section of chapter V on the implications of the stan¬
dards will serve as a framework for review of the privacy
control by the auditor.

The information in chapter V along

with the presentation below supplements
concepts and procedures

for the auditor the

in SAS 1.

The following are examples of the review that the au¬
ditor might make with regards to each standard.
tions are in the

The sugges¬

form of questions to which the auditor

would seek answers.
Openness—Is there public notice of the existence of
the data bank?

Have

individuals been notified?

Do controls

exist to limit the use of the data to those uses specified
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in the notices?
quiries

Are there procedures

for responding to in¬

from those wishing to know whether information is

maintained about them?
Individual access—Do procedures exist for providing
copies of records to individuals?

Do controls exist to in¬

sure that all data in a record is contained in these copies?
Are these copies understandable?
Individual participation—Do procedures exist to pro¬
vide individuals an opportunity to register complaints con¬
cerning integrity of the data in their records?
organization have arbitration procedures?

Does the

Are there proce¬

dures to insure that records are corrected or amended?

What

provisions have been made to insure that amendments are in¬
cluded whenever records are accessed?
Collection limitation—Does the organization have a
policy of limiting data collection?

What controls exist to

insure that no extra data is collected or entered in the
records?

Have sources of data been notified of additional

sources which might be used?

Does the organization period¬

ically review this collection limitation policy?
Use limitation—Are there controls to limit the inter¬
nal uses of information?

Are these controls consistent with

notices given to individuals concerning the internal uses of
data?
Disclosure limitation—Are there controls to limit the
external disclosure of information?

Are these controls
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consistent with notices given to individuals concerning the
external disclosure of data?

Are there procedures to limit

disclosures to organizations which have established an effec¬
tive privacy protection program which is consistent with the
confidentiality expectations of the individual and the
sending organization?
Information management—Has an individual been ap¬
pointed as privacy monitor?

What controls exist to insure

that the sources and past users of personal data are noti¬
fied of corrections made to that data?
on the accuracy of the data?
dated data?

Are there controls

Are there procedures to purge

Are the organization's personnel knowledgeable

with regards the established privacy policies?
ganization established separation of duties

Has the or¬

in critical

areas?
Accountability—Does the organization maintain a log
of data sources and uses?
A final comment on this standard involves the CPA's
use of the internal audit function in conducting the review
of internal control.
subject,

SAS 9,

which supercedes

SAS 1 on this

suggests that the CPA make use of the internal au¬

dit function if the objectivity of the internal
be determined.

function can

The independence or objectivity of the inter¬

nal audit function could be questioned since it has been sug¬
gested above that internal auditors be involved in the design
and implementation of privacy controls.

A recent study.
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however,

has shown that the internal auditor's

independence

need not be sacrificed by participation in such projects.
Organizations and CPAs should review this report to avoid
those situations which might lead to a loss of internal au¬
dit independence.

The report states that design phase au¬

diting will not impair independence under four conditions: ^
1.

The internal auditor should not be perceived as a de¬
signer or participant but rather as a consultant or mat¬
ters of controls

2.

The internal audit must have EDP technical competence
to be self-reliant

3.

There is adequate review of work by internal audit mana¬
gers

4.

There is top management support of internal audit acti¬
vities
The third standard of field work is
Sufficient competent evidential matter is to be obtained
through inspection, observation, inquiries, and confir¬
mations to afford a reasonable basis for an opinion re¬
garding the financial statements under examination.

In conducting a privacy audit it is necessary that the au¬
ditor obtain sufficient competent and relevant evidence to
m

afford a reasonable basis
ments,

conclusions,

for the auditor's opinions,

judg¬

and recommendations concerning the pri¬

vacy practices of the organization.

The review of privacy

control conducted to satisfy the second standard of field
work serves as a basis

for determining the nature,

timing

and extent of tests to be performed in the gathering of evi¬
dence.

It is this

gathering of evidence which serves as the
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basis

for the auditor's opinion concerning the effectiveness

of the privacy procedures of the organization.
In financial audits evidential matter supports the
nancial statements.

It is

fi¬

the underlying accounting data

and corroborating information.

In a privacy audit evidential

matter supports the statements of the organization concerning
the privacy policy and practices.
containing personal information,

It consists of the records
special records maintained

in accordance with generally accepted privacy principles and
corroborating information.
The following is a description of some evidential mat¬
ter which could be obtained during a privacy audit and sug¬
gested methods of confirmation.
evidence and confirmation methods
standards.

This presentation describes
for each of the privacy

The presentation conforms to the presentation in

chapter V on the techniques

for implementing the standards.

The auditor would only gather and confirm evidence to sup¬
port the contentions made by the organization regarding its
privacy policy and practices.
Openness—Copies of the actual notices made to the
public or to individuals would serve as the evidential mat¬
ter. The effectiveness of the procedures could be confirmed
by surveying the public that the organization was attempting
to reach or the
notified.

specific

individuals that should have been
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Individual access—Copies of records in the format
which would be sent to individuals would serve as evidence.
The auditor would have to exercise judgment to determine
that the copies are understandable.

The auditor could con¬

firm that complete records are sent to individuals by test¬
ing the software used to access and make copies of the re¬
cords .
Individual participation—Letters or other documenta¬
tion of correspondence between the organization and the indi¬
vidual regarding requested corrections to records would be
evidence.

Confirmation would require that the auditor ex¬

tract the records from the files to determine that correc¬
tions or amendments are indeed in the records.

The auditor

could also test the software to determine the effectiveness
of the record update process.
Collection limitation—Evidence of the effectiveness
of this

standard would include forms used for data collection

and any notices contained thereon,

a review of record formats

m

and software restrictions on data types and sources.

Con¬

firmation of this standard would require comparing a sample
of records with the source documents to verify that only au¬
thorized data from authorized sources is stored.

The auditor

could also test the software to determine the effectiveness
of the processing controls on data types and sources.
It was noted in chapter V that implementation of this
standard presents the particular problem of controlling the
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use of data from unauthorized sources.

The auditor would

need to verify that some separation of duties existed where¬
by one person is responsible for preparing source documents
and entering codes and another person certifies those source
codes prior to data entry.

This type procedure would be

necessary to exercise control over the collection and stor¬
age of data from unauthorized sources.
Use limitation—Confirmed evidence of the effectiveness
of this

standard would be the inability of the auditor to

gain access to the computer system or to unauthorized per¬
sonal data on that system.

For example,

the auditor could

attempt to gain access to data while using the access code of
an individual in the organization.
Other evidence for this standard would be a review of
the notices given to individuals concerning the internal uses
of personal data.

Confirmation that actual uses were consis¬

tent with those notices would require a comparison of the
notices and the authentication/authorization procedures and
tables used by the organization to verify that uses are con¬
sistent with policy and public notices.
Disclosure limitation—Confirmed evidence of effective¬
ness would be the inability of the auditor to gain access to
data

for use by unauthorized organizations.

Evidence to as¬

sist the auditor would be reports of the results of privacy
audits of other organizations.

Confirmation would be a re¬

view of the disclosure authorization table to verify that
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only those organizations which comply with the minimum pri¬
vacy procedures are included in the table.

Further confir¬

mation would be that only those organizations in the table
can get personal data.
Other evidence for this

standard would be a review of

the notices given to individuals concerning the external uses
of personal data.

Confirmation would be a comparison of the

notices with organizations in the authorization table to
verify that organizations which are sent data are known to
the individual.
Information management—The important aspect of this
standard for purposes of collecting and verifying evidential
matter is the propagation of error corrections by the organi¬
zation.

Confirmed evidence of the effectiveness of this

standard would require that the auditor attempt various re¬
cord corrections and verify that the corrected records were
sent to the sources of the corrected data or past users of
the data.
Testing of the past effectiveness of this

standard

would require a file of source documents which generated the
changes.

These source documents would be traced to the re¬

cords to verify corrections made and a review of the records
maintained by the sources and users of the data to confirm
their receipt of the changes.

The auditor might instead

verify the existence and completeness of any log of the dis¬
patches of such corrections.

175

Another aspect of this standard is the security system
installed as part of the mechanism necessary to assure that
the data is current and accurate.

The auditor could test

the integrity of the data by sampling the files and obtain¬
ing verification of the information from the person about
whom the data is maintained.

This procedure would be much

the same as that conducted by auditors now to verify the re¬
liability of accounting data such as accounts receivable.
Accountability—Evidence of the implementation of this
standard would be the transaction logs created by the organi¬
zation.

The minimum content of these logs has been suggested

in chapter V.

The auditor would need to confirm that any

addition of data to a personal record file would automatic¬
ally create a log of the source of the data.

The auditor

would also need to confirm that any internal or external
uses of data would result in an automatic creation of a log
of that use.

Tests of the existing software would provide

confirmation of the present functioning of the logging sys¬
tem.
In audits of financial statements an auditor is guided
by the principle of materiality.
dential matter,

for example,

On the sufficiency of evi¬

SAS 1 states:

The amount and kinds of evidential matter required to
support an informed opinion are matters for the auditor
to determine in the exercise of his professional judg¬
ment after a careful study of the circumstances in the
particular case.
In making such decisions, he should
consider the nature of the item under consideration;
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the materiality of possible errors and irregulari¬
ties; . . ,15
Since materiality is an economic concept,

the auditor will

have some difficulty applying this to the collection of evi¬
dential matter and to the report of findings in a privacy
audit.

The Cohen Commission,

in discussing the auditor's

response to detected illegal or questionable acts,

states:

This responsibility rests on the premise that conven¬
tional concepts of materiality, based principally on
quantitative considerations, are inapplicable to known
illegal or questionable acts.
The auditor should not
take it on himself to determine that some violations of
the law on propriety are more or less serious than
other.^
The Commission goes on to suggest a possible solution
to this problem.

They state:

However, the inapplicability of the materiality concept
to the auditor's decision as to whether to act does
not imply that his actions should always be the same.
The auditor must obtain consideration appropriate to
the circumstances of every illegal or questionable act.
This involves at least three factors ... he must per¬
form sufficient additional or alternative audit proce¬
dures to assure himself of the extent and consequences
of the irregularity.
The second factor is a comparison
of the act with the standard of corporate conduct
against which the auditor is conducting his examina¬
tion. . . . Finally, . . . obtain an appropriate dispo¬
sition . . . require disclosure of the violation . . .
it should be disclosed in the auditor's report.^
A solution to this problem of materiality in privacy
audits

is

suggested here.

As noted in chapter V,

zation might be guided in its
vity of the data.

an organi¬

implementation by the sensiti¬

The cost and sophistication of privacy

controls might then be a

function of the sensitivity of the
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data.

On the

idea that an organization's

pends on the circumstances,

accountability de¬

Rosenfeld states:

Persons who are accountable to others are judged with
an ideal standard—by behavior or results that would be
ideal in the circumstances.
No one is expected to act
ideally in a given set of circumstances, of course,
but may be judged by how far short of the ideal he falls.
The key to standards is the circumstance.18
This
signs
tion

suggests

a procedure whereby the organization as¬

sensitivity ratings

to the

items

for which they are accountable.

of personal
Bing^

has

informa¬

suggested a

sensitivity classification system which might be useful
this

purpose.

The organization could

privacy report describe

the

then

as part of

for the

items

of personal

formation which are maintained by the organization.

materiality

in the

nomic value

as

cial

Highly

is

than would

responsible

auditor

is

teriality.

less

for

freed

teriality used
sitivity rating

as measures

and more extreme

sensitive data.

from the

in

of

eco¬

finan¬

sensitive data would require more

formulating the

However,

in¬

The

same way that the auditor now uses

sophisticated controls,
dures

sensitivity ratings

measure of materiality when auditing

statements.

its

sensitivity rating and corre¬

sponding protection procedures

auditor could use these

for

audit

Since

testing proce¬

the organization

sensitivity ratings,

the

responsibility of determining ma¬

since

financial

the monetary measurement
audits

system would need

is

a

to be

standard,

of ma¬

the

standardized.

sen¬
Also,
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the auditor would need to verify that this
ing was

applied correctly by

the organization.

This procedure presents
determining the

the auditor with a basis

sufficiency of evidential matter

termining the extent of audit procedures
presents

the auditor with a basis

port concerning the

level of control

ing

as

is

and

for

for de¬

necessary.

It also

for determining what to

study of the privacy controls

If the
is

sensitivity rat¬

for the data

re¬

conducted.

in each sensitivity rat¬

stated by the organization,

then a

favorable

report

issued.
The

organization may also wish to

performance
example,

standards

to the various

sensitivity groups.

the organization might state that the most

data will be maintained at

99%

then

that the data

confirm,

grup was

assign quantified

by

sampling,

accurate

to

accuracy.

For

sensitive

The auditor could
in that

sensitivity

that degree with a certain level

of

confidence.

Standards
The

of Reporting
first

standard of reporting is:

The report shall state whether the financial statements
are presented in accordance with generally accepted ac¬
counting principles.
The

representation of management of interest

audit
should

is

the privacy policy

statement.

The audit report

state whether the privacy policy has

and enacted
principles.

in a privacy

been

formulated

in accordance with generally accepted privacy
The privacy policy

statement would enumerate
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the practices which the company was required to enact and
those which the organization had voluntarily adopted.

The

auditor would be stating that given those practices that the
policy statement and enacting procedures were prepared in
accordance with generally accepted privacy principles.
For example,

the organization may have chosen to vo¬

luntarily adopt the recommendations of the Privacy Protec¬
tion Study Commission concerning the safeguaring of privacy
of personnel records.

The organization would formulate a

policy and enacting procedures

for that purpose.

The au¬

ditor would state that given the decision to comply with
those recommendations,

that the policies and policy state¬

ments are prepared and the procedures are enacted in accor¬
dance with generally accepted privacy principles.
The second standard of reporting is:
The report shall state whether such principles have been
consistently observed in the current period in relation
to the preceding period.
For a privacy audit the purpose of this standard is to re¬
quire that the auditor note changes made in privacy policy
and practices

since the last privacy report.

The auditor

would not judge the implications of such changes since that
is a judgment to be made by the reader of such reports.
major benefit of privacy reports

is

the information concern¬

ing what is actually being done by an organization.
lighting changes made
of these reports

is

from one period to the next,

facilitated.

The

By high¬
the use
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The third standard of reporting is:
Informative disclosures in the financial statements are
to be regarded as reasonably accurate unless otherwise
stated in the report.
For a privacy audit an auditor is to assume that the disclo¬
sures in the organization's privacy report are adequate.

It

is not the auditor's responsibility to judge the completeness
of the organization's representation.
The

fourth standard of reporting is:

The report shall either contain an expression of opinion
regarding the financial statements, taken as a whole, or
an assertion to the effect that an opinion cannot be ex¬
pressed.
When an overall opinion cannot be expressed,
the reasons therefor should be stated.
In all cases
where an auditor's name is associated with financial
statements, the report should contain a clear-cut indica¬
tion of the character of the auditor's examination, if
any, and the degree of resonsibility he is taking.
Just as there is a standard auditor's report issued in con¬
nection with a basic

financial audit,

there should be a

standard auditor's report issued in connection with a privacy
audit.

The suggested form of such a report is as

follows:

We reviewed the organization's privacy policy statement,
described in the report by management, and reviewed and
tested the related controls and internal audit proce¬
dures.
We received assurance from the organization's
legal counsel that the organization has implemented all
mandatory privacy practices.
Counsel has also assured
us that the optional practices implemented are appropri¬
ate for this organization.
We have found that the procedures reported by management
do exist and if effective would implement the organiza¬
tion's privacy policy.
We have tested the controls and
internal audit procedures and found that they do effec¬
tively implement the organization's privacy policy.
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We are stating that the privacy policy is accurately re¬
ported and is effective.
We are not giving an opinion
that privacy is adequately protected by this organiza¬
tion as that is not our function.
The

first paragraph of the auditor's report defines

the scope of the auditor's examination.

It states that the

policy statement is the representation of management and its
legal counsel.

The auditor assumes that this representation

is accurate unless evidence is

found to the contrary.

The

auditor does not guarantee the privacy of individuals about
whom information is maintained only that the controls are
as stated and are effective.

The second paragraph expresses

the auditor's opinion on the results of the investigation.
The third paragraph clarifies again the responsibilities as¬
sumed by the auditor.

This paragraph is directed at the

general public and is intended to reduce the possibility of
misinterpretation
SAS
to the

2,

of

the auditor's statement.

which supercedes parts of SAS 1 with regards

fourth standard of reporting,

enumerates

several cir¬

cumstances resulting in a departure from the auditor's
standard report.

The following is

a description of condi¬

tions which would lead to departure from the standard au¬
ditor's report on privacy.
If the auditor is unable to obtain the assurance of
the organization's

legal counsel that the privacy policy of

the organization is appropriate,
an opinion.

the auditor should disclaim

It is not the function of the auditor to
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determine what laws and regulations are appropriate for the
organization.

Not receiving the counsel's assurance signi¬

ficantly expands the scope of the privacy audit into an
area in which the auditor is not qualified.
If the auditor finds that the representation of manage¬
ment is either missing or inadequate,
claim an opinion.

the auditor would dis¬

The auditor should remember that it is

the representation of management which is being audited.
The organization's statement should present a sufficient ba¬
sis

for an opinion.
The organization is required to prepare its privacy

policy statement in accordance with generally accepted pri¬
vacy principles.

As mentioned above,

should specify the laws,
dures
sible.

the policy statement

regulations and voluntary proce¬

for which the organization has decided to be respon¬
The organization should then list the eight privacy

standards and the procedures which are enacted to implement
each standard.

Finally,

the organization would specify the

specific techniques which are used to implement each stan¬
dard.

This
First,

framework was suggested for two reasons.
it gives the organization guidance in formulat¬

ing and enacting its privacy policy.

Policy formulation is

guided by the intent of the privacy standards as they are
derived from the objectives of privacy
ness,

maximize fairness,

(minimize intrusive¬

create legitimate enforceable ex¬

pectations of confidentiality).

Policy enactment is guided
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by the practices
These

enactment
The

normally used to
techniques were

second reason

privacy principles

framework

statement
ness

policy

itself be

implement the
follow

standards

for being effective
It
zational

follows,

the

of privacy.

therefore,

implement the

statement the

basis

of

Should
to serve

as

if they

have

standards

the

the potential

standards.

issue

the auditor's

is

inadequate,

stan¬
either

in accordance with generally accepted privacy

or

the

policy

used to

auditor cannot

statement

principles

the

that without an adequate organi¬

dard

not prepared

should

By reviewing the

from use of

If the

in reviewing the

auditor can determine

any opinion and must depart
report.

in con¬

By reviewing the procedures

implementing the

privacy policy

the auditor

judge,

if the techniques

in

in chapter V.

the adequacy and appropriate¬

and techniques used to

auditor can determine

to guide

can

standards.

generally accepted

The auditor,

adequate,

from the objectives

practices

is

statement,

of the procedures.

specified

for using the

ducting the privacy audit.
organization's

implement the

for

some other reason

audit,
the

the auditor

of an

audit,

qualified opinion would be

adequate

the auditor would issue

or an unqualified opinion.

implemented by management are

form the

should disclaim an opinion.

representation of management be

the basis

either an adverse

insufficient to

If

the controls

adequate and effective,

issued.

adequate or are not appropriate

for

If

the controls

the privacy

an un¬

are

standard

in¬
in
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question,

an adverse opinion would be given.

If the con¬

trols are adequate and appropriate but are found to be in¬
effective,

an adverse opinion would be given.

A financial audit can result in a qualified opinion.
The auditor may find that the financial statements are
fairly presented with some exception or exceptions.

The au¬

ditor would not give a qualified opinion for a privacy audit.
A privacy program cannot be effective or appropriate
whole" with some exceptions.

The privacy controls are

either effective or appropriate or they are not.
controls are appropriate and effective,
qualified.

"on the

If all

the opinion is un¬

If some control or controls are not appropriate

or effective the auditor gives an adverse opinion stating
which controls are not appropriate or effective.

Summary
This

section has presented standards

of a privacy audit.

for the conduct

The framework for this presentation

was the present generally accepted auditing standards.
was done to avoid duplication.

Many of the concepts,

This
proce¬

dures and general information contained in the statements
on auditing standards is applicable to a privacy audit.
This section has suggested areas

in which the standards

needed to be supplemented or altered for a privacy audit.
These standards have met the
the

following ways:

five audit model goals

in
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1.

The basis of the audit is the representation of manage¬
ment contained in the privacy policy statement and the
assurance of the organization's legal counsel.
The po¬
licy statement is presented in accordance with generally
accepted privacy principles.
This procedure has mini¬
mized the limitations of the auditor in interpreting
privacy laws and regulations.
It has also maximized the
competence of the auditor by requiring that the auditor
review a statement by the organization and perform cer¬
tain tests of effectiveness

2.

The statement of the organization about which the auditor
gains assurance from legal counsel serves as the criteria
for evaluation.
The basis of the counsel's assurance
are the privacy laws and regulations which by their na¬
ture are generally accepted

3.

Supplements to the standards of field work suggested me¬
thods for gathering evidence which would be quantifiable
and verifiable

4.

It has already been shown that the privacy techniques
by their nature record information about their own
functioning and are in themselves a system of controls.
The standards of reporting were supplemented to suggest
that if these conditions did not exist that the auditor
could not make an unqualified opinion

5.

An auditor's privacy report was suggested

Audit Techniques

The purpose of this section is to suggest audit tools
and techniques which the auditor might employ in obtaining
and confirming evidence in the conduct of a privacy audit.
Mair,

Wood and Davis

(Mair)

suggest that there is a distinc¬

tion between audit tools and techniques.

They state

A technique is an action that the auditor may perform,
whereas a tool is something tangible that he can use.
They later state that a tool

ii 22
an audit technique."22

"assists in implementation of

This section first suggests audit
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techniques and then outlines the use of some of the current
audit tools.
It is not the intention of this researcher to suggest
an optimum set of tools and techniques.
proach is to outline methods
and to present a

A 'more useful ap¬

for choosing audit techniques

"menu" of audit tools.

used since it connotes a list of items

The term menu is
from which the auditor

can choose depending on the situation at that time.
timum set of tools and techniques
reasons.

First,

is provided here for three

as Mair has noted,

pends on the technique employed.

No op¬

the choice of tools de¬

Second,

the techniques em¬

ployed will depend on the privacy implementation procedures
adopted in each organization.
privacy implementation,

Since there

is variation in

there will be variation in audit

techniques and tools precluding the formulation of an opti¬
mal set.

Cash,

Bailey and Whinston

(Cash)

have noted that

there is no set combination of tools and techniques which
can be employed in all situations.

Concerning computer au¬

dit techniques they state
We have not pursued the issue of optimal combinations in
this paper as there is no unique solution to this issue.
Our purpose is to review this literature and provide
insights into the techniques.
Each auditor may then use
these results in developing the audit program suited to
the situation.22
Finally,

the choice of audit techniques will depend on the

initial review of the privacy system of control.
explained further below.

This

is
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Since the scope of this research project is
computerized record-keeping systems,

limited to

the audit tools and

techniques presented will be those applicable to a computer
environment.

This does not limit the presentation to compu¬

terized audit tools and techniques.

There are manual proce¬

dures which can be effectively utilized in a computer envi¬
ronment.

Also,

some of the controls used to implement pri¬

vacy are manual in nature and,

as noted by Mair,

Normally, the examination of manual procedures must be
performed manually . . . 24
A review of the literature shows that there are many
different classification schemes used by various authors as
frameworks

for discussing audit tools and techniques.

These

schemes are based on the classification given the controls
being audited and the responsibilities of the auditor.
example,
niques

For

Mair describes controls and audit tools and tech¬

in terms of

data processing:

"the three major aspects of electronic
applications,

information processing facility

systems development,
(IPF)."

25

and the

Mair goes on to

describe two possible ways of verifying application controls
He states
There are two purposes for utilizing the various tech¬
niques described:
(1) to verify the manual and/or compu
ter processing operations and (2) to verify the results
of processing.26
A similar framework is used by the
nal Auditors
reports.

Institute of Inter¬

in the Systems Auditability and Control

The SAC framework is described as

follows:

(SAC)
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The typical data processing function includes three ele¬
ments:
computer application systems, . . . computer
service center operations, . . . application systems
development . . .
The SAC reports use this framework to describe control and
audit practices actually in use
were

in the organizations which

surveyed during the SAC study.
Sardinas

28

describes the three phases of software

security and auditability as preprocessing,
postprocessing.

processing and

These phases include procedures which are

performed before a computer program executives,

while the

program is executing and after a program has completed execu¬
tion.
All of the above classification schemes are very simi¬
lar.

They all are both classification schemes

for control

and for the audit practices used to review and evaluate
those controls.

These schemes can be summarized as follows:

I. Application System Development
preprocessing (Sardinas)

(Mair,

II. Computer Service Center Operation
preprocessing (Sardinas)

SAC)

(Mair,

SAC)

III. Applications (Mair, SAC)
phases of processing (Mair)
processing (Sardinas)
results of processing (Mair)
postprocessing (Sardinas)
These schemes are useful as references to control and audit
practices.

They are not used in this research as a frame¬

work because they do not conform to the privacy model de¬
veloped above.

For a presentation of audit tools and
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techniques to be meaningful the framework must conform to
the framework of the controls established.

Since privacy

controls are established and reported by the organization us¬
ing the GAPP framework,

the audit practices must be pre¬

sented in the same framework.

Since it is the above sum¬

marized schemes with which most people are familiar,

they

will be cross-referenced to the GAPP framework wherever pos¬
sible .
Mautz and Sharaf take a different approach to classify¬
ing audit techniques.

They first determine the nature of the

assertion to be tested,

suggest the audit evidence applicable

to testing the assertion and then suggest audit techniques
which can be utilized by the auditor in the particular aituation.

29

For example,

physical things

the assertion of the existence of non¬

(accounts receivable)

could be tested by the

statement of an independent third party using the confirma¬
tion audit technique.

This is a most useful classification

scheme for this research project for two reasons.
First,
example,

it lends itself to the GAPP framework.

For

an assertion of the information management privacy

standard is that personal information is accurate.

Evidence

for this assertion could be the statement by an independent
third party
tained) .

(the person about whom the information is main¬

This evidence could be obtained using the confir¬

mation audit technique.
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Second,

the Mautz and Sharaf scheme suggests that the

nature of the assertion determines the quality of evidence
which can be gathered to test the assertion.

It is shown

below that this is important to the auditor as the privacy
audit program is designed.
Having outlined the intent,
the audit technique presentation,
three subsections.

scope and framework for
this section includes

First is a discussion of a process or

program the auditor might use in conducting the audit.

Se¬

cond is a discussion of some audit tools and techniques.
Third is a presentation of some "new" audit approaches.

Audit Program
An auditor's review of internal control is a sequen¬
tial process generally involving a preliminary review,
gathering of detailed information,
tests,

the

the performance of audit

and the evaluation of findings.

This is a cumulative

process in which an evaluation of the results of each step
is an input to the designing and conducting of the next se¬
quential step.
SAS 3,

for example,

prescribes a preliminary review

which involves conducting inquiries,
sonnel,

and reviewing documentation.

observing client per¬
The results of this

step are used to determine the extent of additional control
review.

An evaluation of the results of the detailed review

are used to determine the extent of reliance to be placed on
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the controls and the extent of substantive tests to be per¬
formed.

This detailed review involves tests of compliance

to "provide reasonable assurance that accounting control procedures are being applied as described."

30

The auditor con¬

cludes the review with an evaluation of the system of con¬
trol .
There are other examples in the literature of these au¬
dit steps.

Mair states:

Seven specific steps should be found in every compliance
audit examination (audits to verify compliance with con¬
trols) :
- Define objectives
- Gather basic information
- Gather detailed information
- Evaluate control
- Design audit tests
- Perform tests
- Evaluate findings31
The SAC reports found that
Most of the internal auditors interviewed followed some
variation of a three-phase approach, which includes:
- Initial review and evaluation of the area to be audited
and audit plan preparation
- Detailed review and evaluation of processing logic and
controls
- Tests to verify compliance with established controls,
and verification of selected data records.^2
Mautz and Sharaf recommend steps which conform to their au¬
dit technique classification scheme presented above.

They

state:
The
the
1.
2.

.

3

procedure of judgment formation may be divided into
following steps:
Recognition of the proposition to be proved
Evaluation of the proposition as one requiring evi¬
dence of a high or moderate degree of probability
Collection of evidence within the given limits of
time and cost
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4.

Evaluation of the evidence obtained as valid or not
valid
Formulation of judgment as to the proposition at is¬
sue^

5.

Arthur Andersen & Co.

(AA)

presents an approach to the

review and evaluation of internal control which has many
points

in common with the privacy audit standards presented

.
.
34
above m this chapter.

The AA approach is also a stepwise

process as the others above.

AA also,

however,

incorporates

a more explicit consideration of control and audit objec¬
tives .
The AA guide breaks economic events into cycles with
the accompanying transactions,

systems,

faces and data bases being identified.

procedures,

inter¬

This cycle approach

is easily extended to the non-economic events which involve
personal information since the basis

for grouping events

to cycles is the job accomplished by the events.

in¬

The audit

team identifies the broad and specific internal control ob¬
jectives

for each cycle which can be be used to evaluate the

effectiveness of the controls.
objectives are

roughly

It is noted here that these

equivalent to the privacy objectives

and standard developed in chapter

IV.

The audit team then identifies the control techniques
which are employed to achieve the control objectives.
gives the team a basis

This

for determining the degree to which

the basic objectives are being achieved.

This approach fo¬

cuses on the controls in place rather than what might be but
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is

not.

dards
the

Again this

developed above.

controls

which might be

in place,

stated that
The next

entity's
basis

techniques

of

it has
step

internal

for a

the controls which

employed.

process

evaluation of the
The

nique with a
facilitates

The

ther

the

control
place

as

"transaction

that the auditor

specific control
this

process

standard are

The AA process
control

an overview of the

techniques
techniques
objectives
described.

serve

specific

auditor

since

a

above

first reviews

if they could be effective
privacy policy.

This

the controls.

flow review."

is
AA

During this

should identify each tech¬

objective.
the

as

control

privacy auditing standards

to determine

a

the organization

environment which will

similar approach.

process AA notes

for each

is

to a more detailed evaluation of

this

the existence

implemented.

in implementing the organization's

calls

the CPA reviews

the auditor determines

control

the privacy controls

a prelude

stan¬

employed by the organization.

in the AA process

subsequent

suggested a

privacy audit

decision concerning the privacy controls

and effectiveness

has

to the

In a privacy audit

and techniques

Without makinq a

of

corresponds

The

GAPP

framework

implementation techniques

specified by the organization.
concludes with an evaluation of

and compliance
provide

the

testing to determine whe¬

reasonable assurance

that

the

are achieved and that the controls

are

in
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This brief survey of the literature on the review and
evaluation of internal control shows that authoritative
guides approach the internal control review as a cumulative
step process with the results of each step
for the next step.

forming the basis

The AA approach adds to this process an

explicit consideration of control objectives and an evalua¬
tion of the control techniques which implenent those objec¬
tives .
The auditor receives

little guidance from this

litera¬

ture on how to review the results of each step and to use
these results to design and conduct the next step in the
-J5

process.

For example,

SAS 1 and SAS

3

suggest that the

discovery during the preliminary review of weaknesses

in the

controls considered material in nature should determine the
extent of additional review and tests of compliance.

Also,

Mautz and Sharaf state
. . . more compelling evidence is required for material
assertion than for assertions that are not material.36
The nature,

timing and extent of tests conducted by the au¬

ditor are dependent on this concept of materiality.
concept,

although not clearly defined,

is

This

familiar to the

auditor and is used in conducting financial audits.

The au¬

ditor may have difficulty applying this concept in a privacy
audit.
These audit steps

surveyed above also require that the

auditor make an overall evaluation of

the system of control.
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This is also a difficult process

for the auditor.

Mair

states
• • • typical auditing literature indicates simply that
the 'auditor evaluates the controls' without elaborating
much further.
As a matter of fact, the auditor custom¬
arily studies the detailed information that was gathered
and then intuitively leaps to a conclusion.
Such in¬
tuition is largely dependent upon the skills and experi¬
ence of the auditor.
The quality of the decision is
quite suspect when the application system is sophisti¬
cated or unique. ^
The intuitive nature of this evaluation process may or
may not present the auditor with a difficult task in the con¬
duct of a financial audit.
vacy audit,

However,

in the conduct of a pri¬

an auditor cannot at first be expected to possess

the skills and experience necessary to make judgments con¬
cerning the effectiveness of the privacy control system.
The following conclusions are drawn

from this brief

survey of the literature concerning the review and evalua¬
tion of internal control:

the review is a cumulative step

process requiring an evaluation based on materiality at each
step;

the auditor is required to make an overall evaluation

at the conclusion of the review which is usually made in¬
tuitively and is also based on the concept of materiality;
the auditor may not at first have the skill and experience
necessary to make these evaluations

in the conduct of a pri¬

vacy audit.
It was noted above in chapter III that the auditor was
qualified to conduct a privacy audit.

It is not this re¬

searcher's intention to contradict that by stating here that
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auditor may not have the skill or experience necessary for a
privacy audit.

However,

since the intuitive evaluation ne¬

cessary in a review of internal control is normally based on
the use of the concept of materiality,

it is necessary to

suggest an alternative to this concept for a privacy audit.
This section suggests a framework for making the required
evaluation decisions which replaces the materiality concept
with that of data sensitivity and formalizes the review pro¬
cess to decrease the auditor's reliance on intuition.

The

resulting framework will suggest techniques to the auditor
for use at each stage in the review process.
The audit program suggested here consists of
steps which are similar to those

five

steps discussed above.

The

first step is an initial review of the privacy controls im¬
plemented by the organization.

The results of the review is

a preliminary evaluation of the privacy controls.
forms the basis of the auditor's
the audit report.

This step

first required statement in

The auditor would state that the controls

are in place as represented by the organization.
The second step in the program is a detailed review of
the system of privacy control.

This step results in a mea¬

sure of the potential loss to which the personal information
of each record system is exposed.

This

loss

is calculated

from a combination of the sensitivity of the information,
the probability of exposure and the importance of the
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controls in preventing that exposure.
or

"criticality"

This

loss potential

measure is used by the auditor to design

the audit tests of compliance.
The third step in the program is the design of the au¬
dit tests.

The results of this step is a measure of extent

of testing required to determine the effectivness of the
controls.

The fourth step is the actual performance of the

tests and the fifth step is an evaluation of the system of
control.
these

The following is a detailed description of each of

steps.

The process is conducted by the auditor for

each system of personal records and for each privacy stan¬
dard in effect

for that system.

Initial Review
This part of the program involves
formulation of a conclusion.

First,

five steps and the

the auditor identifies

the objectives of the standard under consideration.
ample,

For ex¬

the use limitation standard is defined as the limiting

of the internal use of information.

The auditor would review

the organization's internal privacy policy and public privacy
representation to determine what limits the organization
wishes to place on the internal use of information.

This

is

simply a review of documentation.
Second,

the auditor identifies the controls which have

been implemented to enact the standard.

For example,

sidering again the use limitation standard,

con¬

the auditor
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would review the relevant documentation to determine what
access controls have been implemented.

The philosophy of

the AA guide referenced above is important at this

stage of

the audit program.

for de¬

The auditor is not responsible

termining what controls could have been implemented but is
responsible

for reviewing the organization's

implementation

plan to determine what has been implemented.

The AA guide

states
Arthur Andersen's approach recognizes this by focusing
on the controls that are in place rather than what might
be but are not.38
The checklist/questionnaire procedure often employed by au¬
ditors would not be used here.

It is only necessary that

the auditor identify those controls which are implemented for
each standard.
The third step in this

initial review is an identifica-

tion of potential causes of exposures.
relationship between controls,
sure.

Mair

39

describes the

exposures and causes of expo¬

An exposure is the effect of a cause of exposure.

control acts to reduce the cause of the exposure.

A

At this

stage in the initial review the auditor reviews the objec¬
tives of the standard and identifies any causes of exposure
which could act against that objective and result in failure
of the standard

(could result in exposure).

For example,

causes of exposure which could act on the standard of use
limitation are unlimited access to on-line data files,
properly distributed report output or perhaps

im¬

failure of the
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hardware/software used to implement the authentication/
authorization procedures.
tial causes of exposure.

40

Mair summarizes many other potenThe auditor may find it useful

to summarize the causes of exposure and the controls on
those exposures as

in figure 5.

The auditor would indicate

where the control acts to reduce the cause of the exposure.
Hoffman describes these causes of exposures as
"threats"
threats

and proposes that one can enumerate the potential

(t)

of objects

to form a set of threats
(0)

(T)

which act on a set

composed of individual objects

(o).

Hoffman

id discussing potential intrusion activities or threats on
security objects.

This concept is also useful,

thought of as causes of exposure
standards

(objects).

would then be

(threats)

however,

and objectives of

The results of the auditor's

summarized as in figure 6.

if

review

Using this dia¬

gram allows the auditor to represent those causes which ex¬
pose more than one objective and those objectives

subject to

more than one cause.
In summary,

Hoffman states:

The object-threat relations form a bipartite graph (fi¬
gure 6) in which edge <t.o.> exists if and only if t.
is a viable means of gaining access to object o..
it
should be noted that the relation of threats to-’objects
is not one to one; a threat may compromise any number
of objects and an object may be vulnerable to more than
one threat.41
The fourth step in the initial

review is to identify

the exposures which could result from the causes

just
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Figure 6.

The Threat-Object Relation
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identified.

Mair suggests nine exposures to which an organi¬

zation is susceptible.

He states

The following list of exposures includes some of the re¬
verse effects that a business organization might en¬
counter :
- erroneous record keeping
- unacceptable accounting
- business interruption
- erroneous management decisions
- fraud and embezzlement
- statutory sanctions
- excessive costs/deficient revenues
- loss or destruction of assets
- competitive advantage^
This is a list which applies to a general computer audit but
which is a useful guide to the auditor in summarizing the
privacy exposures to which an organization is subject.

This

information can be summarized by the auditor in table form
as in figure
would

7,

indicate

which is an augmented figure 5.

The auditor

wherever a cause could lead to that particu¬

lar exposure.
Following further the Hoffman framework introduced
above may also be useful to the auditor.

Figure

8 presents

sets T and O included in figure 6 and adds a set of security
measures M.

These security measures are the controls

mented by the organization.

In summary,

imple¬

Hoffman states

The set of security measures transforms the bipartitate
graph of [figure 6] into the tripartite graph of [fi¬
gure 8].
In a 'protected' system, all edges are of the
form <t^m:j_> and <m^Oj>.
Any edge of the form <t^Oj>
identifies an unprotected object.
It should be noted
that a single security technique may counter more than
one threat and/or protect more than one object. . .43
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Figure 8.

The Basic Security System
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The use of both of these figures
ditor in the following ways.

is helpful to the au¬

Using figure 7 gives the au¬

ditor a ready reference regarding exposures and the controls
which have reduced the possibility of exposures by reducing
the causes of the exposure.

By reviewing the table the au¬

ditor can determine that there is a control for each cause
of exposure.

Using figure 8

gives the auditor a ready visual

reference regarding the extent to which a given standard is
implemented.

If the auditor's diagram has no edges of the

form <tj_Oj>/

that standard can be assumed to be implemented

since all potential causes of exposure have been reduced by
one or more controls

leading to no unprotected or unimple¬

mented objective.
The final step in the initial review is to determine
if the privacy controls are implemented and if effective
would enact the privacy policy of the organization.

The au¬

ditor would review any tables made like that in figure 7,
find that all causes of exposure are covered by a control,
and conclude that the privacy of the records

in the particu¬

lar system of interest are protected as represented by the
organization.
made

The auditor could also assemble the diagrams

like that in figure 8,

plemented,

find that all standards are im¬

and conclude that the records in the particular

system of interest are protected as represented by the or¬
ganization.
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Two clarifications need to be made at this point.
First,

there will be controls which act on many or all

causes of exposure.

In the matrix diagram

(figure 7)

control may be checked in many or all columns
that the control acts on more than one cause.
diagram

(figure 8)

a

indicating
In the set

there may be a security measure

which acts on many threats.

AA points out that conclusions

on these type controls are difficult to reach.

They state

Because pervasive-type internal control techniques are
general in nature, no conclusions should be drawn from
them regarding whether specific cycle control objectives
have been achieved.
Such conclusions can be reached
only after the specific techniques used to achieve a
specific cycle control objective had been identified
and appropriate compliance tests of such techniques have
been performed.44
The auditor,

in reaching a conclusion on this

initial review,

should carefully evaluate the diagram to determine that
there are controls acting on each specific cause for expo¬
sure which has been identified.
The second clarification concerning the conclusions
reached after the initial review is that the auditor may not
be able to state that all standards are implemented nor that
the privacy of records in a particular system are protected
as represented by the organization.

The auditor would first

state this conclusion in the audit report.

In a financial

audit the auditor could continue the audit process at this
point while not relying on the system of control.

Since in

a privacy audit the controls are the primary subject of
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consideration,

the auditor would have to decide whether to

continue the audit.
ditor's part.

It would require judgment on the au¬

The auditor would refer to the discussion of

the fourth standard of reporting above in this chapter.
the controls were completely lacking or inappropriate,

If
the

auditor might wish to stop at this point and issue an ad¬
verse opinion.
Should the auditor decide to continue,

the detailed re¬

view stage of the audit would be the next step.

Detailed Review
This part of the program involves
calculation of a loss potential
standard of interest.

each system,

for each system or privacy

This part of the program uses record

systems as a focal point.
of the personal

four steps and the

After determining the sensitivity

information and other characteristics of

the auditor assigns probabilities of exposure

and weights the importance of the controls in reducing the
causes of those exposures.

The auditor would calculate a

numerical or linguistic loss potential for each system.
The SAC study found similar measures being used by internal
auditors.^
The first characteristic of the record system is the
sensitivity of the personal data in the system.
surrogate for the

This

is a

"value" of the information and replaces

the materiality concept normally used in auditing.

This may
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have already been calculated by the organization and used as
a

guide

gested
any

in

implementing the privacy controls.

in chapter V.)

If the organization has

sensitivity ratings,

permit a determination of

the auditor may have
the value of the

determining the extent of audit
Sharaf explain this

(This we

point

tests

further.

sug¬

not assigned
to do

so

system and

necessary.

to
for

Mautz

and

They state

Because cost and time are so important in the perform¬
ance of an engagement, transactions, events, and even
irregularities of little or no materiality cannot be
given the attention which must be reserved for material
transactions, events, and irregularities.4^
Material weaknesses
in a

become,

for a privacy audit,

system of records which is

auditor

sensitive

weaknesses

in nature.

The

should concentrate on testing controls which are

ing on causes

of exposure which could result

of sensitive personal

in the

act

exposure

information.

A m7

Bing
sufficient.
1.
2.

3.

The

has
He

suggests

the

grading groups

are

following groups:

Normal aspects:
General personal information such as
name, date of birth
Personal aspects:
intimate, detailed or specific infor¬
mation such as religion, rent payments, and work ab¬
sences
Disparaging or defamatory aspects such as cause of disso
lution of previous marriage or information on default of
payments
rating assigned to a

characteristics
next

suggested that three

stage of

of the

system would partly depend on the

system which

the detailed review.

would determine whether one

rating

are determined
The

in the

characteristics

(that of the most

209

sensitive data in the system)

should be assigned or whether

data of different sensitivity ratings is controlled separ¬
ately
thods)

(stored on different mediums,

accessed by different me¬

requiring the assignment of different ratings to

different sets of data.
The next step in the detailed review is to determine
the other characteristics of each system being considered.
The characteristics of the system will determine the prob¬
ability of exposures and the importance

(weights)

attached

to the controls which reduce the causes of the exposures.
These characteristics presented here,
consider,

are certainly not complete.

which an auditor might
The implications of

these characteristics are only briefly presented.

More de¬

tails on the implications can be obtained in the references
provided.
Many of the characteristics of interest here are those
that result from the use of advanced computer technology.
As

systems become more sophisticated it becomes

difficult to verify the existence of controls

increasingly

since many of

these controls are incorporated into the hardware and soft¬
ware of the system.

As computer

of software packages

such as data base management systems

(DBMS)

and operating systems,

installations make more use

controls become more concen¬

trated in these packages and therefore become more critical.
These packages also raise the possibility of an auditor
sacrificing independence as these packages are used to
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extract data for verification.

Also,

as systems move away

from batch-oriented processing modes to on-line,
modes with highly integrated files,

real-time

it becomes more diffi¬

cult to control the accuracy of the data and to verify in¬
terim results of processing.

Other characteristics of in¬

terest here are the quality,

quantity and scope of internal

auditing in the organization and the interrelationship of
the controls on the system development process,

the applica¬

tion systems and the information processing facility.
As computerized record-keeping systems have evolved
many of the controls which had been manual in nature have
been incorporated into the hardware/software of the system.
Controls on the accuracy of the data and on access to the
data,

for example,

have become part of the system.

When the

auditor attempts to verify the effectiveness of these con¬
trols there are two major choices of techniques with vari¬
ous combinations of the two.
results of the processing,

The auditor can verify the

the files.

This can be accom¬

plished by the use of confirmations or comparisons with
other independently,

externally maintained files or by per¬

forming reasonableness or other edit tests on the resulting
data.

This process

is performed to secure evidence that

the processing results are accurate and complete.

This pro¬

cedure only provides an inference that the essential con¬
trols are functioning.
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The auditor may also verify the actual controls by
testing the processing directly.

This testing will provide

evidence of the present and continued reliability of the
controls.
The SAC reports

found incidences of various combina-

tions of these techniques.
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The three identified were:

1.

Verify the results of processing and infer that controls
are functioning

2.

Verify application program controls and complement this
with verification of the results of processing

3.

Data verification (results) processing complemented by
selective functional testing

The auditor must be aware of the extent of the use of soft¬
ware/hardware controls and consider the difficulty of verifi¬
cation and the

"invisible" nature of these controls when de¬

termining the importance of the controls.

This problem is

extensively discussed in Mair and the SAC reports.
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The use by the organization of software packages will
impact on the controls
tion of these controls.

instituted and the auditor's verifica¬
For example,

control over the access

to data may have been incorporated into the operating system,
the DBMS or both.

The integrity of these controls becomes

important since these may be the only methods of limiting
access to data files.
The very nature of a DBMS makes them causes
cular auditor concern.

for parti¬

The consolidation of files and the

reduced redundancy of data in the files precludes
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post-processing editing in many cases and raises the impor¬
tance of controls over access and updating.

Since one of

the objectives of a DBMS is to increase the integrity of the
data,

erroneous

update.

input is often prevented from causing a file

However,

this

feature requires the controls over

reinput of corrected transactions be strengthened to pro¬
tect against loss of transactions.

Adams^ discusses these

and other issues at some length.
Another issue on the use of DBMS in an organization is
that of auditor independence.

When accessing data

perform some post-processing verification tests,

files to

the au¬

ditor is in most cases utilizing the data accessing routines
of the DBMS and the operating system.
verify the integrity of these routines,

If the auditor cannot
then the auditor is

not necessarily independent of the organization in conduct¬
ing the audit.

The organization could have modified these

routines giving the auditor no assurance that the data ob¬
tained is

that which was requested.

Many organizations

are evolving from a batch-mode of

processing to on-line and real-time modes of processing.
Mair^ points out many audit problems which result from this
evolution.

For example,

illusion of timeliness
on a batch basis.
tions

some on-line systems only give an

since actual update of files occurs

Controls on the submission of transac¬

for processing becomes important to insure accuracy
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of files.

Real-time inquiry and update systems require more

extensive and sophisticated access controls than do batch
systems.
Also,

as organizations evolve away from the use of

batch systems,

there are fewer ponts at which the organiza¬

tion and the auditor can verify interim results of process¬
ing.

Controls internal to the software/hardware become more

critical since there is no external review at the interim
stages.

The auditor in attempting to verify controls in

such systems must resort to more sophisticated auditing
tools to verify controls or must be satisfied with verifying
the results of processing.
The quality,

quantity and scope of internal auditing

in the organization becomes more important as the system be¬
comes more sophisticated.

If the internal auditor is per¬

ceived as qualified and independent,
adjust the scope of their study.
tenburg and Davis
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the CPAs may be able to

A study conducted by Rit-

found CPAs very willing to adjust the

scope of their audits if they were satisfied with the work
of the internal audit staff.

Rittenburg and Davis also

found that the activities which had the most impact on the
scope of the CPA study were those which involved ongoing re¬
view of processing controls.

Should the CPA be satisfied

with the internal auditor's monitoring of processing con¬
trols,

verifying these controls might become less

to the CPA.

important
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The final consideration discussed here is the relation¬
ship of the controls over the system development process,
information processing facility,
tems.

and the applications

the

sys¬

The controls over the information processing facility

directly affect the application system controls.
trols complement the application system controls.
auditor finds that these controls are lacking,

These con¬
If the

it is diffi¬

cult to assume that the application controls can be effec¬
tive.

Also,

the control over the system development process

and the participation of the auditor in systems development
help insure that application controls are tested before the
systems are modified.

If controls over the system develop¬

ment process do not exist and the internal auditor does not
participate in the design process by suggesting controls,
then the auditor would not be able to predict the ongoing ef¬
fectiveness of application controls.
These system characteristics have been presented be¬
cause they must be considered by the auditor in estimating
the probability of exposures and in evaluating the impor¬
tance of controls in preventing these exposures.

These con¬

siderations will be incorporated into the estimated loss po¬
tential and again be explicitly considered in the design of
the audit tests.
The loss potential is a modification of risk analysis
which is performed to evaluate the effectiveness of security
measures employed in a computer environment.

These risk
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analyses are also performed to estimate the value of poten¬
tial losses.

This estimate becomes the benefit portion of a

cost/benefit analysis performed concerning the possible in¬
stallation of various security measures.

This researcher

suggests that the auditor estimate a loss potential, which
is analogous to risk analysis,
stage of the privacy audit.

during the detailed review

This loss potential estimate

will be used to determine the extent of audit tests needed.
In a review of the literature this researcher found
references to identifying the potential losses resulting
from exposures.

For example,

the AA guide states

If an objective [control objective] is not achieved, or
only partially achieved, specific risks are stated and
considered.
The guide goes on later to state
Thus, a significant factor in the Arthur Andersen & Co.
approach to the study and evaluation of internal ac¬
counting controls is the emphasis placed on considering
the explicit risks associated with nonachieved or under¬
achieved internal control objectives.53
On this same subject, Mair states
. . . the magnitude of the application exposures must be
estimated.
This involves appraising the maximum plaus¬
ible consequences in dollars that could result from a
particular exposure.
That amount may then be multiplied
by the likelihood of its occurrence.
Mair goes on later to state
Selection of the processing steps and controls to be
tested is based primarily upon the factor of 'exposure.'
The auditor selects the features within the application
to be tested based upon
- the relationships determined to exist between controls
and causes

216

- the volume and value of the items being controlled
- the worst likely error rate to be expected without de¬
tection if the controls weren't there.54
This researcher suggests the calculation of a loss po¬
tential.

This,

as Mair suggests,

is calculated by multiply¬

ing the value of the items being controlled by the likeli¬
hood of the occurrence of an exposure.

The value of concern

in a privacy audit is the sensitivity of the personal re¬
cords.

The likelihood of occurrence of the exposure is the

probability of the exposure,

given the characteristics of

the system and the controls in place.
is defined as

The loss potential

follows:

1 ?
LP = S x ~
V
P.W.
i=l
1 1

where:
LP = loss potential
S = Sensitivity of the personal records in the system
S = (1,2,3) and 1 = normal aspects
2 = personal aspects
3 = disparaging or defamatory as¬
pects
P. = probability of exposure i
1
P= (0,1,2,3,4) and 0 = virtually impossible
1 = not likely
2 = possible
3 = very likely
4 = certain to occur
n = number of exposures being considered
W.
l

importance of controls over exposure P^
unimportant
W = (1,2,3,4,5) and 1
not very important
2
important
3
very important
4
critical
5
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Note that

for one exposure combines the probability of

the exposure with the degree of dependence on the controls
in reducing the probability of the occurrences of that ex¬
posure.

If there is only one very critical control operat¬

ing on an exposure,

then the probability of occurrence is

more likely than if there were several controls.

The prob¬

ability of occurrence is adjusted for the nature of that
control.

Assignment of probabilities and weights of impor¬

tance is discussed below.
It should also be noted that the auditor can sum ex¬
posures P^W^ over one standard to get a privacy standard
loss potential or over all exposures to get a system privacy
loss potential.
The explicit use of the weight of importance of con¬
trols is not normal in risk analysis.

For example,

Martin

states
Vulnerability to a certain event may be defined as the
cost that an organization would incur if that event took
place. . . . exposure to a stated event may be defined
as the vulnerability to that* event multiplied by the
probability of its occurrence. . .55
Martin's probability of occurrence is a scale 0-7 of likeli¬
hood of occurrence in a period of time from not likely
to likely 10

times per day

(7).

The National Bureau of Standards
analysis as

(0)

(NBS)

describes risk

follows:

The first step in risk analysis is to estimate the po¬
tential losses to which the ADP (Automatic Data Process¬
ing) facility is exposed. . . . place a dollar value on
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the loss estimate. . . . the second step of the risk
analysis is to evaluate the threats to the ADP facility
. . . develop estimates of the probability of occurrence
of each threat type. . . . the third step in the risk
analysis is to combine the estimate of the value of the
potential loss and probability of loss to develop an es¬
timate of loss expectancy.^6
Neither Martin nor the NBS guide explicitly consider
the critical nature of controls in developing an exposure or
loss expectancy.
however,

A person conducting a risk analysis could,

implicitly consider the existence of the controls

when estimating the probability of occurrence of the threats
or exposures but would not necessarily consider the impor¬
tance of the controls.
The weight of importance of the controls is expli¬
citly included in the privacy loss potential calculation to
assist the auditor in determining the areas in which audit
effort should be concentrated.

During the initial review

the auditor would have identified the exposures that could
act against the objectives of the privacy standards and
would also have identified the controls which act to reduce
the probability of the exposures.

These control and expo¬

sure relationships would have been diagrammed as in figure 8
and put into a matrix as in figure7.

The auditor could by

visual inspection determine what controls need to be tested.
However as the number of exposures,

controls and systems in¬

creases and there exist several controls acting concurrently
in many exposures it becomes more difficult to concentrate
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the audit effort for maximum efficiency.

The AA guide makes

this point when they state:
An entity may employ hundreds of internal control tech¬
niques. . . . only those that obviously are used and
that appear to provide the greatest degree of assurance
that the objectives are achieved need to be considered
by the study team. S’7
The SAC reports describe a technique used within some
organizations to direct audit effort to those application
systems with the most audit need.

They state:

The technique identifies quantifiable characteristics
of a computer application system that are significant
from a risk analysis viewpoint.
The characteristics
are weighted and combined to obtain a system score.
Several computer application systems may be scored in
this way and the potential benefits obtainable from
auditing the systems may be compared.
The privacy loss potential analysis reduces the amount of
intuition needed to determine the extent of audit testing
necessary for the various standards or systems.

The results

of this analysis will assist the auditor in determining the
extent of audit testing required and in determining the
areas that require that testing.
In assigning the probability of exposure

an auditor

would consider the characteristics of the system identified
earlier in this detailed review stage.

For example,

the

probability of errors going undetected is higher in a DBMS
system where the reduction of data redundancy also reduces
the possibility for cross-checks
for example,

for reasonableness.

Also,

there is a greater probability of unauthorized
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use and updates of data in application systems

if controls

over access to the information processing center are lax or
nonexistent.
The auditor would also consider the controls which are
identified to be in place to reduce the probability of the
exposure.

Reference to the visual aids like

figure 7 and

figure 8 would be useful

for this purpose.

If there are no

controls on an exposure,

then the exposure is very likely to

occur.
The auditor may also wish to consider the nature of
the exposure itself.

The auditor may consider whether the

exposure is one that a person in the organization may wish
to intentionally cause to occur.

For example,

gaining ac¬

cess to personal data for monetary gain is perhaps more
likely to occur than avoiding sending correction notices to
sources and users of the personal data since there is nothing
to be gained by doing so.
could be

Considering whether exposures

intentional or unintentional and the motives

for in¬

tentional exposures could affect the probability of an ex¬
posure .
In assigning weights of importance to the controls
over exposures the auditor would again consider the charac¬
teristics of the system and the possible
ganization employees.

intent of the or¬

The auditor would also consider the

number of controls which operate on an exposure.

If there

is only one control which acts to reduce the probability of
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an exposure,

then that control

is much more critical than if

there are several controls identified as acting on an expo¬
sure regardless of the apparent quality of that control.

The

auditor may seem to be reconsidering much of the information
which went into estimating the probability of the exposures.
For the most part this is true.
above,

However,

as mentioned

the intent is to significantly increase the probability

of those exposures which become more likely to occur as the
characteristics of the system,

the motivations of the em¬

ployees and,

the critical nature of the con¬

most importantly,

trol are considered.
The final point discussed concerning the detailed review
is an alternative to the loss potential calculation.

Hoff¬

man suggests a linguistic variable approach to measuring the
security of a system which,

while sacrificing the apparent

precision of a numeric approach,
confidence that the final
This

"fuzzy"

may give a higher level of
rating is more realistic.

linguistic variable approach follows

tite graph of figure

from the tripar¬

8 and is described by Hoffman as fol-

1
59
lows:
B is a set of barriers,
threats,

security objects,

a mapping of T x 0 x M,

and security measures,

ordered tuples b = <t^,oj,mk>,

the

to a set of

the security points

in the sys¬

tem.
Each element in the barrier set B is a composite variable
.

r\j

B with three components.

Each component has a name

(t^,oj /Hi^)
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and a linguistic value

(P

,

the threat possibility,

L , the

X/

X/

%

object loss value and R

,

the security measure resistance)

which is a linguistic variable which assumes values which
are words rather than numbers.

The composite linguistic

'Xj

variable B is diagrammed in figure 9.
The subscripts

for the linguistic variables are the

same as the barrier B to emphasize that these components are
evaluated in the context of the specific barrier.
ditor could devise the barrier set B,

The au¬

assign linguistic

values to the probability of an exposure £ and to the object
C\j

loss value

(sensitivity)

(\j

L for each barrier B and from these

results determine the extent of testing necessary to deter¬
mine a linguistic value
resistance.
tem exists

for variable

the security measure

The auditor would conclude that a complete sys¬
if there

is a set

<t.,o.,m. >
l
3
k

for all

<t.,o.>
D
D

sets.

The auditor would conclude that this system is effective if
all R took values of effective given P and L values.
Having completed the detailed review and having either
calculated a loss potential or described a barrier set B,
the auditor next designs the audit tests

shown to be required

by the results of the detailed review.

Audit Test Design
At this stage of the privacy audit the auditor decides
the nature and extent of the audit tests to be performed.
The auditor also decides the areas

for performing tests.
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The auditor could decide that the loss potential is suffi¬
cient criteria

for design of audit tests.

A high loss poten

tial in a system or on a control or standard indicates that
extensive testing is required.

A low loss potential indi¬

cates that less testing is required.
verse relationship.

SAS 1 notes this

in¬

It states:

The second standard of field work recognizes that the
extent of tests required to constitute sufficient evi¬
dential matter under the third standard vary inversely
with the auditor's reliance on internal control.^0
This researcher suggests,

however,

that the quality of evi¬

dence required and the costs of performing the tests are ad¬
ditional criteria which may be employed in choosing the
tests.
Mautz and Sharaf suggest that as propositions being
tested increase in materiality the stronger the evidence
must be.

They state:

The persuasiveness of audit evidence increases, approach
ing compulsion as different types of evidence combine to
support any given proposition. . . . The more material
the proposition under consideration, the stronger must
be the evidence upon which judgment rests, varying from
a merely persuasive preponderance for immaterial propo¬
sitions to compelling or near compelling evidence for
material propositions.
Mautz and Sharaf note,

however,

that the strength of the

evidence varies with the nature of the assertion being
tested because the nature of the assertion determines to a
great extent the types of audit evidence possible.
vide the nature of assertions

into four groups.
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They diGroup

I

asserts the existence of physical things and can be tested
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empirically by physical examination and counts.
dence gathered for this group is compelling.
serts

some mathematical computation,

tionally by recomputation.
group is also compelling.

The evi¬

Group II as¬

and can be tested ra¬

The evidence gathered for this
Group III asserts the existence

of physical things not present and can be tested authorita¬
tively by confirmation with third parties or by reviewing
authoritative documentation.

The evidence gathered for this

group is merely persuasive.
The fourth, group asserts the existence of nonphysical
things,

the nonexistence of physical and nonphysical things,

qualitative judgments and value judgment quantities.

These

assertions are tested in many different ways and the evi¬
dence gathered is merely persuasive.
In a privacy audit the majority of the evidence pos¬
sible is merely persuasive.

For example,

evidence on the

accuracy of personal records

is gathered by confirmation,

which is merely persuasive.

Much of the evidence can be

gathered using a combination of authoritarianism and ration¬
alism.

For example,

the limiting of the access and use of

personal data can be tested by reviewing documentation,

by

interviewing personnel and by reviewing access logs created
by the computer.

This evidence is authoritarian.

This evi¬

dence can be complemented by testing the access controls to
determine their effectiveness.
Mautz and Sharaf state,

This evidence

as quoted above,

is rational.

that the
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persuasiveness of audit evidence increases as different types
of evidence combine to support a proposition.

This is the

philosophical side of the arguments presented above that au¬
dit tests

should be a combination of tests of processing re¬

sults and tests of controls.
The auditor should,
evidence necessary,

then,

determine the strength of

given the magnitude of the loss potential.

If the loss potential

is high and the nature of the proposi¬

tion being tested cannot lead to compelling evidence,

then

different types of tests will be required to increase the
persuasiveness of the evidence.

The auditor should not make

a conclusion on the effectiveness of a significant control
unless the evidence is strong.
The second criteria which might be considered in de¬
signing audit tests

is the cost of the tests to be performed.

As the quantity of tests increases to increase the persua¬
siveness of the evidence,

the cost of the audit increases.

Also as the sophistication of the audit techniques

increases,

the initial costs of acquiring the expertise required to per¬
form the techniques increases.

This expertise is acquired by

increased training or by hiring of consultants.
tests will require more time.

Also some

Time may be needed to design

the tests or time may be needed to write specialized software
for the tests.
be required.

Client or audit firm computer time may also
Should the overall cost of the audit be a
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consideration,

then the costs of the audit tests should be

used in designing the audit program.
Three criteria which might be used in deciding the ex¬
tent of audit testing have now been identified.
teria are loss potential

(LP),

quality of evidence

cost of audit tests

(C).

audit

and the Q and C combined,

fort.

"criticality"

The SAC reports

bining these

These cri¬
(Q),

and

The LP might loosely be termed the
the audit ef¬

identified different methods of com-

factors to decide on an audit plan.
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First,

audit need might be defined as criticality multiplied by ef¬
fort.

Second,

audit need might be defined as criticality

without considering effort.

Third,

audit cost-benefit might

be defined as criticality divided by effort.
to the criteria developed above,

these three

Relating this
formulations are

derived:
Audit need = LP x Q x C;

or

Audit need = LP;
Audit cost - benefit = LP +

(Q x C).

The auditor conducting the privacy audit would need to con¬
sider the environment and objectives which exist

for the au¬

dit in question before deciding the use of the criteria above
in designing the audit tests.

Perform Audit Tests
After considering the criteria developed in the section
above,

the auditor would design the tests necessary to
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evaluate the effectiveness of the privacy standard for each
system of personal records.

The tools which might be used

to evaluate the proposition of each standard will be out¬
lined in the next major section below

(Audit Tools).

The

final step in the privacy audit process is an evaluation of
the results of the tests.

Evaluation of the Privacy System of Control
After performing the audit tests,

the auditor must make

judgments as to the degree of effectiveness of the techniques
implemented by the organization to enact the privacy stan¬
dards.

Although the auditor might intuitively reach conclu¬

sions on the effectiveness of the system of control,

this

section offers three more quantitative evaluation methods.
The first method requires the calculation of a privacy
rating
ing

(PR)

(SR).
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which is a variation on Hoffman's

security rat-

The privacy rating can be calculated for each

privacy standard for each system.

The privacy rating is de¬

fined as follows:

PR

p

(s,r)

1
n
= T
G. I.
n if;1
1 k

where:
PR

(s,r)
P

= privacy rating of system s by rater r.
Subscript p notes that all ratings are partial
system ratings.
Each privacy standard is
rated separately

n = number of controls being considered
G.

l

=

"goodness"

of control i;

CUG<_1
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I.

= importance of control i.
Also equals p.w.,
probability of exposure i and weight of1 1
importance of control i over exposure i.
Note:

0<I.

The constraint that

n
for l<i<n and
7 I.=n
i=i 1
I^=n insures that perfectly

private systems have a rating of 1

for all standards and a

system totally deficient of privacy safeguards would have a
rating of 0

for all standards.

The goodness rating is the subjective evaluation of the
auditor based on the results of the audit tests.

Note that

the auditor would consider this goodness a degree of effec¬
tiveness

since G is between 0

and 1.

trol to be effective half the time,

If a test shows a con¬
then G might equal 0,

since that result would be totally unacceptable.
trol
equal

is found to be effective 99%
.8 or

.9,

of the time,

If a con¬

then G might

for example.

The importance rating I would have to be transformed
each time that a new PR is calculated.
cide which controls are to be evaluated,

The auditor would de¬
multiply the rele¬

vant P and W ratings and scale the results
given PR calculation,

£

such that for a

I^=n.

The PR measure could be used to evaluate each standard
within a system.

The auditor may choose to use the absolute

results and assume that scores of

.9

or better for all

stan¬

dards are sufficient for an unqualified opinion in the au¬
ditor's privacy report.
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The auditor should use this measure carefully.

Each

component of the result as well as the result itself should
be evaluated since as Hoffman notes:
. . . that equation rejects to some extent the theory
that 'a chain is no stronger than its weakest link.'
This is the reason that only partial system ratings are
gested here.

sug¬

It cannot be assumed that one effective stan¬

dard cancels out an ineffective standard to result

in an ef¬

fective privacy program.

for ex¬

ample,

It would not be correct,

to assume that an effective collection limitation

standard compensates

for an ineffective use

limitation stan¬

dard resulting in an effective privacy protection program.
A second evaluation method involves extending the use
of the barrier set B diagrammed in figure 9.

After having

defined the relevant composite linguistic variables B the
auditor would perform audit tests to determine a linguistic
value
Having

for the variables. R,
filled in the values

the security measure resistance.
for all variables &,

the auditor

f\j

can-*then review each barrier B and the barrier set B.
results of this review is a

"fuzzy"

The

rating for each barrier

or a combination of barriers making up a sub-set of B for a
privacy standard.
The third method for evaluation is to compare the re¬
sults of the tests to some predetermined standard or maximum.
The PR measure could be compared with a maximum possible PR
measure.

PR would be calculated twice.

One calculation
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would be

performed as

with G values

above.

The

second would be

being the highest that

conclusion of the audit

tests.

could be

index

=

to

.90

excellent

.49

to

0

very poor

The auditor could with experience
develop more

less

on absolute values

tection

the

index

1.00

dits

given at

Then

PR actual
= privacy protection
PR maximum
and

calculated

in conducting privacy au¬

realistic maximum

figures

for G and rely

for PR and more on the privacy pro¬

index.

Audit Tools
This
used to

section presents

test

to enact

the effectiveness

the privacy

standards

sentation

for each

exposures

and the controls

those exposures.
sentation
which

some audit

These were

outlined

standard then goes

used by the auditor to
in reducing the

the exposures.

It

in

tempt has been made
tools which could be

the

figure

The

causes

pre¬
of

7.

The pre¬

suggest tools

test the effectiveness

probability of
all

in conducting EDP

of

in each case.

the causes
these

audits.

to present an exhaustive
used

implemented

the probability of

on to

should be noted that

now used by auditors

could be

an organization.

used to reduce

of the controls

are

in

controls

standard briefly reviews

for each

could be

of the

tools which

tools
No

at¬

list of the

Also,

since

some

of
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tools are used many times,

they will be briefly described

only when they are introduced.
This presentation does not include the more common or
more pervasive type controls.
lified personnel,

For example,

training,

qua¬

general systems development controls and

general controls over the information processing center are
ignored.

Only those controls which can be directly related

to the privacy standard causes of exposure are presented
here.
tive,

Also,

these controls are not intended to be a defini¬

complete list.

There are many variations of privacy

protection implementation possible which preclude presenting
a definitive list of controls

in this research.

The controls and the audit methods

suggested to not

attempt to address the issue of efficiency.

Whether one im¬

plementation is more efficient than another is not of concern
in this presentation.

Openness
There are
standard.

four causes of exposures possible for this

First,

the public notice of existence of the data

bank is either not published or the notice does not reach a
substantial portion of the potential candidates
in the data bank.

for inclusion

The organization might control

for this

situation by creating a suspense file or an annual budget re¬
quirement that reminds the organization to renew its public
notices.

During this annual renewal process the organization
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might

review the characteristics

compare this to the audience
The

quiring the periodic

this

from this
review,

the target

duals who have

The

the auditor

uses

(GAS),

files,

ing

sent to the

in the organization's
individual knows

is

software,

quite common among auditors.

several

times

and to process

during this
GAS

is

operations,

record

output

statistical

functions.

DBMS has

file

comparisons,
As

internal

complex and as

increased the effectiveness

of

correct

access

files,

structures have become more

examine

are

updating of

and

is

Functions which

usually by choosing parameters,
logical

It

presentation

used to

inquiries.

arithmetic operations,

functions

in an at¬

of the existence

handling operations,

of

files

indivi¬

especially generalized au¬

in general here.

specified,

files,

storage

file of personal

verify application processing and controls,

file conditions
can be

use

explained

undertaken to

the data bank.

use of audit

software

is

of

complement

custom-designed

could sample the
to be

to

re¬

actually reached

generalized or

confirmations

records

recommended for
and

Using

confirm that the

and of the

dit

If the auditor wishes

to which the notices

audience.

and prepare

tempt to

review and the documentation that

review.

extent

software

records

used.

and by reviewing the documentation re¬

a confirmation process might be

determine the

audit

the media being

and

auditor could test these controls by physically

examining the notices

sults

of

of the target audience

GAS has

the

use

decreased
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GAS packages are often unable to access the data directly
which either prevents their use altogether,

forcing the au¬

ditor to use the much more expensive method of customdesigned software or requires that the auditor have the
client create an interface between the GAS and the client's
data.

This last alternative raises the question of auditor

independence which was addressed above.
The results of the auditor's confirmation process,
testing the extent of public notice success,
preted carefully.

should be

inter¬

The auditor needs to exercise judgment in

what the results of the confirmation process mean with re¬
gards the effectiveness of the organization in reaching its
target audience,

those people who are likely candidates

for

inclusion in the data banks.
This second cause of exposures

for this standard is

the failure to notify individuals who actually have records
about them in the data bank.

Notices would include

informa¬

tion that such a record does exist and the uses of that re¬
cord.

The causes are that pre-printed input and output

forms

are not used nor are notices printed on periodic correspon¬
dence with the individuals,

such as

statements.

Control

for

this cause of exposures could be the standardization of
forms,

the segregation of the duties of preparing documents

and forms

from the duties of using the

forms

of sending the documents to the individual.

for input or
Automatic print¬

ing of notices on correspondence might also be employed with
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the responsibility for verifying that documents have notices
again being segregated from the responsibility for printing
notices.
The auditor can test these controls by reviewing or¬
ganization charts and job descriptions

for appropriate se¬

gregation of duties.

The auditor might also review documen¬

tation on procedures,

observe operations,

and review source document files to see
propriate pre-printed forms.

Finally,

conduct inquiries,

if they are the ap¬
the auditor might

conduct a confirmation with individuals about whom records
are stored to verify that they were originally and periodic¬
ally informed of the existence,

contents and uses of the

data bank.
The use of documentation review,

observation,

and in¬

quiry is suggested often in this section on audit tools.
When such tools are suggested it is intended that they sup¬
plement other tools

since by themselves they do not produce

very persuasive evidence.

For example,

tions combined with the review,

the use of confirma¬

observation and inquiries

will give more conclusive evidence than any single tool that
no secret personal

record systems exist.

The third cause of exposure is the

lack of the capa¬

bility of accurately informing individuals

in a timely manner

upon request that a record about them either does or does not
exist

in the data bank.

The primary control that an
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organization can use is a mechanized procedure in the compu¬
ter system itself.
The auditor can easily establish that this capability
exists by requesting that this process be demonstrated and
then observing the operation.

The auditor may wish to test

that this process does not fail to find the requested record
if it is in the system.
process

The auditor can either test the

itself or the results of the process.

To test the process
capture actual requests
requests and,

itself the auditor would need to

(inputs)

using these,

and the results of those

attempt to duplicate the process

using GAS.

If the results are the same then the process is

confirmed.

This technique is called parallel simulation and

is an automated version of what has been termed

"auditing

around the computer."
Another method of verifying the processing would be
the creation of

"dummy"

personal records in the data bank.

The auditor would make up dummy requests
and have them processed along with
records.
exist,

for those records

"live"

requests

for real

Since the auditor knows that these dummy records

all requests should result

in a positive response.

For completeness the auditor should actually submit dummy
requests

for records known not to exist.

are known as integrated test facilities
requests are known as test data.

The dummy records
(ITF)

and the dummy

The combination of the two

will verify the phases of processing.
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To verify the results of this process the auditor
could take the output
verify,

using GAS,

from the normal request process and

that the records either do or do not ex¬

ist.
The final causes of exposures is the public and indi¬
vidual notices containing incomplete or inaccurate informa¬
tion.

The organization controls

for this by insuring that

its privacy implementation corresponds to these notices.
auditor must make qualitative
of exposure.

The

judgments regarding this cause

The auditor could test the control on this by

reviewing all privacy policy and procedures and determining
if the practices actually correspond to the information in
the notices.

Individual access
There are two causes of exposures
First,

for this

standard.

the copy of the record provided to the individual

not easily understood.

The organization can control

is

for this

by providing conversion tables in the computer system so that
any codes are translated to explanatory phrases and by pro¬
viding for formatted print-outs or print-outs on pre-printed
forms.

The auditor can examine this output and determine

its readability.
The second cause of exposure is the printout of incom¬
plete copies of records.
record at all

(The problem of not

finding the

is discussed under the openness standard.)
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The controls implemented by the organization depend to a
great extent on the internal storage formats.
the internal storage structures,

however,

software is the main method of control.
would want to be sure,

for example,

Regardless of

the accessing
The organization

that data access rou¬

tines do not erroneously end before successfully completing
a traversal of a set of chained records.
might,

for example,

The organization

include a hash total of the contents of

an individual's record in the master record.
such as amendments are added,

As details

the hash total is updated.

When a record is accessed the hash total of the record re¬
trieved must equal the hash total stored in the record.
To test the effectiveness of these controls the au¬
ditor again has the choice of verifying the results of pro¬
cessing or verifying the processing controls themselves.
To verify the processing controls the auditor could per
form parallel
are complex,

simulation.

If the internal data structures

GAS may not be effective and special-purpose au

dit software would have to be designed.

The

ITF and test

data combination could also be used here.
Another method of verifying processing controls is the
snapshot method which is also called tracing and tagging.
To use this method the auditor identifies
special code)

in some way

those inputs that are of interest.

case it would be requests
processing of the

for copies of records.

input progresses

(a

In this
As the

information concerning
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the condition of the input,

the stage of processing and the

contents of certain memory locations

is output

for review.

The auditor would review the output to determine if the ac¬
cessing routine ended before the entire record had been ac¬
cessed.

This method could be used in conjunction with ITF

and test data to determine what processes were used to pro¬
cess the test data.
To verify the results of processing the auditor could
select some output records and,
accessing routines

using GAS,

verify that the

find all of each record requested.

Individual participation
The main cause of exposures

for this

standard is the

failure to input record corrections and amendments to re¬
cords.

The organization can use pre-numbered correction and

amendment forms.

The organization then devises an internally

maintained suspense

file system which periodically prints no¬

tices of missing form numbers.

There could also be a proce¬

dure of putting a code on the record which has a correction
or amendment forthcoming.
a certain length of time,
an input missing.

If the input is not processed in
a notice

is printed that there

is

These two procedures could be performed

simultaneously by segregated functions thus adding another
control.
The auditor could test many of these controls by re¬
viewing documentation on procedures,
tion charts and job descriptions,

by reviewing organiza¬

by inquiry and by
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observation of operations.

The auditor could also manually

trace the process of record correction to verify that changes
are processed.
The auditor could verify the integrity of the programs
used to update records through the use of test data and ITF.
Snapshot,

tracing and tagging could also be used to insure

that inputs actually update the records.
especially important when amendments,
the records,

This would be

which are not part of

are added to the file.

To test the results of processing the auditor could
read from the

file,

using GAS or some other audit software,

copies of records which should have been updated or amended.
The auditor can then compare the copies of the records to
the source documents to verify the results of the update.

Collection limitation
The

first cause of exposures for this

standard is the

lack of a policy of limited data collection and the failure
to periodically review that policy.
control

The organization can

for this cause of exposure by establishing a suspense

which requires that the policy be reviewed by a certain date.
The auditor can review documentation and conduct

inquiries

to see that this policy does exist and is reviewed.

It

should be noted that the auditor is not responsible for re¬
viewing the content of this policy.

As with all privacy
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practices the auditor is merely responsible for determining
that what the organization has stated is as they say.
The second cause of exposures

for this standard is

the entrance of unauthorized data into the system.
trol for this the organization can segregate the
which prepare input forms
input the data.

functions

from the functions which actually

The forms for input could be pre-printed

to reduce attempts to input unauthorized data.
could be made

To con¬

Provision

for cross-referencing source documents to in¬

ternal records.

This

feature would allow periodic compari¬

son of records and documents to verify that only the

infor¬

mation on the documents is contained in the records.

The

nature of the record storage and retrieval system also of¬
fers controls to the organization.

For example,

fixed for¬

mat records can only contain that data for which the records
were originally designed.

Also,

with DBMSs the DMD or DSMD

can be designed to accept only authorized data types.
To test these controls the auditor can review documentation and organization charts and job descriptions.

These

could also be compared to data authorization tables to
verify that the accessing and updating of data permitted by
these tables agrees with the documentation.
The sampling of the files using GAS would serve as a
test of the results of processing.

The copies of the records

produced by the GAS would be reviewed for unauthorized data.
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The source document cross reference control would assist in
»

this test.
The controls themselves could be tested using test
data and ITF.

The auditor would attempt to enter unautho¬

rized data into the system.
rallel simulation.
program,

The auditor could also use pa¬

Using actual inputs and a simulation

the auditor could verify that the simulation and

the actual system reject the same unauthorized data.
The tagging,

tracing and snapshot methods could be

used with live data or with test data to verify that error
routines were called in when unauthorized data is input.
The mapping technique could also be used with live or
test data.

This technique allows an auditor to know what

logic modules
are used.

in a program are used and how many times they

The auditor could verify,

for example,

that error

routines are used the same number of times that unauthorized
data is

input.

The third cause of exposures

for this standard is the

entrance of data into the files from unauthorized sources.
The organization could control this cause by requiring that
a source indicator code be a part of all

inputs.

As the in¬

puts are processed by the system a check with the source/
data authorization table would be made to ensure that only
data

from authorized sources

in input to the system.

To con

trol the integrity of the function placing these codes on
the source documents

the organization could segregate the
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functions preparing the documents
sible for input.

from the functions respon¬

The organization could also require an en¬

dorsement from a different function be placed in the source
document.

Finally,

the organization may wish to rotate

these duties or the personnel responsible for them.
To test these controls an auditor can review documenta¬
tion,

review organization charts and job descriptions and

conduct inquiries.

The auditor might also review the source/

data authorization table and the user authorization table to
verify that these agree with the policies,

procedures,

and

documentation which has been reviewed.
It is possible that data entry personnel,
come familiar ‘with their jobs,

who have be¬

could reinput transactions

which were rejected for unauthorized source codes by replac¬
ing the code with one that would be accepted.

The auditor

could test for this condition by performing an analysis of
job accounting,

log tapes or error suspense files.

These

files or tapes are created by many systems to monitor the
actions of the system,

provide for back-up and ensure that

errors are corrected and re-input.

The auditor would attempt

to match the rejected inputs with subsequent successful in¬
puts

in which only the source code was changed.
An alternative to using these files for this review

would be embedded audit data collection which is sometimes
called concurrent processing.

This technique has been also

suggested using the name System Control Audit Review File
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(SCARF)

and Systems Management Facilities

(SMF).

This tech¬

nique collects data concerning certain transactions which
can be subsequently reviewed by the auditor.

This technique

has been termed transaction selection when used with batch
systems.

66

The auditor could set the parameters for this

technique to store all information concerning transactions
which were rejected for unauthorized source code.

The au¬

ditor could then review the files to determine if the source
code was overridden and the transaction successfully pro¬
cessed.

The software for this technique is

the application system software.

"embedded"

in

This requires that the au¬

ditor be involved in the system design process and suggest
the characteristics of the embedded logic.
requires,

therefore,

dependent auditors.

This technique

the cooperation of the internal and in¬
It is conceivable that the embedded lo¬

gic be bypassed by the subsequent modification of the appli¬
cation system or be disabled by modification of the parame¬
ters.
To verify that the embedded logic is being used at the
time of the audit the auditor could tag

"live"

transactions

and trace them or produce snapshots during the processing.
The auditor could also combine this with mapping to be sure
that the embedded logic
tions.

is accessed for all tagged transac¬

A combination of test data and mapping could also be

used in this case.

These techniques could also be used to

verify that source authorization logic and the source/data
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authorization table are called on each time a transaction is
processed.

This would verify that in all cases

inputs are

checked for unauthorized sources.
As

for other standards above,

test data and ITF or parallel

the auditor could use

simulation to verify the ef¬

fectiveness of the controls.

Use

limitation
The cause of exposures

for this standard is unauthor¬

ized use of personal information.
utilized for this
tion routines,
strictions
dures,

The controls which can be

standard include authentication/authoriza¬

authorization/use tables or DMD and DSMD re¬

for DBMSs,

output distribution plans and proce-

segregation of duties and job rotation.

Mair
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de¬

scribes a technique of using

"bait records" which could also

be used by the organization.

To use this technique the or¬

ganization creates dummy records to

"bait" personnel into

unauthorized use of personal data.

The internal auditors

could periodically review the record and the uses of it to
determine if the record has had incidences of unauthorized
access and use.
The auditor would test these controls in much the same
manner as above

for collection limitation.

The emphasis

for

the tests for use limitation is on testing the use controls
rather than the source controls but the principles are the
same.
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Disclosures

limitation

The cause of exposures

for this

standard is the unau¬

thorized external disclosure of personal information.

The

controls implemented by the organization and audit tests of
compliance are as above for use limitation.

The one addi¬

tional review required of the auditor is a comparison of the
authorization table and the reports of privacy audits ofthird parties to verify that the organization releases per¬
sonal data only to other organizations which comply with
certain privacy requirements.

Information management
There are four causes of exposure for this standard.
First,

the organization has not appointed a privacy monitor.

Personnel procedures could be used to control
cause.

for this

Requiring that a position or number of positions

in

the organization have as part of their job description the
duties of privacy monitor and that these positions have a
high priority for hiring could serve as a control
cause.

The auditor can review job descriptions,

ing practices,

for this
review hir¬

conduct inquiries and observe operations to

determine compliance with these controls.
The second cause of exposure is

failure to notify past

users of data and the sources of that data of corrections
made to the data.
of corrections.

This process has been termed propagation
The organization can control

for this
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exposure by having notices automatically produced by the com¬
puter when erroneous data is corrected.

The function pre¬

paring correction source documents could maintain a suspense
file of corrections until the output notices have been re¬
ceived.

Since it is

likely that there will be a need to

distinguish error corrections from normal data updates,

it

might be advisable to segregate these duties into two dif¬
ferent functions.

This would preclude circumventing the

automatic notice procedures by submitting error corrections
as normal updates.
The auditor could review documentation,
tions,

observe opera¬

conduct inquiries and review organization charts and

job descriptions to verify the segregation of duties and sus¬
pense file aspect of these controls.
The auditor using test data or by tagging live data
could verify that notices automatically result from error
correction by reviewing job accounting or other logs or files
created by embedded audit data collection.
The combination of tracing and mapping of

live or test

data input would be used to verify that the logic modules
which make the notices are used when error corrections are
input.
Parallel simulation could be used to compare actual
notices produced with those produced by the auditor's simula¬
tion software.
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Finally,

the auditor might extract a sample of error

correction source documents and compare these to logs of er¬
ror correction notices to verify that the sampled documents
all resulted in error notifications.
The third cause of exposure is the existence of erro¬
neous or dated data in the personal records.

Controls to

protect the accuracy are the same general controls used to
keep all data,

personal and otherwise,

accurate.

To ensure

that data is current the organization can make provisions
for putting dates

in the records along with the data and

then periodically purging from the files that data which is
no longer current.

The assigning of dates can be performed

automatically as data is entered.

The purging routine can

be carried out continuously or be periodically scheduled.
The auditor can test for the automatic assignment of
dates using test data,
mapping,

embedded audit data collection,

or any number of the tests discussed above.

auditor can review job accounting logs,

The

processing schedules

and other documents to verify that the purging process is
carried out.

The results of the purging process could be

verified by reviewing samples of the files to determine that
only current information is present.

Also,

the files could

be scanned looking for data which is being maintained beyond
established retention dates.
To test for the accuracy of data the auditor can use
many of the tools which would normally be used for

249

verification.

Error prevention,

detection and correction

controls could be tested for effectiveness.

The auditor

could also confirm the accuracy of the data with the indi¬
vidual about whom the data is stored.

The process would in¬

volve use of GAS or other audit software to produce confir¬
mations to be sent to the individuals.
The final causes of exposures

for this standard is

the

nonexistence or ineffectiveness of general controls over the
information processing facility and the systems development
process.

The controls and the audit techniques and tools

could be those normally associated with these activities.

Accountability
The main cause of exposure for this standard is

the

failure to record or copy the sources and uses of personal
information.

The organization can exercise control over this

cause by implementing automatic mechanized procedures
cording the information anytime that data is
cessed.

for re¬

input or ac¬

The controls discussed above for collection,

use

and disclosure limitation are important here also because
some of those controls attempt to prevent circumvention of
the authorization processes.
controls

If the circumvention of these

is effective then the sources and uses which are re¬

corded will be accurate.
All of the tools necessary to test for the effective¬
ness have been discussed above.

The auditor would need to
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have verified the effectiveness of the use,

disclosure and

collection limitation controls to verify that when sources
and uses are logged that they are accurate.

Then the au¬

ditor would test the actual input and accesses to verify
that these cause the creation of the use and source informa¬
tion.

Audit tools

summary

This section has presented an overview of some sources
of exposures,

controls

privacy standards.
nitive nor complete.

and audit tools

for each of the eight

None of this has been necessarily defi¬
The variations in implementations be¬

tween different organizations

and the differences in or¬

ganization characteristics precludes a definitive list of
causes of exposures for each standard.

Some of the causes

of exposure presented here may not apply to some organiza¬
tions while there may be some additional causes which exist
in others.

The controls used vary with the causes of expo¬

sure and can also be different for the same exposure because
the particular organizational environment must be considered
before choosing controls.
The audit tools presented above have merely been sug¬
gestive of how commonly used audit tools can be applied to a
privacy audit.

Where the objectives of the tests were simi¬

lar for two or more standards the tests were only suggested
in one place.

In a few places there were many more tests
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which could have been suggested.

The description of the

techniques was abbreviated since these are all described in
other sources.
However,

68

Some of these techniques have limitations.

these were ignored since there are no limitations

which are peculiar to their use in a privacy audit.

New Techniques
Cash presents

four

"new" auditing techniques which

"are

potentially important in their own right and can increase the
effectiveness of existing methods."

None of the tools pre¬

sented in the section above were capable of completely
evaluating the effectiveness of controls because of the pre¬
ponderance of evidence necessary,

the inherent limitations

of the techniques or because of the particular environment
which exists in the client firm.

Cash suggests that these

new techniques are attempts to overcome the

shortcomings

of the traditional audit techniques.
This section presents an overview of these four new
techniques.

The purpose is

to briefly present these tech¬

niques and suggest the implications of their use in a privacy
audit.

Software standardization
In the discussion of technological considerations
above the problem of audit software interface with DBMS and
other uses of complex internal data structures was intro¬
duced.

This

interface problem may cause the auditor to
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either sacrifice independence by having the client facili¬
tate the interface or to spend additional time and money de¬
veloping specialized software for each audit engagement.

A

solution to this problem might be the standardization of
compilers,

object code and source code.

Cash states:

The justification usually presented with these ap¬
proaches is that with standardized software, uniform
examination and.evaluation procedures could be
adopted.
If feasible,

this procedure would greatly assist the auditor

in conducting privacy audits.

However,

standardization at¬

tempts have proven to be difficult given the particularly
desirable

features of the myriad of software alternatives.

One standardized set of languages with all the desirable
features would probably be too complex to be of any use.

Systems design involvement
Some of the audit tools suggested above require the
participation of the auditor in the systems design process.
The SCARF technique,

for example,

requires that the auditor

specify the characteristics of the audit logic modules while
the application system is being designed.

Also,

the

fami¬

liarity with the entire system that the auditor would gain
while participating in the design process would facilitate
auditing the system after it was made operational.
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Formal systems

assertions

This approach to auditing includes

involvement of the

auditor in the system design function and the introduction
of a standard system development technique that allows
mal assertions about the resultant system.

for¬

The logical

justification for this approach is similar to that which
has the auditor's dependence on internal control determine
the extent of additional testing.

If the auditor can prove

that the process used to generate application systems

is re¬

liable then there is a higher degree of confidence that the
resultant output system is reliable..
This approach offers

features which facilitate the

standardization and system design involvement techniques dis
cussed above.

The formal system assertions approach offers

the auditor a standard set of controls and general design
methodology with which to participate in the system design
process.

Also,

this approach offers a standardized system

design methodology which is an alternative to the software
standards which are perceived as not viable.
tions of this approach,

The specifica¬

which are outlined below,

tained from a paper by Cash,

Bailey and Whinston

are ob(Cash).
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The system design methodology for formal systems asser
tions establishes

four phases

in the design process.

phase must be proven equivalent to the ones
The methodology thereby asserts

Each

linked to it.

software system reliability

as a result of the formalism introduced into the system

254

development cycle.

Cash

notes that formal system asser¬

tions will allow a more thorough investigation of the
client's internal control system by reducing the time ne¬
cessary to verify computer program code.
The four phases in the design process are described as
follows:
1.

Theoretical model

(TM)

is a formal specification

that addresses an abstracted version of the system.

This

phase is initiated by the presentation of user requirements
to the systems analyst followed by a presentation by the au¬
ditor of system control specifications in terms of user re¬
quirements .
2.

Implementation specification

(IS)

consists of

qualifications to the theoretical model that reflect the en¬
vironment in which the model is to be implemented.
phase involves,

first,

This

the derivation of an implementation

specification which supports modularization of the theoreti¬
cal model and facilitates its

implementation via a program-

••

ming language.

The second aspect of this phase is

a formal

proof of equivalence with the theoretical model.
3.

Source language specification

(SL)

is the algorith¬

mic representation of the implementation specifications in
some programming language.

This

step is performed in a

language which supports structured programming since program
modules are amenable to proofs of correctness.
of this phase are proved to correspond to the
fore to the TM.

The results
IS and there¬
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4.

Machine language representation

tion process

(ML)

is a transla¬

from the source language specification.

The ML

is demonstrated to be consistent with the higher level spe¬
cification of the SL by certifying the correctness and the
authenticity of the translator and resultant code.

The Internal Control Model

(TICOM)

TICOM is a technique which facilitates the review and
evaluation of internal controls from a total systems per¬
spective.

This technique views the manual and automated com¬

ponents of the total system of control in an equal fashion.
This technique also specifically recognizes the interaction
of the several control perspectives.
cific application controls,

The general and spe¬

the information processing

facility controls and the controls on the system development
process all come together to make up the total system of in¬
ternal control.

TICOM assists the auditor in recognizing

these overlapping controls and in recognizing where they do
not overlap.

The potential impact that these controls can

have on one another in preventing and failing to prevent
causes of exposure was discussed above.
The TICOM methodology can be applied to an existing
system.

However,

the application of the formal systems as¬

sertion methodology is a precondition for the maximum benefit
of TICOM.
The general characteristics of TICOM are as

follows:
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1.

Provides an encoding mechanism for internal control
systems that views automated and manual procedures
equally which provides a total system perspective
for review and evaluation
Uses recent EDP technological advances to facilitate
review and evaluation of the system for more tho¬
rough investigation
Facilitates positional analysis
Eliminates 'slanted' questions on a questionnaire
Allows simulation of accounting subsystems to check
for 'lagged' (also termed 'compensatory') control
procedures, and subsystem overlap that might condone
fraudulent activity
Facilitates viewing internal control systems at dif¬
ferent levels of detail which allows the auditor to
specify the level of detail needed to perform the
review and evaluation.73

2.

3.
4.
5.

6.

Although desired for accounting control,

this model

lends itself to assisting in the conduct of a privacy audit.
The model addresses all of the issues related to the review
and evaluation of privacy controls.
addresses the problem,

This model specifically

discussed above,

of the formulation

of an opinion as to the overall effectiveness of a control
system.

The number of controls that comprise a control sys¬

tem could potentially cause the auditor problems in forming
an overall evaluation.
as a total system,

As this model views internal control

this problem is

alleviated.

The specifications of this approach,
sented below,
and Whinston.

are obtained from two papers by Cash,

Bailey

74

Figure 10
ization,

which are pre¬

is a schematic of the TICOM system.

Elicitation of System Description,

Initial¬

the conversion of

that description into the Internal Control Description
Language

(ICDL),

and the submission of the

ICDL to the

257

Figure 10.

TICOM Schematic
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Internal Control
all

Description Language Analyzer

steps preceding the

loading of

nal Control Description Data
stored description of
trol

system.

which is

The

the manual

ICDDB

the data base
75

committee.

Base

is

The
are

as

Through the use of

Initialization

is

information in the

the

location,

the

client organization.
2.

and

the

internal

a

internal con¬
structure,

control

au¬

system in

is presently possible.

the TICOM development

steps

title,

functional

Elicitation of System Description
the

free-form or questionnaires.
printed with the

form generated?"

form distributed?"
skeleton

The

and

statements.

in¬

and physi¬
of

the process

control

and have

"To whom are

answers

ICDL primitive

internal

is

and

This

employees

The questionnaires

ICDL primitives

static

system.

identification index for all

of evoking a description of

ICDL

setting up of the

internal control

of the name,

cal

plete

ICDDB is

the query processor the

efficient manner than

formation consists

to

and automated

Inter¬

follows:

literal

a

The

are

structure proposed by the CODASYL

essential elements of

1.

"Is

(ICDDB).

into the

a network data base

ditor can objectively analyze
a much more

the data

(ICDLA)

system using
are pre¬

questions

the parts

to the questions

such as

of
are

statements which result

in

the
fill-ins
com¬
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The

free-form method requires that the auditor develop

a mental image of the internal control system and transpose
that image into ICDL statements.
3.

Generation of Internal Control Description Language

is a process of converting the questionnaire and free-form
results into machine-readable form.
4.

Internal Control Description Language Analyzer de¬

termines the consistency and completeness of the ICDL state¬
ments,

prints diagnostics and performs a generalized loading

function.
It should be noted that this

system also includes the

description and analysis of the software and hardware aspects
of the internal control system.
The

ICDDB's network data structure supports the query

access to date.

The query language suggested by Cash is a

GPLAN/QS which is a non-procedural language using common
English statements of the form:
<COMMAND><RETRIEVAL CLAUSE>CONDITIONAL CLAUSE>
The TICOM model is only conceptual at this time.

If

and when implemented this system offers a powerful and easy
to use tool to the auditor to assist in the review and
evaluation of internal control systems.

When combined with

the

the use of the TICOM

formal

system assertion methodology,

system would allow the auditor to perform more objective and
complete reviews of internal control and to be more prepared
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to make

judgments on the overall effectiveness of the total

system of control.

Summary

This chapter has presented a model for a privacy audit.
The goals of the model were established,
auditor outlined,

the function of the

and the audit techniques suggested.

The goals of the model were met in the following man¬
ner.

The auditor's assumed competence is maximized by de¬

signing the audit function to be similar to the present re¬
view and evaluation of internal control and by suggesting
tools and techniques which are already widely used.
ditor's

The au¬

limitations were minimized by requiring substantial

input by the organization and the organization's

legal coun¬

sel and by suggesting an alternative to the materiality cri¬
teria often utilized by the auditor.

The privacy laws,

the

privacy committee recommendations and the GAPP framework
satisfy the requirement for the establishment of generally
accepted operational criteria.
Methods were suggested whereby the auditor could col¬
lect verifiable,

quantifiable evidence with which to make

assertions concerning the privacy system.

It was pointed out

above that the privacy standards require the recording of
information and installation of controls.

These were dis¬

cussed at length in the audit technique section.
an auditor's report of findings was

suggested.

Finally,
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The auditor's

function in conducting a privacy audit

is much the same as that in conducting a financial audit.
The auditor begins the examination with the representation
of the organization,
performs tests,
Standards
The

then reviews the system of control,

and finally issues a report of findings.

for the privacy audit function were suggested.
final section of this chapter suggested the appli¬

cation in a privacy audit of presently existing audit tools
and techniques.

Some

"new"

techniques which hold great pro¬

mise for assisting an auditor in conducting reviews and
evaluations of internal control were also reviewed.
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CHAPTER

VII

CONCLUDING REMARKS

This chapter presents a summary of the research pro¬
ject,

discusses its

limitations and proposes some actions

for the future.

Summary

This research project

began: with a discussion of the

problem of privacy as it exists today.
individuals'

The protection of

right to privacy is a widely discussed yet

sometimes misunderstood topic.
today for several reasons.

Privacy is a popular subject

First,

there is a growing re¬

cognition that great financial and psychological harm can
be done to an individual whose right to privacy has been
violated.

Second,

individuals have voiced concern about

erosion of their privacy,

particularly that caused by the

ever-increasing use of computers

for record-keeping.

discussions on transborder data flow,

Third,

a problem partially

attributed to privacy are being carried out on an interna¬
tional basis.
The problem of privacy is often confused with secrecy
and computer security.
about individuals

Secrecy is the absence of information

in the possession of others while privacy
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is the control of that information by the individual.

Com¬

puter security is a system of control implemented by an or¬
ganization to protect its

information assets against uses

which are not in accordance with the organization's policies
Privacy is the right of an individual to participate in de¬
cisions made with .regard to that personal information which
is

in the hands of others.

To participate in these deci¬

sions an individual needs to know what information is main¬
tained by others and how it is used.
There are at this time a few laws in existence in this
country which have attempted to give to individuals mechan¬
isms

for participating in the decisions made with regard to

personal
of 1974

information maintained by others.
specifies certain requirements

functions

in the Federal Government.

The Privacy Act

for record-keeping
There are other fe¬

deral laws which set similar requirements

for specific parts

of the private sector.
The Report of the Privacy Protection Study Commission,
issued in July of 1977,

will serve as the basis

for any fur¬

ther implementation of privacy in the public and private
sector.

The Commission's report suggests a privacy implemen

tation plan that involves legal requirements,
pliance,

voluntary com¬

the right to remedy violations of privacy in the

courts and a permanent privacy commission to participate in
the

formulation of privacy legislation and to monitor the

implementation of The Privacy Act of

1974.

The Commission
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was guided in formulating its
principles.

These are:

implementation plan by three

first,

reform should be created;

that incentives

second,

for systemic

that existing regulatory

and enforcement mechanisms should be used as much as pos¬
sible;

and third,

that unnecessary cost be avoided.

This researcher has suggested that the Commission's
plan is incomplete because the implementation principles did
not address all of the privacy issue.
plementation principles were added.

Three additional im¬
These are:

first,

that

consideration be given to the movement for an international
privacy policy;

second,

that the impact of technology on

compliance be considered;

and third,

that information be

provided to the general public concerning the privacy proce¬
dures of record-keeping organizations.
The resulting privacy implementation model suggested
in chapter III includes an audit by certified public accoutants

(CPAs)

of the privacy safeguards implemented by

record-keeping organizations.

This audit would be supple¬

mentary to the plan of the Privacy Commission.
quirements,

voluntary compliance,

The

legal re¬

recourse in the courts,

the

proposed privacy commission and the audit would be comple¬
mentary functions.
Since the CPA is required now to review and evaluate
internal control during the
dit,
trol,

financial audit,

the privacy au¬

which is also a review and evaluation of internal con¬
should be conducted as a part of the

financial audit

270

to minimize the cost of the privacy audit.

The resulting

report of the auditor would be used by individuals,
ganizations,

other or¬

and the proposed privacy commission to evaluate

the privacy procedures of record-keeping organizations.
Having an independent function publicly report on the
privacy procedures

implemented by organizations balances

the needs of individuals and other interested parties to know
about and control the information maintained about them with
the needs of organizations to use personal information to
manage their affairs.

The public independent report is a

strong incentive for organizations to conform to a certain
norm of privacy practices.
in this plan.

The courts act as a safety valve

When violations do occur,

last resort is recourse in the courts.

an individual's
Finally,

the pro¬

posed privacy commission serves as a national focal point
for monitoring privacy practices,
technology advances.
formation,

privacy violations and

By accumulating and evaluating this

in¬

the commission can suggest privacy practices and

implementation plans in the future.
The arguments for an audit of privacy safegurds are
summarized as follows.

First,

changes in the laws and the

responsiveness of the courts to those laws occur much more
slowly than changes in computer technology.

An audit is a

compliance monitoring mechanism which can more easily keep
pace with changes in technology.

By verifying compliance

with privacy laws and privacy commission recommendations.
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the

audit mechanism can provide

a more

use of technology

in violation of the

Second,

is

the audit

effects

which,

right

This

of privacy violations,

is more desirable,

than use of the

although a necessary component of

tection plan,
have been

found to have occurred.

in

international

a way

It was

acceptable

suggested that the

This

the

to parti¬

flow agreements.

and a commission does

is

logical candidate

the CPA.

That

conduct the privacy audit has not been
research.

States

of

they

not

to other countries.

ducting the privacy audit

this

the use

for the United

The present privacy plan of courts
appear to be

the privacy pro¬

Third,

transborder data

given

courts

can only correct privacy violations after

audit mechanism may be
cipate

to privacy.

a preemptive mechanism which attempts

to prevent privacy violations.
the

timely check on the

reseracher only

for con¬

the CPA should

suggested prior to

found a

few places

in

the

literature which mentioned a privacy audit and none made

any

suggestion of who might

because

the

conduct the

audit.

concern about privacy rights

is

This

only a

is

so

recent de¬

velopment.
There are certainly alternatives
job.

The

CPA for

this

creation of a new government agency or private pro¬

fession was

dismissed by this

and time necessary

researcher because of the

for development.

Study Commission raised the
of

to the

issue of

any government monitoring of

cost

The

Privacy Protection

the

constitutionality

privacy

safeguards

in

the
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private

sector.

This would preclude

the use of the

General

Accounting Office

or other existing or any newly created

government agency

for

auditors was

privacy audits.

dismissed by this

fession presently
which would be

lacks

the

The

internal

researcher because that

appearance of

necessary to

use of

give

pro¬

independence

credibility to

the audit

report.
To
auditor
audit
to

facilitate the
an

audit model was

standards,

assist
The

audit

the

a

and to give guidance

devised.

framework,

auditor

standards

and

The model

consists

audit.

suggested are extensions
Standards.

Generally Accepted Privacy Principles

The

of the

present

framework of

(GAPP)

was

devised to

assist organizations in implementing privacy practices
to assist
tices.
cause

The

of

in reviewing

framework

some

procedures

intent
the

assists

and evaluating those

are

to a

set of privacy goals.

implement privacy with

of the various

auditor because

used

for a

between the GAPP

prac¬

the organizations be¬

it

practices.
is

This

similar

in

financial

and the

GAAP

audit.

This

some

and
al¬

idea

framework

as¬

structure to the

present Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
which

and

order to the many privacy procedures

the organization to

the

sists

all

auditor

GAPP

it gives

relates
lows

the

of

suggested audit techniques

in conducting the

Generally Accepted Auditing

to the

(GAAP)

The main difference

frameworks

is

that

the

GAPP
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is only a classification scheme

for the various privacy

practices.
The audit model concludes with a suggested audit pro¬
gram which is very similar to that conducted by an auditor
in reviewing and evaluating internal control.

The auditor

reviews the representation of management to determine what
the organization has planned to do to protect privacy.

The

auditor then evaluates this plan for effectiveness using the
same tools presently used in a financial audit.
audit tools,

Some new

which might be of assistance to the auditor in

conducting privacy audits,

were also introduced.

Recommendations for the Future

This

study has been exploratory in nature which makes

it quite limited.

The privacy and audit models are based on

the assumptions of this researcher.
impractical at this stage.

Statistical tests are

The resulting models are there¬

fore based on insights rather than on any conclusive proofs.
The next stage in the research into a solution of the
privacy problem should be a validation of the assumptions on
which the privacy model is based.

It should be determined

if an independent report concerning the privacy practices of
organizations

in this

country will satisfy other nations who

would like to see an omnibus privacy law and a regulatory
agency.

A study of the costs of conducting the privacy audit

should be undertaken to determine if the incremental costs
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are less

using this model than they would be

independent agency conducted the audit.

if some other

In conducting such

a study the researcher should be careful to record incremen¬
tal costs above the costs of what the auditor should be do¬
ing and not necessarily above those things that the auditor
is doing.

In studying the costs

it should also be deter¬

mined who is to pay for the audit.

Those who benefit from

the audit should be those who incur the cost.

The third as¬

sumption that was made was that a public report of the pri¬
vacy practices of an organization would be an effective mo¬
tivation for an organization to practice a certain norm of
privacy protection.
this assumption.

A study should be conducted to validate

It should be determined if this public re¬

port will overcome the possibility that technology will make
the violation of privacy rights quite attractive to record¬
keeping organisations.
Research is also necessary to validate the audit model.
A study should be

conducted to determine if the audit model

and the GAPP framework is helpful to the organization and
the auditor.

After this model is

implemented it will be

necessary to accumulate information on the relative effec¬
tiveness of the various control techniques and audit tools.
The proposed privacy commission might be a good focal point
for accumulating this information.
tinuous revision of these controls
get a

"best set"

This would allow a con¬
and audit techniques to

for use by organizations and auditors.
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One audit tool that was introduced was the
Control Model

(TICOM).

Internal

This tool is only conceptual at this

time.

Research needs to be done in further developing this

tool.

The TICOM technique appears to hold great promise

for

assisting the auditor in conducting a review and evaluation
of internal control.

A specific application of interest

for

this research is the use of this tool in reviewing and eval¬
uating privacy practices.
Should the privacy and audit models be validated and
found to be a desirable complement to the privacy implementa¬
tion plan of the Privacy Protection Study Commission,
tional actions would be necessary.

addi¬

The American Institute of

Certified Public Accountants would need to publish a set of
audit standards

for use in a privacy audit.

These would

provide guidance to the auditor in conducting the audit and
would provide the readers of the privacy reports with a stan¬
dard report with which to comparatively evaluate the prac¬
tices of organizations.

It is also possible that a

legisla¬

tive requirement for such audits would be desirable.

Sug¬

gesting that organizations will voluntarily submit to privacy
audits may not be realistic.

Conclusions

This research has introduced a plan for the implementa¬
tion of privacy which attempts to satisfy the perceived needs
of all parties

concerned with the privacy problem.

A
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framework for making this plan feasible has also been sug¬
gested.

There is additional developmental research required

before the plan can be implemented.
study are,
velopment.

however,

a sound basis

The results of this

for conducting such de¬

It is hoped that this study can be the basis

an efficient,

for

effective privacy protection program.

Research into the area of privacy is

just beginning.

The problem of protecting privacy is quite complex.

There

may not be a privacy implementation mechanism which satis¬
factorily meets the needs of all competing interests.
research suggests one solution.
subject,

As research continues on the

alternative solutions may be suggested.

years before a .solution is

found.

This

It may be

This research has been an

attempt to establish the groundwork for the

future research.

The conclusion reached above that the CPA is the logi¬
cal candidate for conducting the privacy audit may be
to be

less than satisfactory to some.

reasons

for this.

First,

ternative may not be true.
training for CPAs
tive
Also,

functions.

that the CPA is the lowest cost alIn the short-run,

other than training,

the cost of

for the alterna¬

long-run this may not be the case.

there may be costs,

Second,

There are several

should be less than costs
In the

found

both monetary and non-monetary,

which should be considered.

the CPA is shown above to be eminently quali¬

fied for this task because the privacy audit is presented as
very similar to tasks already performed by the CPA.

This
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may not be the case.

The CPA review of privacy controls is

an end in itself while the CPA review of internal control in
financial audits is one phase in the review of financial
statements.

The CPA can review these statements without re¬

liance on the controls

should that be necessary.

In a pri¬

vacy audit there is no alternative to the controls them¬
selves.

This is a situation quite different

Third,

for the auditor.

the CPA is again presented as qualified for this

task because there are no new audit tools required.

The au¬

dit program outlined above did not present any audit tools
not already

found in use by auditors.

these tools

in a privacy audit would,

For example,

The application of
however,

be different.

the sampling of receivable files with audit

software for the purpose of obtaining confirmations and
thereby establishing the accuracy of the stated amount of
receivables is not the same as doing that confirmation for
personal record files to determine
curate.

The auditor is

if the information is ac¬

familiar with the results of receiv¬

able confirmations and is not necessarily familiar with the
results of personal record confirmations.

The auditor can

reach a conclusion concerning asset overstatements after re¬
viewing confirmation results because the auditor is an ac¬
countant.

The auditor may not be able to reach a conclusion

on the overall accuracy of personal records.
Fourth,

the CPA was

chosen for this task because of the

perceived independence of the profession.

It may be that the
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internal auditor will eventually be perceived as independent
when reporting to an audit committee.
public perceive this independence,
be a better choice
dit.

Should the general

the internal auditor may

for the task of conducting a privacy au¬

The internal auditor uses all of the tools

for a privacy audit.

Also,

suggested

the internal auditor is involved

on an ongoing basis with the organization.

This permits an

intimate knowledge of the privacy requirements

for a company

and also permits the more effective use of the audit tools
which require constant system design involvement.
Finally,

the CPA was chosen for this task because of

what was thought to be a considerable overlap of financial
audit and privacy audit tasks.
of minimizing cost.
task,

This was required by the goal

Should the internal auditor be given the

the minimization of cost could be realized.

portant,

however,

many controls

is the issue of overlap.

It is true that

implemented for financial records

as those implemented for personal records.

More im¬

are the

same

It is also true

r

that all of the tools required of the auditor for a privacy
audit are used for financial audits.
controls
cords.

some of the

for privacy are not those used for financial re¬
There may be a difference in the importance of the

controls.
controls

However,

It may not be obvious to the auditor that some
used for

financial records are more or less

tant with regard to privacy.
audit tools differs.

Also,

impor¬

the application of the

It is not determined at this time the
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amount of overlap between these two tasks.

The desirability

of having the CPA conduct privacy audits hinges on this
point.

The suggestion that an audit be conducted and the

presentation of an audit program remain as significant con¬
tributions of this research regardless of the outcome of that
debate.

280

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Auditing Standards Established by the GAO, Their Meaning and
Significance for CPAs, A Report.
New York:
American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1973.
"Auditing the Data Base, Working Panel Report on Auditing,"
by Donald L. Adams, Chairman.
Data Base 8 (Fall
1976):41-64.
Bigelow, Robert P., and Nycum, Susan H.
Your Computer and
the Law.
Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
1975.
Browne, Peter S.
"Computer Security—A Survey."
National
Computer Conference Proceedings 45 (1976):53-63.
Caplan, Edwin H.
"Accounting Research as an Information
Source for Theory Construction."
In "Report of the
Committee on Research Methodology in Accounting."
by
Robert R. Sterling, Chairman.
The Accounting Review
Supplement 47 (1972):437-444.
Cash,

James I., Jr.; Bailey, Andrew D., Jr.; and Whinston,
Andrew B.
"Details of the TICOM Model."
Krannert
Graduate School of Management, Purdue University,
August 1976.

Cash,

James I., Jr.; Bailey, Andrew D., Jr.; and Whinston,
Andrew B.
"A Survey of Techniques for Auditing EDPBased Accounting Information Systems."
The Account¬
ing Review 52 (October 1977):813-832.

Cash,

James I., Jr.; Bailey, Andrew D., Jr.; and Whinston,
Andrew B.
"Systems Design Methodology for Formal Sys¬
tem Assertions."
Krannert Graduate School of Manage¬
ment, Purdue University, July 1976.

Cash,

James I., Jr.; Bailey, Andrew D., Jr.; and Whinston,
Andrew B.
"The TICOM Model—A Network Data Base Ap¬
proach to Review and Evaluation of Internal Control
Systems."
National Computer Conference Proceedings 46
(1977):843-85T:

Caws,

Peter.
"Accounting Research--Science or Methodology?"
In Research Methodology in Accounting, pp. 71-73.
Edited by Robert R. Sterling, Lawrence, Kansas:
Scholars Book Company, 1972.

281

Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities:
Report, Conclu~sions, and Recommendations, A Report of the Commission
on Auditors' Responsibilities.
By Manuel F. Cohen,
Chairman.
New York:
American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants, 1978.
"Corporate Internal Professionals Also Have Public Responsi¬
bilities," report of a speech by Harvey Kapnick.
Executive News Briefs.
Arthur Andersen & Co., October
1977.
Cramer, Joe J., Jr., and Sorter, George H., eds.
Objectives
of Financial Statements.
Vol. 2:
Selected Papers.
New York:
American Institute of Certified PublicAc¬
countants, 1974.
The Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act of 1970,
U.S. Code, Vol. 31, 1970.
Cyert,

Richard M., and Ijiri, Yuji.
"A Framework for De¬
veloping the Objectives of Financial Statements."
In
Objectives of Financial Statements.
Vol. 2:
Selected
Papers I
pp. 30-35.
Edited by Joe J. Cramer, Jr. andGeorge -H. Sorter.
New York:
American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants, 1974.

Data Banks and Society:
Proceedings of the First Interna¬
tional Oslo Symposium on Data Banks and Society.
Oslo,
Norway:
Scandanavian University Books, 1974.
Data Base Task Group of CODASYL Programming Language Committee Report"
New York:
Association for Computing
Machinery, April 1971.
Databanks in a Free Society:
Computers, Record-Keeping and
Privacy, The Report of the Project on Computer Data¬
banks of the Computer Science and Engineering Board' of
the National Academy of Sciences^
By Alan F. Westin,
Project Director and Michael F. Baker, Assistant Pro¬
ject Director.
New York:
Quadrangle/The New York
Times Book Company, 1972.
Date,

C. J.
An Introduction to Database Systems.
Reading,
Massachusetts:
Addison-Wesley PublishingCompany,
1975.

DeMarco, Victor F.
"How Internal Auditors Can Help Stamp
Out Illegal Acts."
The Internal Auditor 35 (February
1978):60-65.

282
Dodd,

G. G.
"Elements of Data Management
Systems."
mg Surveys 1 (June 1969): 119-128 .

Dooley, Ann.
world,

"Workers Want Voice in Data
Use."
October 10, 1977, p. 1.

Comput-

Computer-

Dapuch, Nicholas, and Revsine
, Lawrence, eds.
Accounting
Research 1960-1970:
A
Critical Evaluation.
University
of Illinois, 1973.
The Equal Credit Opportunity Act,

U.s.

The Fair Credit Billing Act,

Code.

U.s.

The Fair Credit Reporting Act,

U.s.

Code,
Vol.

Code.

Vol.
15,

Vol.

U.S.

Code,

Vol.

1976.

1974.

15,

Family^Education^Rights and Privacy Act of 1974,

The Freedom of Information Act.

15,

1970.

U.s.

5,

Code.

1966.

French, Nancy.
"EEC Moving Toward Data Protection Accord."
Computerworld, October 10, 1977, p. 5.
—.
"Equifax Tactics Unfair to Subjects, FTC Rules."
Computerworld, December 26, 1977/January 2, 1978, p. 1.
——*
Newspaper Hits U.S. Privacy Recommendations."
Computerworld, September 5, 1977, p. 9.
Fried,

Charles.
"Privacy."
ary 1968 ): 475-493 .

The Yale Law Journal 77
---

(Janu¬

Got^lek' Allan; Dalfen, Charles; and Katz, Kenneth.
"The
Transborder Transfer of Information by Communications
and Computer Systems:
Issues and Approaches to Guiding
Principles."
American Journal of International Law
68 (April 19747:227-257.
Grady,

Paul.
Inventory of Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles for Business Enterprises.
New York:
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1965.

Graham, Robert M.
Principles of Systems Programming.
York:
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1975.

New

A Guide for Studying and Evaluating Internal Accounting Con¬
trols.Arthur Andersen & Co., 1978.
Hendriksen,
wood,

Eldon S.
Illinois:

Accounting Theory.
“Richard D. Irwin,

revised ed.
Inc., 1970.

Home-

283

Hoffman, Lance J.
Modern Methods
Privacy.
Englewood Cliffs,
Hall, Inc., 1977.

for Computer
New Jersey:

Security and
Prentice-

Holmes, Edith.
"Carter Chided for Dragging Feet on Privacy."
ComputerworId, May 29, 1978, p. 5.
_.
"GAO Auditors Demonstrate SSA Data Too Easy to
Steal."
Computerworld, March 13, 1978, p. 1.
_.
"NCIC Audit Expansion Pending."
October 17, 1977, p. 1.
_.
"Senate Launches
November 14, 1977, p.

Trial EFT Bill."
1.

_.
"Transborder Data Taking Back
world, October 24, 1977, p. 2.
Ijiri,

Computerworld,

Computerworld,

Seat."

Computer-

Yuji.
"A Priori Research in Accounting:
A Critique."
In Accounting Research 1960-1970:
A Critical Evalua¬
tion, pp. 20-25.
Edited by Nicholas Dapuch and Law¬
rence Revsine.
University of Illinois, 1973.

_.
Theory of Accounting Measurement.
Sarasota,
Florida:
American Accounting Association, 1975.
Kelley, Thomas P.
"Statement on Auditing Standards No. 2—
Required Communication of Material Weaknesses in Inter¬
nal Accounting Control."
The Journal of Accountancy
144 (November 1977):118-120.
Krauss, Leonard I.
SAFE:
Security Audit and Field Evalua¬
tion for Computer Facilities and Information Systems.
East Brunswick, New Jersey:
Firebrand, Krauss and
Company, 1972.
Kuhn,

The

Thomas S.
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.
2nd enlarged ed.
University of Chicago Press, 1970.

Law on Federal Justice
Vol. 42, 1973.

Lobel,

Information

Systems,

U.S.

Code,

Jerome.
"Privacy of Employment and Personal Informa¬
tion Systems."
The Internal Auditor 34 (October
1977):51-56.

Lundrell, E. Drake, Jr.
"EFT Commission Delivers
Computerworld, November 7, 1977, p. 1.

Report."

284

_.
"Unhappy EFT Commissioners Hit Time Lack."
puterworld, November 7, 1977, p. 5.

Com-

Lyon,

John K.
Wiley &

John

Mader,

Chris, and Hager, Robert.
Information Systems:
Technology, Economics, Applications.
Chicago:
Science
Research Associates, Inc., 1974.

Mair,

William C.; Wood, Donald R.; and Davis, Keagle W.
Com¬
puter Control and Audit.
2nd ed.
Altamonte Springs,
Florida:
The Institute of Internal Auditors, 1976.

The Database Administrator.
Sons, Inc., 1976.

New York:

Management Advisory Services, Guideline Series Number 6:
"Guidelines for Participation in Government Audit En¬
gagements to Evaluate Economy, Efficiency, and Program
Results.
New York:
American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants, 1977.
Martin, James.
Security Accuracy and Privacy in Computer
Systems.
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey:
Prentice-Hall,
Inc., 1973.
Mautz,

May,

R. K.,
diting.

and Sharaf, Hussein A.
The Philosophy of Au¬
American Accounting Association, 1961.

George 0.
Financial Accounting.
millan Co.^ 1943.

New York:

The Mac¬

Miller, Arthur R.
The Assault on Privacy:
Computers, Data
Banks, and Dossiers.
Ann Arbor, Michigan:
The Univer¬
sity of Michigan Press, 1971.
Moonitz, Maurice.
The Basic Postulates of Accounting.
New
York:
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1961.
"More Seeing DP as Privacy Peril."
1978, p. 9.

Computerworld,

May 22,

National Information Policy, A Report of the Domestic Coun¬
cil Committee on the Right of Privacy.
By Nelson A.
Rockefeller, Chairman^
Washington, D.C.:
National
Commission on Libraries and Information Sciences, 1976.
Nelson, Carl L.
"A Priori Research in Accounting."
In Ac¬
counting Research 1960-1970:
A Critical Evaluation,
pp. 3-19.
Edited by Nicholas Dapuch and Lawrence Revsine.
University of Illinois, 1975.

285

Objectives of Financial Statements;
Report of the Study
~~Group on the Objectives of Financial Statements.
New
York:
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1973.
Personal Privacy in an Information Society, the Report of
the Privacy Protection Study Commission.
By DavidF.
Linowes, Chairman.
Washington, D.C.:
Government
Printing Office, 1977.
Pipe,

G. Russell.
"Privacy Principles
Computerworld, July 18, 1977, p.

Portway, Patrick S.
Computerworld,
The

Privacy Act of

Ignore
4.

"EFT Systems?
No Thanks,
January 9, 1978, p. 14.

1974,

U.S.

Code,

Vol.

5,

Global Needs."

Not Yet."

1974.

Proctor, John P.
"Compliance Auditing."
The
ditor 32 (January/February 1975):76-78.

Internal Au¬

Records, Computers, and the Rights of Citizens, the Report
"of the Secretary's Advisory Committee on Automated
Personal Data Systems, U.S. Department of Health, Edu¬
cation and Welfare.
By Willis H. Ware, Chairman.
Boston:
The Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
1973.
Regulation Z of Federal
lations , Vol. 12,

Reserve
1968.

Board,

Code of Federal

Regu¬

"Report of the Committee on Research Methodology in Account¬
ing. "
by Robert R. Sterling, Chairman.
The Accounting
Review Supplement 47 (1972):398-520.
"Report to the Council of the Special Committee on Research
Program," by Weldon Powell, Chairman.
The Journal of
Accountancy 106 (December 1958):62-68.
Rittenburg, Larry E.
Auditor Independence and System Design.
Altamonte Springs^ Florida:
The Institute of InternaT
Auditors,

1977.

Rittenburg, Larry E., and Davis, Gordon B.
"The Role of In¬
ternal Auditors in Auditing EDP Systems."
The Journal
of Accountancy 144 (December 1977):51-58.
Rosenberg,

Jerry M.

dom House,

The

1969.

Death of Privacy.

New York:

Ran¬

286

Rosenfeld, Paul.
"Stewardship."
In Objectives of Financial
Statements.
Vol. 2:
Selected Papers, pp. 123-140.
Edited by Joe J. Cramer, Jr. and George H. Sorter.
New York:
American Institute of Certified Public Ac¬
countants, 19 74 .
Rothman, Stanley, and Mosmann, Charles.
Computers and So¬
ciety:
The Technology and Its Social Implications.'
Chicago:
Science Research Associates, Inc., 1972.
Sardinas, Joseph L., Jr.
"Computer Security and the Au¬
ditor's Responsibility."
Ph.D. dissertation, The
Pennsylvania State University, 1975.
Smith,

Robert Ellis, and Snyder, Keith E., eds.
Compilation
of State and Federal Privacy Laws.
Washington, D.C.:
Privacy Journal, 1977.

Sobel,

Lester A.,
File, Inc.,

ed.
War on Privacy.
1976.

New York:

Facts on

"Social Reponsibility of the Profession," report of a speech
by David F. Linowes.
The Journal of Accountancy 131
(January 1971):66-69.
Sprouse, Robert T. and Moonitz, Maurice.
A Tentative Set of
Broad Accounting Principles for Business Enterprises.
New York:
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1962.
Sprowls, R. Clay.
Management Data Bases.
Wiley & Sons,—Inc., 1976.

New York:

John

A Statement of Basic Accounting Theory, The Report of the
Committee to Prepare a Statement of Basic Accounting
Theory.
By Charles T. Zlatkovich, Chairman.
Evanston,
Illinois:
American Accounting Association, 1966.
A Statement of Basic Auditing Concepts, A Report of the Committee on Basic Auditing Concepts.
By Joseph A. Silvoso, Chairman.
American Accounting Association, 1973.
Statement on Auditing Standards No. 1, Codification of Auditing Standards and Procedures.
New York:
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1973.
Statement on Auditing Standards No. 2,
Financial Statements.
New York:
of Certified Public Accountants,

Reports on Audited
American Institute
1974.

287

Statement on Auditing Standards No. 3, The Effects of EDP on
the Auditor's Study and Evaluation of Internal Control
New York:American Institute~of Certified Public Accountants, 1974.
Statement on Auditing Standards No. 9, The Effect of an in¬
ternal Audit Function on the Scope of the Independent
Auditor 1s Examination.
New York:
American Institute
of Certified Public Accountants, 1976.
^er^n<?/ Robert R. , ed.
Lawrence, Kansas:

Research Methodology in Accounting.
Scholars Book Co., 1972.-a

Storey, Reed K.
The Search for Accounting Principles:
Today's Problem in Perspective.
New York:
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1964.
Systems Auditability and Control Study:
Data Processing Au¬
dit Practice Report..
Altamonte Springs, Florida:
The
Institute of Internal Auditors, 1977.

Systems Auditability and Control Study:
Data Processing Control Practices Report.
Altamonte Springs, Florida:
The Institute of Internal Auditors, 1977.
Systems Auditability and Control Study:
Executive Report.
Altamonte Springs, Florida:
The Institute of Internal
Auditors, 1977.
The Tax Reform Act of 1976,
The Truth-in-Lending Act,

U.S.

U.S.

Code,

Code,

Vol.

Vol.

15,

15,

1968.

1968.

U.S.

Department of Commerce.
National Bureau of Standards.
Guidelines for Automatic Data Processing Physical Se¬
curity and Risk Management, Federal Information Pro¬
cessing Standards Publication 31.
Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1974.

U.S.

Congress Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights
of the Committee on the Judiciary.
Federal Data Banks
and Constitutional Rights, 93rd CongT^ 2d sess., 1974.

U.S.

General Accounting Office.
Standards for Audit of
Governmental Organizations, Programs, Activities and
Functions.
Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1972.

288

U.S.

Office of Management and Budget.
Federal Personal Data
Systems Subject to the Privacy Act of 1974, First An¬
nual Report of the President Calendar Year 1975.
Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, T976.

U.S.

Office of Management and Budget.
Federal Personal Data
Systems Subject to the Privacy Act of 1974, Second An¬
nual Report of the President, Calendar Year 1976.
Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1977.

Warren, Samuel D., and Brandeis, Louis D.
"The Right of Pri¬
vacy."
Harvard Law Review 4 (1890):193-220.
Wells,

M. C.
"A Revolution in Accounting Thought?"
counting Review 51 (July 1976):471-482.

The Ac¬

Wessel, Milton R.
Freedom's Edge:
The Computer Threat to
Society.
Reading, Massachusetts:
Addison-Wesley Publishmq Companv, 1974 .
Westin, Alan F.
1967.

Privacy and Freedom.

New York:

Atheneum,

Withington, Frederick G.
"Future Computer Technology."
Data Base 9 (Spring 1976):7-14.
Wooldridge, Susan; Corder, Colin R.; and Johnson, Claude R.
Security Standards for Data Processing.
London:
The
Macmillan Press, Ltd., 1973.

